voluntary waiver in Nebraska

2016In addition, the court found that any statements made by Turner and Bond either were volunteered without custodial inquiry or followed the voluntary waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

2016In addition, the court found that any statements made by Turner and Bond either were volunteered without custodial inquiry or followed the voluntary waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

1990See, also, State v. Blue, 223 Neb. 379 , 391 N.W.2d 102 (1986); State v. Miles, 202 Neb. 126 , 274 N.W.2d 153 (1979).

1990See, also, State v. Blue, 223 Neb. 379 , 391 N.W.2d 102 (1986); State v. Miles, 202 Neb. 126 , 274 N.W.2d 153 (1979).

2025A criminal defend­ant has a constitutional right to waive the assistance of counsel and conduct his or her own defense under the Sixth 5 State v. Warlick, 308 Neb. 656 , 956 N.W.2d 269 (2021). 6 Brief for appellee at 20 (quoting U.S. v. Allison, 264 Fed.

2025A criminal defend­ant has a constitutional right to waive the assistance of counsel and conduct his or her own defense under the Sixth 5 State v. Warlick, 308 Neb. 656 , 956 N.W.2d 269 (2021). 6 Brief for appellee at 20 (quoting U.S. v. Allison, 264 Fed.

2020A waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, privilege, or claim, and may be demonstrated 20 Monge, supra note 16 . 21 Id., 524 U.S. at 724 . 22 See, id.; Salas, supra note 19. 23 Wilson, supra note 19 . 24 Id. 25 Scott, supra note 19 . - 449 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. VALDEZ Cite as 305 Neb. 441 by or inferred from a person’s conduct. 26 A voluntary waiver, knowingly and intelligently made, must affirmatively appear from the record. 27 To establish a waiver of a legal right, there must be a clear, unequivocal, and decisi

2020A waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, privilege, or claim, and may be demonstrated 20 Monge, supra note 16 . 21 Id., 524 U.S. at 724 . 22 See, id.; Salas, supra note 19. 23 Wilson, supra note 19 . 24 Id. 25 Scott, supra note 19 . - 449 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. VALDEZ Cite as 305 Neb. 441 by or inferred from a person’s conduct. 26 A voluntary waiver, knowingly and intelligently made, must affirmatively appear from the record. 27 To establish a waiver of a legal right, there must be a clear, unequivocal, and decisi

2020A waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, privilege, or claim, and may be demonstrated 20 Monge, supra note 16 . 21 Id., 524 U.S. at 724 . 22 See, id.; Salas, supra note 19. 23 Wilson, supra note 19 . 24 Id. 25 Scott, supra note 19 . - 449 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. VALDEZ Cite as 305 Neb. 441 by or inferred from a person’s conduct. 26 A voluntary waiver, knowingly and intelligently made, must affirmatively appear from the record. 27 To establish a waiver of a legal right, there must be a clear, unequivocal, and decisi

2018And do you wish to go to trial today? [Cotton]: Yes, sir.” (ii) Cotton’s Waiver Was Effective [26,27] A waiver is the voluntary and intentional relin- quishment of a known right, privilege, or claim, and may be demonstrated by or inferred from a person’s conduct.53 There is no formalistic litany required to establish that a waiver was knowingly and intelligently made; instead, when considering whether a defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his or her right to counsel, we review the totality of the circumstances appearing in the record.54 A voluntary waiver, knowingly and

2018And do you wish to go to trial today? [Cotton]: Yes, sir.” (ii) Cotton’s Waiver Was Effective [26,27] A waiver is the voluntary and intentional relin- quishment of a known right, privilege, or claim, and may be demonstrated by or inferred from a person’s conduct.53 There is no formalistic litany required to establish that a waiver was knowingly and intelligently made; instead, when considering whether a defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his or her right to counsel, we review the totality of the circumstances appearing in the record.54 A voluntary waiver, knowingly and

