41 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1974–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Green v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen2 sentences1995See id. (regulatory presumption that unemployment compensation claimant’s separation from work was involuntary is rebuttable, but burden of persuasion remains on employer). . 1995See id. (regulatory presumption that unemployment compensation claimant's separation from work was involuntary is rebuttable, but burden of persuasion remains on employer). [16] "We have interpreted the phrase `burden of proof' [in D.C.Code 1-1509(b)] to mean burden of persuasion." Id. at 837 n. 5 (citing Washington Pub. | 2 | 2 |
Nathan L. Drew v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1989See generally Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11 , 331 F.2d 85 (1964). 1989See generally Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11 , 331 F.2d 85 (1964). | 2 | 2 |
Roy C. Haven, Jr., a Minor by His Next Friend v. Judson G. Randolph, M.D.green2 sentences1979E. g., Haven v. Randolph, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 150, 152 , 494 F.2d 1069, 1070 (1974) (per curiam) ( prima facie case established by evidence of standard and breach). [4] In this case, there is no evidentiary basis for the kind of instruction now proposed. 1979E. g., Haven v. Randolph, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 150, 152 , 494 F.2d 1069, 1070 (1974) (per curiam) ( prima facie case established by evidence of standard and breach). [4] In this case, there is no evidentiary basis for the kind of instruction now proposed. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Joseph A. Bundygreen2 sentences1978Appellant objected to this continuance and to one other, and there is, of course, no significant difference between an objection to a request for a continuance and a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. [2] some circumstances, and particularly in the face of a general routine of preservation, such as the D.C. police have established, the absence of notes may be the kind of mishap best handled by instructing the jury with an adaptation of the kind of instruction used in case of a missing witness, that the jury is free to infer that the missing original notes would have been different f 1978Appellant objected to this continuance and to one other, and there is, of course, no significant difference between an objection to a request for a continuance and a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. [2] some circumstances, and particularly in the face of a general routine of preservation, such as the D.C. police have established, the absence of notes may be the kind of mishap best handled by instructing the jury with an adaptation of the kind of instruction used in case of a missing witness, that the jury is free to infer that the missing original notes would have been different f | 1 | 2 |
Murray v. Carriergreen2 sentences2018However, the Supreme Court has said that "the question of cause for a procedural default does not turn on whether counsel erred or on the kind of error counsel may have made." Murray v. Carrier , 477 U.S. 478 , 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639 , 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (emphasis added). 2018However, the Supreme Court has said that "the question of cause for a procedural default does not turn on whether counsel erred or on the kind of error counsel may have made." Murray v. Carrier , 477 U.S. 478 , 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639 , 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Bennett v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); see also Bennett v. United States, 763 A.2d 1117 (D.C. 2000) (This kind of error to be evaluated under Kotteakos). | 1 | 1 |
Alexander Shapolia v. Los Alamos National Laboratory, and John Whettengreen1 sentence2008See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has explained that when “discrimination is not targeted against a particular religion, but against those who do not share a particular religious belief, the use of the protected class factor is inappropriate.” Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir.1993). | 1 | 1 |
Mungo v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2003See id. (“in bench trials, it is not unusual for trial judges to initiate this kind of inquiry because neither juries nor jury instructions are implicated”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Reedgreen1 sentence2002In Reed we stated “It may be that, under certain circumstances, ..., holding a suspension in abeyance for this kind of violation might be appropriate.” In re Reed, 679 A.2d at 508. | 1 | 1 |
Ralph L. Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church and Bishop Joseph A. Yeakelgreen1 sentence2002Examining such controversies is precisely the kind of inquiry that is forbidden to civil courts since “[w]hose voice speaks for the church is per se a religious matter.” Minker, supra, 894 F.2d at 1357 (internal punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
In Re THBgreen2 sentences2001See In re T.H.B., supra, 670 A.2d at 902 . 2001See In re T.H.B., supra, 670 A.2d at 902 . | 1 | 1 |
