10 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Helmergreen2 sentences2019Two Hearts also argues that even if his March 31 statements were voluntary, they should be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine because the only intervening event between the interviews “was the passage of time.” See State v. Helmer, 1996 S.D. 31, ¶ 32 , 545 N.W.2d 471, 476 (“When preceding confessions or statements are inadmissible, subsequent statements are not automatically inadmissible, but they are suspect.”). 2019Two Hearts also argues that even if his March 31 statements were voluntary, they should be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine because the only intervening event between the interviews “was the passage of time.” See State v. Helmer, 1996 S.D. 31, ¶ 32 , 545 N.W.2d 471, 476 (“When preceding confessions or statements are inadmissible, subsequent statements are not automatically inadmissible, but they are suspect.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Heneygreen2 sentences2019See State v. Heney, 2013 S.D. 77 , ¶ 11, 839 N.W.2d 558, 562 . -23- #28588, #28597 [¶48.] During both interviews, following the voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights, Two Hearts mentioned his possible need for an attorney several times to the detectives. 2019See State v. Heney, 2013 S.D. 77 , ¶ 11, 839 N.W.2d 558, 562 . -23- #28433, #28434 [¶48.] During both interviews, following the voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights, Two Hearts mentioned his possible need for an attorney several times to the detectives. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Ferolagreen2 sentences2001Although she may have been tired from the questioning, “there is no evidence that [she] was so overcome by fatigue or stress as to prevent a voluntary waiver.” State v. Ferola, 518 A.2d 1339, 1346 (R.I.1986); see State v. Ervin, 979 S.W.2d 149, 161 (Mo.1998) (finding no evidence that defendant’s lack of sleep “affected his ability to understand and voluntarily waive his rights” even when he had not slept for twenty-four hours). 2001Although she may have been tired from the questioning, "there is no evidence that [she] *256 was so overcome by fatigue or stress as to prevent a voluntary waiver." State v. Ferola, 518 A.2d 1339, 1346 (R.I.1986); see State v. Ervin, 979 S.W.2d 149, 161 (Mo. 1998) (finding no evidence that defendant's lack of sleep "affected his ability to understand and voluntarily waive his rights" even when he had not slept for twenty-four hours). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ervingreen2 sentences2001Although she may have been tired from the questioning, “there is no evidence that [she] was so overcome by fatigue or stress as to prevent a voluntary waiver.” State v. Ferola, 518 A.2d 1339, 1346 (R.I.1986); see State v. Ervin, 979 S.W.2d 149, 161 (Mo.1998) (finding no evidence that defendant’s lack of sleep “affected his ability to understand and voluntarily waive his rights” even when he had not slept for twenty-four hours). 2001Although she may have been tired from the questioning, "there is no evidence that [she] *256 was so overcome by fatigue or stress as to prevent a voluntary waiver." State v. Ferola, 518 A.2d 1339, 1346 (R.I.1986); see State v. Ervin, 979 S.W.2d 149, 161 (Mo. 1998) (finding no evidence that defendant's lack of sleep "affected his ability to understand and voluntarily waive his rights" even when he had not slept for twenty-four hours). | 1 | 1 |
Colorado v. Connellygreen2 sentences2000Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 523 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 486 (1986) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 421 (1986)). 2000Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 523 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 486 (1986) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 421 (1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Moran v. Burbinegreen2 sentences2000Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 523 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 486 (1986) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 421 (1986)). 2000Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 523 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 486 (1986) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 421 (1986)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fare v. Michael C.
green
2 sentences1983Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). 1983Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). | 4 | 1980–1983 |
State v. Blackburn
green
2 sentences2019After a voluntary waiver of Miranda rights, however, "law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney." Id. ¶ 11, 766 N.W.2d at 182 . "[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning." Id . [¶48.] During both interviews, following the voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights, Two Hearts mentioned his possibl 2019After a voluntary waiver of Miranda rights, however, “law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Id. ¶ 11, 766 N.W.2d at 182 . “[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning.” Id. 12. | 3 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Cowell
green
2 sentences1981Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); State v. Cowell, 288 N.W.2d 322 (S.D.1980). 1981Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); State v. Cowell, 288 N.W.2d 322 (S.D.1980). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Kor
green
2 sentences1977Although there is authority to support the view that disclosures made during cross-examination are not considered to constitute a voluntary waiver of the attorney-client privilege, see, e. g., People v. Kor, 129 Cal.App.2d 436 , 277 P.2d 94 ; Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122 , 345 A.2d 830 , and cases cited therein; Annot. 51 A.L.R.2d 521 , § 8, we conclude that the better view is that by not claiming the privilege during cross-examination a witness is deemed to have waived it. 1977Although there is authority to support the view that disclosures made during cross-examination are not considered to constitute a voluntary waiver of the attorney-client privilege, see, e. g., People v. Kor, 129 Cal.App.2d 436 , 277 P.2d 94 ; Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122 , 345 A.2d 830 , and cases cited therein; Annot. 51 A.L.R.2d 521 , § 8, we conclude that the better view is that by not claiming the privilege during cross-examination a witness is deemed to have waived it. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Harrison v. State
green
2 sentences1977Although there is authority to support the view that disclosures made during cross-examination are not considered to constitute a voluntary waiver of the attorney-client privilege, see, e. g., People v. Kor, 129 Cal.App.2d 436 , 277 P.2d 94 ; Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122 , 345 A.2d 830 , and cases cited therein; Annot. 51 A.L.R.2d 521 , § 8, we conclude that the better view is that by not claiming the privilege during cross-examination a witness is deemed to have waived it. 1977Although there is authority to support the view that disclosures made during cross-examination are not considered to constitute a voluntary waiver of the attorney-client privilege, see, e. g., People v. Kor, 129 Cal.App.2d 436 , 277 P.2d 94 ; Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122 , 345 A.2d 830 , and cases cited therein; Annot. 51 A.L.R.2d 521 , § 8, we conclude that the better view is that by not claiming the privilege during cross-examination a witness is deemed to have waived it. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.