2018And do you wish to go to trial today? [Cotton]: Yes, sir.” (ii) Cotton’s Waiver Was Effective [26,27] A waiver is the voluntary and intentional relin- quishment of a known right, privilege, or claim, and may be demonstrated by or inferred from a person’s conduct.53 There is no formalistic litany required to establish that a waiver was knowingly and intelligently made; instead, when considering whether a defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his or her right to counsel, we review the totality of the circumstances appearing in the record.54 A voluntary waiver, knowingly and

2016He simply sought to withdraw the voluntary waiver at his mere will, which he had no right or power to do.” Id. at 527 , 80 N.W.2d at 476 .

2016He simply sought to withdraw the voluntary waiver at his mere will, which he had no right or power to do.” Id. at 527 , 80 N.W.2d at 476 .

2013In response to the petition, the Board of 23 Levine v. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 679 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D.

1996See, State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska App. 1995); Moser v. Richmond County Bd. of Commrs., 263 Ga. 63 , 428 S.E.2d 71 (1993); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510 (Vt. 1992); Butler v. Dept. of Public Safety & Corr., 609 So. 2d 790 (La. 1992); Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. App. 1992). “ ‘[R]evocation of a voluntary privilege is “characteristically free of the punitive criminal element.” ’ ” State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995). (b) Historically Remedial In 1957, this court held that the “purpose of the revocation [of a license] is to protect the public, and not to punish the

1996See, State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska App.1995); Moser v. Richmond County Bd. of Commrs., 263 Ga. 63 , 428 S.E.2d 71 (1993); State v. Strong, 158 Vt. 56 , 605 A.2d 510 (1992); Butler v. Dept. of Public Safety & Corr., 609 So.2d 790 (La.1992); Freeman v. State, 611 So.2d 1260 (Fla.App.1992). "`[R]evocation of a voluntary privilege is "characteristically free of the punitive criminal element."'" State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995). (b) Historically Remedial In 1957, this court held that the "purpose of the revocation [of a license] is to protect the public, and not to punish the

1996See, State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska App.1995); Moser v. Richmond County Bd. of Commrs., 263 Ga. 63 , 428 S.E.2d 71 (1993); State v. Strong, 158 Vt. 56 , 605 A.2d 510 (1992); Butler v. Dept. of Public Safety & Corr., 609 So.2d 790 (La.1992); Freeman v. State, 611 So.2d 1260 (Fla.App.1992). "`[R]evocation of a voluntary privilege is "characteristically free of the punitive criminal element."'" State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995). (b) Historically Remedial In 1957, this court held that the "purpose of the revocation [of a license] is to protect the public, and not to punish the

1996See, State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska App.1995); Moser v. Richmond County Bd. of Commrs., 263 Ga. 63 , 428 S.E.2d 71 (1993); State v. Strong, 158 Vt. 56 , 605 A.2d 510 (1992); Butler v. Dept. of Public Safety & Corr., 609 So.2d 790 (La.1992); Freeman v. State, 611 So.2d 1260 (Fla.App.1992). "`[R]evocation of a voluntary privilege is "characteristically free of the punitive criminal element."'" State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995). (b) Historically Remedial In 1957, this court held that the "purpose of the revocation [of a license] is to protect the public, and not to punish the

1996See, State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska App. 1995); Moser v. Richmond County Bd. of Commrs., 263 Ga. 63 , 428 S.E.2d 71 (1993); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510 (Vt. 1992); Butler v. Dept. of Public Safety & Corr., 609 So. 2d 790 (La. 1992); Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. App. 1992). “ ‘[R]evocation of a voluntary privilege is “characteristically free of the punitive criminal element.” ’ ” State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995). (b) Historically Remedial In 1957, this court held that the “purpose of the revocation [of a license] is to protect the public, and not to punish the