Ready v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2000Ready v. United States, 620 A.2d 233, 234 (D.C.1993). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Hinesgreen2 sentences1997See Hessler, 549 A.2d at 703 (emphasizing law on commingling "to alert the Bar that in future cases of even `simple commingling,' a sanction greater than public censure may well be imposed"); In re Hines, 482 A.2d 378, 386-87 (D.C.1984) (per curiam) (adopting recommendation of sanction less than disbarment for misappropriation but "notifying" bar that "disbarment will be the norm" for misappropriation of client funds except in cases of simple negligence). 1997See Hessler, 549 A.2d at 703 (emphasizing law on commingling “to alert the Bar that in future cases of even ‘simple commingling,’ a sanction greater than public censure may well be imposed”); In re Hines, 482 A.2d 378, 386-87 (D.C.1984) (per curiam) (adopting recommendation of sanction less than disbarment for misappropriation but “notifying” bar that “disbarment will be the norm” for misappropriation of client funds except in cases of simple negligence). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Hesslergreen2 sentences1997See Hessler, 549 A.2d at 703 (emphasizing law on commingling "to alert the Bar that in future cases of even `simple commingling,' a sanction greater than public censure may well be imposed"); In re Hines, 482 A.2d 378, 386-87 (D.C.1984) (per curiam) (adopting recommendation of sanction less than disbarment for misappropriation but "notifying" bar that "disbarment will be the norm" for misappropriation of client funds except in cases of simple negligence). 1997See Hessler, 549 A.2d at 703 (emphasizing law on commingling “to alert the Bar that in future cases of even ‘simple commingling,’ a sanction greater than public censure may well be imposed”); In re Hines, 482 A.2d 378, 386-87 (D.C.1984) (per curiam) (adopting recommendation of sanction less than disbarment for misappropriation but “notifying” bar that “disbarment will be the norm” for misappropriation of client funds except in cases of simple negligence). | 1 | 1 |
Howard University v. Bestgreen2 sentences1995See D.C.Code § 1-2556 (private cause of action under Human Rights Act); Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 982 (D.C.1984) .(holding university faculty member’s lawsuit based on actions by college Dean established prima facie case of sexual harassment under Human Rights Act); cf. King v. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656, 664 (D.C.1998) (holding Superior Court had jurisdiction to hear public employee’s statutory “sexual harassment claim” and “interrelated or ‘pendent’ tort claim” for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on sexual harassment). 1995See D.C.Code § 1-2556 (private cause of action under Human Rights Act); Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 982 (D.C.1984) (holding university faculty member's lawsuit based on actions by college Dean established prima facie case of sexual harassment under Human Rights Act); cf. King v. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656, 664 (D.C.1993) (holding Superior Court had jurisdiction to hear public employee's statutory "sexual harassment claim" and "interrelated or `pendent' tort claim" for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on sexual harassment). | 1 | 1 |
King v. Kiddgreen2 sentences1995See D.C.Code § 1-2556 (private cause of action under Human Rights Act); Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 982 (D.C.1984) .(holding university faculty member’s lawsuit based on actions by college Dean established prima facie case of sexual harassment under Human Rights Act); cf. King v. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656, 664 (D.C.1998) (holding Superior Court had jurisdiction to hear public employee’s statutory “sexual harassment claim” and “interrelated or ‘pendent’ tort claim” for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on sexual harassment). 1995See D.C.Code § 1-2556 (private cause of action under Human Rights Act); Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 982 (D.C.1984) (holding university faculty member's lawsuit based on actions by college Dean established prima facie case of sexual harassment under Human Rights Act); cf. King v. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656, 664 (D.C.1993) (holding Superior Court had jurisdiction to hear public employee's statutory "sexual harassment claim" and "interrelated or `pendent' tort claim" for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on sexual harassment). | 1 | 1 |
Irby v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1993Pretrial diversion is a program initiated by the United States Attorney’s office which “ ‘owes its existence and operation solely to prosecutorial discretion.’ ” Irby v. United States, 464 A.2d 136, 141 (D.C.1983) (quoting United States v. Smith, 354 A.2d 510, 512 (D.C.1976)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Smithgreen1 sentence1993Pretrial diversion is a program initiated by the United States Attorney’s office which “ ‘owes its existence and operation solely to prosecutorial discretion.’ ” Irby v. United States, 464 A.2d 136, 141 (D.C.1983) (quoting United States v. Smith, 354 A.2d 510, 512 (D.C.1976)). | 1 | 1 |
Artis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1991See Artis, 505 A.2d at 58 . [3] We find none. *705 On each occasion, the trial court immediately discontinued the poll and ordered further deliberations when juror number one responded "not guilty." At no point did the trial court know whether juror number one was a lone dissenter, for the other eleven jurors were never polled. 1991See Artis, 505 A.2d at 58. 3 We find none. | 1 | 1 |
| Westfall v. Erwinred | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Clinton Bramletgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Phillipsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Gagnongreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Buonacouregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Agursgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wayte v. United States
green
2 sentences1993Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence *193 value, the Government’s overall enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” Fedorov, 600 A.2d at 376 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 , 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530 , 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)). 1993“Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the [government's enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the [government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” Id. | 3 | 1991–1993 |
Davis v. Boyle Bros.
