18 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Reedgreen2 sentences2022See Reed, 196 Ariz. at 39, ¶ 7 (“[D]epending on the circumstances, absence occasioned by attempted suicide may be a voluntary waiver of the right to be present at trial.”). 2022See State v. Sainz, 186 Ariz. 470, 473 (App. 1996) (in determining whether a defendant’s absence is voluntary or involuntary, the superior court must consider all the facts presented to it on the issue); see 7 STATE v. ROWAN Decision of the Court also Reed, 196 Ariz. at 39, ¶ 7 (because the defendant “made a voluntary decision to try to end his life and thereby avoid his trial, the trial court did not err in finding that his suicide attempt and consequent hospitalization constituted a voluntary waiver of his right to be present at the remainder of his trial.”). ¶29 Based on the record before i | 3 | 3 |
State v. Garcia-Contrerasgreen2 sentences2013A voluntary waiver “presupposes meaningful alternatives ... [and] requires trae freedom of choice.” State v. Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. 144 , 147 ¶ 11, 953 P.2d 536, 539 (1998). ¶32 Fitzgerald suggests that he did not voluntarily absent himself from the second penalty-phase trial, arguing that he did so only because he was unable to ensure that another disruptive outburst would not occur in those proceedings. 2013A voluntary waiver “presupposes meaningful alternatives ... [and] requires trae freedom of choice.” State v. Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. 144 , 147 ¶ 11, 953 P.2d 536, 539 (1998). ¶32 Fitzgerald suggests that he did not voluntarily absent himself from the second penalty-phase trial, arguing that he did so only because he was unable to ensure that another disruptive outburst would not occur in those proceedings. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Penagreen2 sentences2018See State v. Pena, 25 Ariz. App. 80, 80-81 (1975) (stating that, for the purpose of showing a voluntary waiver, a statement in a release order signed by a defendant advising him as to his 3 STATE v. COLLINS Decision of the Court right to be present and warning him trial will proceed in his absence is sufficient). 2015State v. Pena, 25 Ariz. App. 80, 81 (1975). ¶14 Here, Defendant signed a release order advising him of his right to be present at trial and warning him that should he fail to appear trial would go forward in his absence. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Armstronggreen1 sentence2022See State v. Romero, 130 Ariz. 142, 147 (1981) (superior court has broad discretion in determining if reasonable grounds exist and such determination is upheld absent a “manifest abuse of discretion.”); see also State v. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. 345, 354, ¶ 40 (2004) (abuse of discretion occurs when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.”). | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2022E.g., 18 STATE v. MACHARDY Opinion of the Court Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-87 (1981) (emphasizing that “voluntariness” of waiver and whether waiver is “knowing and intelligent” are “discrete inquiries” and reversing Arizona Supreme Court for failing to separately consider both aspects of waiver). ¶46 The United States Supreme Court has made it equally clear that, in the context of constitutional waivers, “voluntary” is a legal term of art with a very specific meaning. 9 Voluntariness is not established by a showing that the waiver is volitional or intentional—or that the defendant s | 1 | 1 |
Bram v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2022E.g., 18 STATE v. MACHARDY Opinion of the Court Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-87 (1981) (emphasizing that “voluntariness” of waiver and whether waiver is “knowing and intelligent” are “discrete inquiries” and reversing Arizona Supreme Court for failing to separately consider both aspects of waiver). ¶46 The United States Supreme Court has made it equally clear that, in the context of constitutional waivers, “voluntary” is a legal term of art with a very specific meaning. 9 Voluntariness is not established by a showing that the waiver is volitional or intentional—or that the defendant s | 1 | 1 |
State v. Romerogreen1 sentence2022See State v. Romero, 130 Ariz. 142, 147 (1981) (superior court has broad discretion in determining if reasonable grounds exist and such determination is upheld absent a “manifest abuse of discretion.”); see also State v. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. 345, 354, ¶ 40 (2004) (abuse of discretion occurs when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.”). | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2022E.g., 18 STATE v. MACHARDY Opinion of the Court Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-87 (1981) (emphasizing that “voluntariness” of waiver and whether waiver is “knowing and intelligent” are “discrete inquiries” and reversing Arizona Supreme Court for failing to separately consider both aspects of waiver). ¶46 The United States Supreme Court has made it equally clear that, in the context of constitutional waivers, “voluntary” is a legal term of art with a very specific meaning. 9 Voluntariness is not established by a showing that the waiver is volitional or intentional—or that the defendant s | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sainzgreen1 sentence2022See State v. Sainz, 186 Ariz. 470, 473 (App. 1996) (in determining whether a defendant’s absence is voluntary or involuntary, the superior court must consider all the facts presented to it on the issue); see 7 STATE v. ROWAN Decision of the Court also Reed, 196 Ariz. at 39, ¶ 7 (because the defendant “made a voluntary decision to try to end his life and thereby avoid his trial, the trial court did not err in finding that his suicide attempt and consequent hospitalization constituted a voluntary waiver of his right to be present at the remainder of his trial.”). ¶29 Based on the record before i | 1 | 1 |
