voluntary waiver in District of Columbia

8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

Case	Followed	Cited
Seaboard Lumber Company v. United Statesgreen cafc · 1990 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2002–2005 2 sentences 2005“It is ... generally accepted that a voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial ‘suffers from no inherent constitutional or legal infirmity.’” Id. at 1111 (quoting Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed.Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 , 111 S.Ct. 1308 , 113 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991)). 2002It is also generally accepted that a voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial “suffers from no inherent constitutional or legal infirmity.” Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed.Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 , 111 S.Ct. 1308 , 113 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991).	2	2
Beasley v. United Statesgreen dc · 1986 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 1 sentence 2015“When the officers who question a suspect by using trickery demonstrate an ‘undeviating intent ... to extract a confession ... the confession obtained must be examined with the most careful scrutiny.’ ” Brisbon, 957 A.2d at 945 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 , 79 S.Ct. 1202 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959)); Beasley v. United States, 512 A.2d 1007, 1015 (D.C.1986) (likewise noting that “[t]he use of deception or trickery by police during an interrogation” is “subject to close scrutiny”).	1	1
Dorsey v. United Statesgreen dc · 2013 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 1 sentence 2015See 60 A.3d at 1204 (noting that if Dorsey had “given in and confessed during the first round of his interrogation, we would find it impossible to conclude that he made a voluntary waiver or confession”).	1	1
Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owengreen massappct · 1992 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002Although such a waiver must be knowing and voluntary, see, e.g., National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir.1977), 7 several courts have held that jury waiver clauses “are enforceable unless they are unconscionable, offend public policy, or are shown to be unfair in the particular circumstances.” Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 248, 253 , 588 N.E.2d 705, 708 (1992) (citation omitted); accord, e.g., Avenue Associates, Inc. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc.2d 719, 719 , 373 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815 (N.Y.App. 2002Although such a waiver must be knowing and voluntary, see, e.g., National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir.1977), 7 several courts have held that jury waiver clauses “are enforceable unless they are unconscionable, offend public policy, or are shown to be unfair in the particular circumstances.” Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 248, 253 , 588 N.E.2d 705, 708 (1992) (citation omitted); accord, e.g., Avenue Associates, Inc. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc.2d 719, 719 , 373 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815 (N.Y.App.	1	1
Avenue Associates, Inc. v. Buxbaumgreen nyappterm · 1975 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002Although such a waiver must be knowing and voluntary, see, e.g., National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir.1977), 7 several courts have held that jury waiver clauses “are enforceable unless they are unconscionable, offend public policy, or are shown to be unfair in the particular circumstances.” Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 248, 253 , 588 N.E.2d 705, 708 (1992) (citation omitted); accord, e.g., Avenue Associates, Inc. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc.2d 719, 719 , 373 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815 (N.Y.App. 2002Although such a waiver must be knowing and voluntary, see, e.g., National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir.1977), 7 several courts have held that jury waiver clauses “are enforceable unless they are unconscionable, offend public policy, or are shown to be unfair in the particular circumstances.” Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 248, 253 , 588 N.E.2d 705, 708 (1992) (citation omitted); accord, e.g., Avenue Associates, Inc. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc.2d 719, 719 , 373 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815 (N.Y.App.	1	1
National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. H. Walter Hendrix, III and Jean K. Hendrixgreen ca2 · 1977 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 1 sentence 2002Although such a waiver must be knowing and voluntary, see, e.g., National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir.1977), 7 several courts have held that jury waiver clauses “are enforceable unless they are unconscionable, offend public policy, or are shown to be unfair in the particular circumstances.” Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 248, 253 , 588 N.E.2d 705, 708 (1992) (citation omitted); accord, e.g., Avenue Associates, Inc. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc.2d 719, 719 , 373 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815 (N.Y.App.	1	1
Hawkins v. United Statesgreen dc · 1973 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981 2 sentences 1981Taylor v. United States, supra at 992 n.6; see Hawkins v. United States, D.C.App., 304 A.2d 279, 282 (1973). 1981Taylor v. United States, supra at 992 n.6; see Hawkins v. United States, D.C.App., 304 A.2d 279, 282 (1973).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