1996See, State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska App.1995); Moser v. Richmond County Bd. of Commrs., 263 Ga. 63 , 428 S.E.2d 71 (1993); State v. Strong, 158 Vt. 56 , 605 A.2d 510 (1992); Butler v. Dept. of Public Safety & Corr., 609 So.2d 790 (La.1992); Freeman v. State, 611 So.2d 1260 (Fla.App.1992). "`[R]evocation of a voluntary privilege is "characteristically free of the punitive criminal element."'" State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995). (b) Historically Remedial In 1957, this court held that the "purpose of the revocation [of a license] is to protect the public, and not to punish the

1996See, State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska App.1995); Moser v. Richmond County Bd. of Commrs., 263 Ga. 63 , 428 S.E.2d 71 (1993); State v. Strong, 158 Vt. 56 , 605 A.2d 510 (1992); Butler v. Dept. of Public Safety & Corr., 609 So.2d 790 (La.1992); Freeman v. State, 611 So.2d 1260 (Fla.App.1992). "`[R]evocation of a voluntary privilege is "characteristically free of the punitive criminal element."'" State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995). (b) Historically Remedial In 1957, this court held that the "purpose of the revocation [of a license] is to protect the public, and not to punish the

1996See, State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska App.1995); Moser v. Richmond County Bd. of Commrs., 263 Ga. 63 , 428 S.E.2d 71 (1993); State v. Strong, 158 Vt. 56 , 605 A.2d 510 (1992); Butler v. Dept. of Public Safety & Corr., 609 So.2d 790 (La.1992); Freeman v. State, 611 So.2d 1260 (Fla.App.1992). "`[R]evocation of a voluntary privilege is "characteristically free of the punitive criminal element."'" State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995). (b) Historically Remedial In 1957, this court held that the "purpose of the revocation [of a license] is to protect the public, and not to punish the

1988State v. Bishop, 224 Neb. 522 , 399 N.W.2d 271 (1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 924 , 108 S. Ct. 285 , 98 L.

1988State v. Bishop, 224 Neb. 522 , 399 N.W.2d 271 (1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 924 , 108 S. Ct. 285 , 98 L.

1988State v. Bishop, 224 Neb. 522 , 399 N.W.2d 271 (1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 924 , 108 S. Ct. 285 , 98 L.

1988State v. Bishop, 224 Neb. 522 , 399 N.W.2d 271 (1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 924 , 108 S. Ct. 285 , 98 L.

1988State v. Bishop, 224 Neb. 522 , 399 N.W.2d 271 (1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 924 , 108 S. Ct. 285 , 98 L.

1987State v. Miles, supra. See, also, Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 , 50 S. Ct. 253 , 74 L.

1987State v. Miles, supra. See, also, Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 , 50 S. Ct. 253 , 74 L.

1973In that same case it should be noted this court specifically approved the following language from Seaton v. State, 106 Neb. 833 , 184 N. W. 890 : “It is the duty of a trial court to see that defendants in criminal cases are tried by a jury such that not even the suspicion of bias (leaning) or prejudice (prejudgment) can attach to any member thereof.

1973In that same case it should be noted this court specifically approved the following language from Seaton v. State, 106 Neb. 833 , 184 N. W. 890 : “It is the duty of a trial court to see that defendants in criminal cases are tried by a jury such that not even the suspicion of bias (leaning) or prejudice (prejudgment) can attach to any member thereof.

1973The failure to object at that time should certainly not be treated as a voluntary waiver of the constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury. '■ In State v. Eggers, 175 Neb. 79 , 120 N. W. 2d 541 , we; held that by passing the jurors for cause the defendant waived any objection to their selection as jurors and that the defendant is not permitted to change his mind after an unfavorable verdict.

1973The failure to object at that time should certainly not be treated as a voluntary waiver of the constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury. '■ In State v. Eggers, 175 Neb. 79 , 120 N. W. 2d 541 , we; held that by passing the jurors for cause the defendant waived any objection to their selection as jurors and that the defendant is not permitted to change his mind after an unfavorable verdict.