green
1 sentence2015The appeals court concluded that, under these unique “one suit plus” circumstances, this default “judgment is not an incident of an ordinary suit involved in this kind of claim.” Id. at 520 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Kotteakos v. United States
green
1 sentence2015Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); see also Bennett v. United States, 763 A.2d 1117 (D.C. 2000) (This kind of error to be evaluated under Kotteakos). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Black v. Romano
green
2 sentences2006Black, 471 U.S. at 612 , 105 S.Ct. 2254 . 2006Black, 471 U.S. at 612 , 105 S.Ct. 2254 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In Re Spiridon
green
2 sentences2004In In re Spiridon, 755 A.2d 463 (D.C.2000), we described the kind of inquiry that must be made before a conclusion is reached as to whether conduct involves moral turpitude on the facts: Once one accepts that conduct deemed criminal by a society... may or may not involve moral turpitude, the determination becomes intensely specific to the particular facts and circumstances. 2004In In re Spiridon, 755 A.2d 463 (D.C.2000), we described the kind of inquiry that must be made before a conclusion is reached as to whether conduct involves moral turpitude on the facts: Once one accepts that conduct deemed criminal by a society ... may or may not involve moral turpitude, the determination becomes intensely specific to the particular facts and circumstances. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Powell v. United States
green
1 sentence1999“A party’s failure to object to an instruction before the jury begins deliberations as required by Super.Ct.Crim.R. 30, results in severe consequences on appeal [even] if that party might have been entitled to a different instruction.” Powell v. United States, 684 A.2d 373 , 379 n. 9 (D.C.1996). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Hawkins v. United States
green
2 sentences1996Applying the kind of analysis spelled out in Toliver , we are satisfied that evidence of Holiday’s drug offense was admissible to explain the circumstances of his arrest on the weapon charge, see Day, 360 A.2d at 485 , just as we are persuaded that evidence of the weapon offense was inextricably a part of Holiday’s arrest on the drug charge, see Hawkins, 482 A.2d at 1233 . 1996Applying the kind of analysis spelled out in Toliver , we are satisfied that evidence of Holiday's drug offense was admissible to explain the circumstances of his arrest on the weapon charge, see Day, 360 A.2d at 485 , just as we are persuaded that evidence of the weapon offense was inextricably a part of Holiday's arrest on the drug charge, see Hawkins, 482 A.2d at 1233 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Day v. United States
green
2 sentences1996Applying the kind of analysis spelled out in Toliver , we are satisfied that evidence of Holiday’s drug offense was admissible to explain the circumstances of his arrest on the weapon charge, see Day, 360 A.2d at 485 , just as we are persuaded that evidence of the weapon offense was inextricably a part of Holiday’s arrest on the drug charge, see Hawkins, 482 A.2d at 1233 . 1996Applying the kind of analysis spelled out in Toliver , we are satisfied that evidence of Holiday's drug offense was admissible to explain the circumstances of his arrest on the weapon charge, see Day, 360 A.2d at 485 , just as we are persuaded that evidence of the weapon offense was inextricably a part of Holiday's arrest on the drug charge, see Hawkins, 482 A.2d at 1233 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Fedorov v. United States
green
1 sentence1993Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence *193 value, the Government’s overall enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” Fedorov, 600 A.2d at 376 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 , 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530 , 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Bell v. Burson
green
2 sentences1992He cites Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), not only for the proposition that a driver’s license may not be revoked or suspended without affording the licensee due process, but that the hearing provided must be appropriate to the nature of the case before license revocation or suspension becomes effective. 1992He cites Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), not only for the proposition that a driver’s license may not be revoked or suspended without affording the licensee due process, but that the hearing provided must be appropriate to the nature of the case before license revocation or suspension becomes effective. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Moss v. Stockard
green
1 sentence1991Recently, we have characterized this particular kind of privilege as a “qualified ‘common interest’ privilege.” Moss, 580 A.2d at 1023-24 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Barr v. Matteo green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Lang green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| In Re the Personal Restraint of King green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Downs v. Downs green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Recor green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Penix v. Jago green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Gilbert v. Alabama green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Valenciano v. Texas green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Matter of LDO green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Kozlowski Unemployment Compensation Case green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Brady v. Maryland green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Goldberg v. United States green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp. green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor v. Baldor Electric Company green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Allentuck v. District of Columbia Minimum Wage & Industrial Safety Board green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.