Case	Cited	Years
Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States green scotus · 1991 2 sentences 2005“It is ... generally accepted that a voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial ‘suffers from no inherent constitutional or legal infirmity.’” Id. at 1111 (quoting Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed.Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 , 111 S.Ct. 1308 , 113 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991)). 2002It is also generally accepted that a voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial “suffers from no inherent constitutional or legal infirmity.” Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed.Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 , 111 S.Ct. 1308 , 113 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991).	2	2002–2005
McKnight v. General Motors Corp. green scotus · 1991 2 sentences 2005“It is ... generally accepted that a voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial ‘suffers from no inherent constitutional or legal infirmity.’” Id. at 1111 (quoting Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed.Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 , 111 S.Ct. 1308 , 113 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991)). 2002It is also generally accepted that a voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial “suffers from no inherent constitutional or legal infirmity.” Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed.Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 , 111 S.Ct. 1308 , 113 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991).	2	2002–2005
Avesta AB v. United States green scotus · 1991 2 sentences 2005“It is ... generally accepted that a voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial ‘suffers from no inherent constitutional or legal infirmity.’” Id. at 1111 (quoting Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed.Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 , 111 S.Ct. 1308 , 113 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991)). 2002It is also generally accepted that a voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial “suffers from no inherent constitutional or legal infirmity.” Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed.Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 , 111 S.Ct. 1308 , 113 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991).	2	2002–2005
Spano v. New York green scotus · 1959 2 sentences 2015“When the officers who question a suspect by using trickery demonstrate an ‘undeviating intent ... to extract a confession ... the confession obtained must be examined with the most careful scrutiny.’ ” Brisbon, 957 A.2d at 945 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 , 79 S.Ct. 1202 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959)); Beasley v. United States, 512 A.2d 1007, 1015 (D.C.1986) (likewise noting that “[t]he use of deception or trickery by police during an interrogation” is “subject to close scrutiny”). 2015“When the officers who question a suspect by using trickery demonstrate an ‘undeviating intent ... to extract a confession ... the confession obtained must be examined with the most careful scrutiny.’ ” Brisbon, 957 A.2d at 945 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 , 79 S.Ct. 1202 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959)); Beasley v. United States, 512 A.2d 1007, 1015 (D.C.1986) (likewise noting that “[t]he use of deception or trickery by police during an interrogation” is “subject to close scrutiny”).	1	2015–2015
Brisbon v. United States green dc · 2008 1 sentence 2015“When the officers who question a suspect by using trickery demonstrate an ‘undeviating intent ... to extract a confession ... the confession obtained must be examined with the most careful scrutiny.’ ” Brisbon, 957 A.2d at 945 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 , 79 S.Ct. 1202 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959)); Beasley v. United States, 512 A.2d 1007, 1015 (D.C.1986) (likewise noting that “[t]he use of deception or trickery by police during an interrogation” is “subject to close scrutiny”).	1	2015–2015
Kyles v. Whitley green scotus · 1995 2 sentences 2011As the Supreme Court has explained, "the rule in Bagley [7] (and, hence, in Brady ) requires less of the prosecution than the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice . . . ." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). 2011As the Supreme Court has explained, "the rule in Bagley [7] (and, hence, in Brady ) requires less of the prosecution than the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice . . . ." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995).	1	2011–2011
Pers Travel, Inc. v. Canal Square Associates green dc · 2002 1 sentence 2005“It is ... generally accepted that a voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial ‘suffers from no inherent constitutional or legal infirmity.’” Id. at 1111 (quoting Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed.Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 , 111 S.Ct. 1308 , 113 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991)).	1	2005–2005
United States v. Lavon Wilson green ca9 · 1988 2 sentences 1993Id. (footnote omitted). 1993Id. (footnote omitted).	1	1993–1993
Oregon v. Elstad green scotus · 1985 2 sentences 1991I believe the Supreme Court would so rule. [1] Cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 992 298, 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1291 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (prosecution may show "a sufficient break in events to undermine the inference that [a] confession was caused by [a] Fourth Amendment violation"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 496 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1639 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (requirement of a break in the stream of events). 1991I believe the Supreme Court would so rule. [1] Cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 992 298, 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1291 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (prosecution may show "a sufficient break in events to undermine the inference that [a] confession was caused by [a] Fourth Amendment violation"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 496 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1639 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (requirement of a break in the stream of events).	1	1991–1991
Miranda v. Arizona green scotus · 1966 2 sentences 1991I believe the Supreme Court would so rule. [1] Cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 992 298, 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1291 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (prosecution may show "a sufficient break in events to undermine the inference that [a] confession was caused by [a] Fourth Amendment violation"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 496 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1639 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (requirement of a break in the stream of events). 1991I believe the Supreme Court would so rule. [1] Cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 992 298, 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1291 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (prosecution may show "a sufficient break in events to undermine the inference that [a] confession was caused by [a] Fourth Amendment violation"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 496 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1639 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (requirement of a break in the stream of events).	1	1991–1991
Alves v. Alves green dc · 1970 2 sentences 1976Where there is subject matter jurisdiction, a court having personal jurisdiction may by its order affect persons other than those personally before it, Alves v. Alves, D.C.App., 262 A.2d 111 (1970), and may order an act which has an effect in another state or is to be carried out in another state. 1976Where there is subject matter jurisdiction, a court having personal jurisdiction may by its order affect persons other than those personally before it, Alves v. Alves, D.C.App., 262 A.2d 111 (1970), and may order an act which has an effect in another state or is to be carried out in anothe state.	1	1976–1976

Where else courts name it

NY 45 (1887–2022) PA 42 (1888–2024) TX 40 (1977–2026) WA 40 (1968–2025) CA 38 (1932–2025) MA 37 (1917–2025) FL 33 (1962–2021) CO 32 (1982–2026) SC 28 (1979–2026) GA 22 (1910–2021) IN 22 (1973–2020) ND 21 (1993–2025) IL 21 (1974–2025) MO 19 (1973–2018) LA 19 (1958–2021) OH 19 (1928–2024) MD 18 (1975–2018) AZ 18 (1974–2022) NE 17 (1973–2025) NJ 17 (1969–2026) NM 14 (1969–2019) RI 14 (1996–2019) OR 13 (1979–2025) KS 13 (1976–2024) MN 13 (1961–2026) TN 12 (1999–2026) ID 12 (1977–2025) KY 12 (1972–2024) MS 11 (1984–2014) AL 10 (1953–2017) MI 10 (1970–2020) NC 10 (1972–2023) HI 10 (1904–2015) SD 10 (1977–2019) VA 9 (1991–2024) CT 9 (1988–2022) UT 8 (1969–2012) DC 8 (1976–2015) WI 8 (1987–2023) IA 8 (1977–2023) OK 7 (1923–2013) AR 6 (1892–2014) MT 6 (1922–2021) WV 5 (1912–2016) AK 5 (1980–2006) VT 4 (1993–2016) ME 4 (1970–2003) NH 3 (1983–1991) WY 3 (1937–2025) VI 2 (1998–2011)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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