Estelle v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2021See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976) (explaining the trial court 6 STATE v. VENABLE Decision of the Court cannot “be faulted for not asking the respondent or his counsel whether he was deliberately going to trial in jail clothes”). | 1 | 1 |
1800 OCOTILLO, LLC v. WLB Group, Inc.green1 sentence2020To determine whether public policy invalidates the voluntary waiver of a statutory right, we consider “whether an identifiable public policy clearly outweighs the interest in enforcing [the negotiated agreement].” Id. at 412 , ¶ 7 (citing 1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. WLB Grp., Inc., 219 Ariz. 200, 202, ¶ 8 (2008); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 (1981)). ¶13 The anti-deficiency statute was “intended to ‘protect consumers from financial ruin’ and ‘eliminate hardships resulting to consumers who, when purchasing a home, fail to realize the extent to which they are subjecting their assets besides | 1 | 1 |
Helvetica Servicing, Inc. v. Pasquangreen1 sentence2020Co. v. Zivkovic, 232 Ariz. at 290, ¶ 16 (quoting Helvetica Servicing, Inc. v. Pasquan, 229 Ariz. 493, 496, ¶ 9 (App. 2012)). | 1 | 1 |
Manuel M. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen2 sentences2018Cf. Manuel M. , 218 Ariz. at 211 ¶ 20, 181 P.3d at 1132 (acknowledging that a parent's nonappearance can constitute a constructive waiver of rights that the parent had been specifically informed could be lost by failing to appear). ¶ 53 The Majority asserts that Rule 64(C)"vests the juvenile court with discretion to find that the parent waived legal rights only after the court first finds that the parent 'failed to appear.' " See supra ¶ 29. 2018Cf. Manuel M. , 218 Ariz. at 211 ¶ 20, 181 P.3d at 1132 (acknowledging that a parent's nonappearance can constitute a constructive waiver of rights that the parent had been specifically informed could be lost by failing to appear). ¶ 53 The Majority asserts that Rule 64(C)"vests the juvenile court with discretion to find that the parent waived legal rights only after the court first finds that the parent 'failed to appear.' " See supra ¶ 29. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Holmgreen2 sentences2004E.g., Holm, 195 Ariz. at 43, ¶ 4 , 985 P.2d at 528 . 2004E.g., Holm, 195 Ariz. at 43, ¶ 4 , 985 P.2d at 528 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2004Mere negligence by a defendant is normally not deemed to be a voluntary waiver of the right to be present. 24A Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 1135 (absence from trial is not voluntary if it is a result of mere negligence and not purposeful, deliberate or under circumstances from which an intent to be absent can be presumed); State v. Smith, 346 N.J.Super. 233 , 787 A.2d 276, 279 (Ct.App.Div.2002)(waiver not governed by reasonable person standard). ¶ 40 Third, the defendant does not have the burden to show his absence was involuntary unless he has personal notice of the time of the hearing, notice of 2004Mere negligence by a defendant is normally not deemed to be a voluntary waiver of the right to be present. 24A Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 1135 (absence from trial is not voluntary if it is a result of mere negligence and not purposeful, deliberate or under circumstances from which an intent to be absent can be presumed); State v. Smith, 346 N.J.Super. 233 , 787 A.2d 276, 279 (Ct.App.Div.2002)(waiver not governed by reasonable person standard). ¶ 40 Third, the defendant does not have the burden to show his absence was involuntary unless he has personal notice of the time of the hearing, notice of | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sunigagreen2 sentences2004State v. Reed, 196 Ariz. 37, 38-39, ¶ 3 , 992 P.2d 1132, 1133-34 (App.1999); State v. Suniga, 145 Ariz. 389, 392 , 701 P.2d 1197, 1200 (App.1985). ¶41 Fourth, if the defendant’s failure to communicate with his attorney is sufficiently egregious, lack of knowledge of the trial date based on communication failure can be deemed to be a voluntary waiver of the right to appear. 2004State v. Reed, 196 Ariz. 37, 38-39, ¶ 3 , 992 P.2d 1132, 1133-34 (App.1999); State v. Suniga, 145 Ariz. 389, 392 , 701 P.2d 1197, 1200 (App.1985). ¶41 Fourth, if the defendant’s failure to communicate with his attorney is sufficiently egregious, lack of knowledge of the trial date based on communication failure can be deemed to be a voluntary waiver of the right to appear. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Martingreen1 sentence1997See State v. Martin, 519 So.2d 87, 92 (La. 1988) (where defendant desired to display his tattoos to the jury, trial judge’s proposal to allow cross-examination limited to questions involving the tattoos was error). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Moran v. Burbine
green
1 sentence2022E.g., 18 STATE v. MACHARDY Opinion of the Court Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-87 (1981) (emphasizing that “voluntariness” of waiver and whether waiver is “knowing and intelligent” are “discrete inquiries” and reversing Arizona Supreme Court for failing to separately consider both aspects of waiver). ¶46 The United States Supreme Court has made it equally clear that, in the context of constitutional waivers, “voluntary” is a legal term of art with a very specific meaning. 9 Voluntariness is not established by a showing that the waiver is volitional or intentional—or that the defendant s | 1 | 2022–2022 |
