voluntary waiver in Alabama

1985Alabama courts have held that "intoxication, short of mania or such impairment of the will and mind as to make an individual unconscious of the meaning of his words, will not render a statement or confession inadmissible." Eaton v. State , 423 So.2d 352 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982), Jackson v. State , 375 So.2d 558 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979).

1985Alabama courts have held that `intoxication, short of mania or such impairment of the will and mind as to make an individual unconscious of the meaning of his words, will not render a statement or confession inadmissible.' Eaton v. State , 423 So.2d 352 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982), Jackson v. State , 375 So.2d 558 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979).

1985Alabama courts have held that "intoxication, short of mania or such impairment of the will and mind as to make an individual unconscious of the meaning of his words, will not render a statement or confession inadmissible." Eaton v. State , 423 So.2d 352 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982), Jackson v. State , 375 So.2d 558 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979).

1985Alabama courts have held that `intoxication, short of mania or such impairment of the will and mind as to make an individual unconscious of the meaning of his words, will not render a statement or confession inadmissible.' Eaton v. State , 423 So.2d 352 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982), Jackson v. State , 375 So.2d 558 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979).

1980In United States v. Smith , 308 F.2d 657 (2nd Cir. 1962), it was stated: "When a law enforcement officer knocks at the door, identifies himself, and asks to be allowed to search the premises, the acquiescence thus obtained is generally not considered to be voluntary consent. . . ." Likewise, in Henderson v. State , 49 Ala. App. 275 , 270 So.2d 822 (1972), this court held that a mere showing that an accused gave officers the keys to her car upon their request to search it was insufficient to show a voluntary waiver of her Fourth Amendment rights.

1980In United States v. Smith , 308 F.2d 657 (2nd Cir. 1962), it was stated: "When a law enforcement officer knocks at the door, identifies himself, and asks to be allowed to search the premises, the acquiescence thus obtained is generally not considered to be voluntary consent. . . ." Likewise, in Henderson v. State , 49 Ala. App. 275 , 270 So.2d 822 (1972), this court held that a mere showing that an accused gave officers the keys to her car upon their request to search it was insufficient to show a voluntary waiver of her Fourth Amendment rights.

1994In Reese , the only evidence of a voluntary waiver of counsel was a stamped notation on the docket sheet "indicating that Reese had waived his right to counsel before pleading guilty." Reese , 620 So.2d at 580 .

1992In Matter of Von Goyt , 461 So.2d 821 (Ala.Civ.App. 1984), the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held that a release signed by a former mental patient allowing transfer of her records from one hospital to another did not constitute a voluntary waiver of the § 34-26-2 psychologist-patient privilege.

1992We conclude, therefore, that the release signed by Miss Von Goyt did not constitute a voluntary waiver of her psychologist-patient privilege." Von Goyt , 461 So.2d at 823 .

1989Garrison v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 372 So.2d 55 (1979)." We stated, in like regard, in Holman v. State , 495 So.2d 115 , 117 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986), that, where there is substantial evidence to support a voluntary waiver by the accused of his Miranda rights and voluntary giving of a confession, the trial judge's decision to admit the confession will not be disturbed by this court.

1989Garrison v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 372 So.2d 55 (1979)." We stated, in like regard, in Holman v. State , 495 So.2d 115 , 117 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986), that, where there is substantial evidence to support a voluntary waiver by the accused of his Miranda rights and voluntary giving of a confession, the trial judge's decision to admit the confession will not be disturbed by this court.

1985In Baker v. State , 472 So.2d 700 , 702 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985), this court, per Judge Taylor, concluded that the appellant voluntarily made certain incriminating statements, notwithstanding the fact that he had been "drinking heavily, and was possibly drunk at the time he was questioned." In responding to Baker's argument that the statements should be suppressed, this court wrote the following: "Appellant's claim that he was so intoxicated at the time of his waiver of rights that it was not a voluntary waiver is also without merit.

1985In City of Dothan v. Hardy , 237 Ala. 603 , 188 So. 264 (1939), this Court approved the admissibility of certain portions of the "Handbook of the Bureau of Standards, No. 10" dealing with "Safety Rules for the Installation and Maintenance of Electrical Supply and Communication Lines," but admonished that such rules, though admissible as expert opinion evidence (to be considered by the jury), were not regulations having the force of law whose violation was negligence per se.

1985In City of Dothan v. Hardy , 237 Ala. 603 , 188 So. 264 (1939), this Court approved the admissibility of certain portions of the "Handbook of the Bureau of Standards, No. 10" dealing with "Safety Rules for the Installation and Maintenance of Electrical Supply and Communication Lines," but admonished that such rules, though admissible as expert opinion evidence (to be considered by the jury), were not regulations having the force of law whose violation was negligence per se.

1980In United States v. Smith , 308 F.2d 657 (2nd Cir. 1962), it was stated: "When a law enforcement officer knocks at the door, identifies himself, and asks to be allowed to search the premises, the acquiescence thus obtained is generally not considered to be voluntary consent. . . ." Likewise, in Henderson v. State , 49 Ala. App. 275 , 270 So.2d 822 (1972), this court held that a mere showing that an accused gave officers the keys to her car upon their request to search it was insufficient to show a voluntary waiver of her Fourth Amendment rights.

1953United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Remond, 221 Ala. 349 , 129 So15.