CSA 13-101 Loop, LLC v. Loop 101, LLC
green
1 sentence2020To determine whether public policy invalidates the voluntary waiver of a statutory right, we consider “whether an identifiable public policy clearly outweighs the interest in enforcing [the negotiated agreement].” Id. at 412 , ¶ 7 (citing 1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. WLB Grp., Inc., 219 Ariz. 200, 202, ¶ 8 (2008); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 (1981)). ¶13 The anti-deficiency statute was “intended to ‘protect consumers from financial ruin’ and ‘eliminate hardships resulting to consumers who, when purchasing a home, fail to realize the extent to which they are subjecting their assets besides | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Bishop
green
2 sentences2007If, as here, the patient is not present, third parties may be examined about the facts of the patient’s apparent decision to waive her right to appear, about their understanding of that decision and about whether it was made voluntarily. 7 ¶30 Although we are bound not to upset the superior court’s finding of a voluntary waiver absent an abuse of discretion, see Bishop, 139 Ariz. at 569 , 679 P.2d at 1056 , we must remand this matter because of the absence of any evidence in the record to support the court’s conclusion that Appellant voluntarily chose to waive her right to be present at the in 2007If, as here, the patient is not present, third parties may be examined about the facts of the patient’s apparent decision to waive her right to appear, about their understanding of that decision and about whether it was made voluntarily. 7 ¶30 Although we are bound not to upset the superior court’s finding of a voluntary waiver absent an abuse of discretion, see Bishop, 139 Ariz. at 569 , 679 P.2d at 1056 , we must remand this matter because of the absence of any evidence in the record to support the court’s conclusion that Appellant voluntarily chose to waive her right to be present at the in | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Love
green
2 sentences2004Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. at 147, ¶ 13 , 953 P.2d at 539 ; Love, 147 Ariz. at 570 , 711 P.2d at 1243 ; Cook, 115 Ariz. at 149 , 564 P.2d at 100 . 2004Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. at 147, ¶ 13 , 953 P.2d at 539 ; Love, 147 Ariz. at 570 , 711 P.2d at 1243 ; Cook, 115 Ariz. at 149 , 564 P.2d at 100 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Cook
green
2 sentences2004Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. at 147, ¶ 13 , 953 P.2d at 539 ; Love, 147 Ariz. at 570 , 711 P.2d at 1243 ; Cook, 115 Ariz. at 149 , 564 P.2d at 100 . 2004Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. at 147, ¶ 13 , 953 P.2d at 539 ; Love, 147 Ariz. at 570 , 711 P.2d at 1243 ; Cook, 115 Ariz. at 149 , 564 P.2d at 100 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2002Smith, 193 Ariz. at 457 ¶ 14, 974 P.2d at 436 ¶ 14. 9 . 2002Smith, 193 Ariz. at 457 ¶ 14, 974 P.2d at 436 ¶ 14. 9 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. Davis
green
2 sentences1999In United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291 (5th Cir.1995), for example, the defendant attended the first week of trial, but then ingested fifty antidepressant pills in a suicide attempt. 1999The district court found the defendant’s resulting absence a voluntary waiver of her right to be present at trial, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating, “[a] defendant cannot disrupt a trial” because the defendant does “not wish to face trial and the prospect of a conviction.” Id. at 303 . ¶ 6 The defendant in Bottom v. State, 860 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.App.1993), was present at trial until the state rested. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Bottom v. State
green
2 sentences1999The district court found the defendant’s resulting absence a voluntary waiver of her right to be present at trial, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating, “[a] defendant cannot disrupt a trial” because the defendant does “not wish to face trial and the prospect of a conviction.” Id. at 303 . ¶ 6 The defendant in Bottom v. State, 860 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.App.1993), was present at trial until the state rested. 1999Attempted suicide is not “some sudden unexpected medical emergency.” Id. ¶ 7 To the extent that these cases stand for the proposition that all absences resulting from attempted suicide are a voluntary waiver of the defendant’s right to attend trial, we cannot agree. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Guerrero
green
1 sentence1991It is not a shield by which the accused may avoid trial and possible punishment by taking advantage of loopholes in the law or arithmetical errors.” Id. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Broncucia v. Colorado
green
1 sentence1984We reaffirm our holding that “law enforce *342 ment officers are not under a constitutional duty to contact a lawyer for the accused if he makes a voluntary waiver of that right.” Id. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Lego v. Twomey
green
2 sentences1974Each of these findings is made beyond a reasonable doubt.” The trial court actually applied a stricter standard of proof than is constitutionally required for in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that voluntariness need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. 1974Each of these findings is made beyond a reasonable doubt.” The trial court actually applied a stricter standard of proof than is constitutionally required for in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that voluntariness need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.