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88 Illinois opinions name it 3 courts 1885–2026 20 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Thurowgreen2 sentences2022These are very different standards, as our supreme court explained in People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 363 (2003): “Though plain-error analysis normally requires the same kind of inquiry as does harmless-error review, there is an ‘important difference’ between the two. [Citation.] In a harmless-error analysis, which applies where, as in the case at bar, the defendant has made a timely objection, it is the State that ‘bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.’ [Citation.] In other words, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the s 2011As explained in Thurow, "plain-error analysis normally requires the same kind of inquiry as does harmless-error review," with the "important difference" between the two being that the State has the burden of persuasion in a harmless-error analysis and the defendant has the burden of persuasion in a plain-error analysis (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thurow, 203 Ill.2d at 363 , 272 Ill.Dec. 185 , 786 N.E.2d 1019 . | 9 | 17 |
United States v. Olanogreen2 sentences2010"Though plain-error analysis normally requires the same kind of inquiry as does harmless-error review, there is an `important difference' between the two." People v. Thurow, 203 Ill.2d 352, 363 , 272 Ill.Dec. 185 , 786 N.E.2d 1019 (2003), quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 , 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508, 520 (1993). 2010"Though plain-error analysis normally requires the same kind of inquiry as does harmless-error review, there is an `important difference' between the two." People v. Thurow, 203 Ill.2d 352, 363 , 272 Ill.Dec. 185 , 786 N.E.2d 1019 (2003), quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 , 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508, 520 (1993). | 5 | 12 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2021See Johnson, 368 Ill. 2021See Johnson, 368 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Woodsgreen2 sentences2017People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 471-72 (2005).” - 16 - 611-12 (2010) (“To preserve a claim for review, a defendant must both object at trial and include the alleged error in a written posttrial motion.” (citing People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988))). 2016People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 471-72 (2005).” 30 1-13-1009 doctrine. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Ruizgreen2 sentences2021See Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 39 (noting that the degree to which a defendant participated in an offense will remain a consideration during sentencing but “[t]o prevent young adult offenders from relying on the mitigating circumstance of their youth simply because they more directly participated in the offense would be error”); Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶ 18 (concluding that, if a young-adult offender can demonstrate that Miller applies to him, “the distinction between mandatory and discretionary sentences evaporates”). ¶ 33 On remand, Mr. Daniels may or may not be able to mak 2020See Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 39 (noting that the degree to which a defendant participated in an offense will remain a consideration during sentencing but “[t]o prevent young adult offenders from relying on the mitigating circumstance of their youth simply because they more directly participated in the offense would be error”); Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶ 18 (concluding that, if a young- adult offender can demonstrate that Miller applies to him, “the distinction between mandatory and discretionary sentences evaporates”). ¶ 33 On remand, Mr. Daniels may or may not be able to ma | 2 | 2 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2021See Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 39 (noting that the degree to which a defendant participated in an offense will remain a consideration during sentencing but “[t]o prevent young adult offenders from relying on the mitigating circumstance of their youth simply because they more directly participated in the offense would be error”); Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶ 18 (concluding that, if a young-adult offender can demonstrate that Miller applies to him, “the distinction between mandatory and discretionary sentences evaporates”). ¶ 33 On remand, Mr. Daniels may or may not be able to mak 2020See Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 39 (noting that the degree to which a defendant participated in an offense will remain a consideration during sentencing but “[t]o prevent young adult offenders from relying on the mitigating circumstance of their youth simply because they more directly participated in the offense would be error”); Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶ 18 (concluding that, if a young- adult offender can demonstrate that Miller applies to him, “the distinction between mandatory and discretionary sentences evaporates”). ¶ 33 On remand, Mr. Daniels may or may not be able to ma | 2 | 2 |
People v. McGheegreen2 sentences2015People v. McGhee, 2012 IL App (1st) 093404, ¶ 26 (discussing the issue as matter of first impression). 2015People v. McGhee, 2012 IL App (1st) 093404, ¶ 26 (discussing the issue as matter of first impression). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Rungegreen2 sentences2015“Trial before a biased tribunal would deprive defendant of a substantial right and constitute structural error requiring reversal.” People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 102 (2009) (citing People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2007), aff’d, 556 U.S. 148 (2009)). 2015"Trial before a biased tribunal would deprive defendant of a substantial right and constitute structural error requiring reversal." People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 102 (2009) (citing People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2007), aff'd, 556 U.S. 148 (2009)). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Riveragreen2 sentences2015“Trial before a biased tribunal would deprive defendant of a substantial right and constitute structural error requiring reversal.” People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 102 (2009) (citing People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2007), aff’d, 556 U.S. 148 (2009)). 2015"Trial before a biased tribunal would deprive defendant of a substantial right and constitute structural error requiring reversal." People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 102 (2009) (citing People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2007), aff'd, 556 U.S. 148 (2009)). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Morrisgreen2 sentences2011See Morris, 236 Ill.2d 345 , 338 Ill.Dec. 863 , 925 N.E.2d 1069 (the portion of the Teague opinion discussing the announcement of new rules in cases on collateral review has not been applied or discussed in Illinois state courts). 2011See Morris, 236 Ill.2d 345 , 338 Ill.Dec. 863 , 925 N.E.2d 1069 (the portion of the Teague opinion discussing the announcement of new rules in cases on collateral review has not been applied or discussed in Illinois state courts). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Vidagreen2 sentences2004People v. Crespo , 203 Ill. 2d 335, 347 (2001) ; see also People v. Kaczmarek , 207 Ill. 2d 288, 302 (2003); People v. Thurow , 203 Ill. 2d 352, 371-72 (2003); accord People v. Vida , 339 Ill. 2004People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 347 (2001); see also People v. Kaczmarek, 207 Ill. 2d 288, 302 (2003); People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 371-72 (2003); accord People v. Vida, 339 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Kaczmarekgreen2 sentences2004People v. Crespo , 203 Ill. 2d 335, 347 (2001) ; see also People v. Kaczmarek , 207 Ill. 2d 288, 302 (2003); People v. Thurow , 203 Ill. 2d 352, 371-72 (2003); accord People v. Vida , 339 Ill. 2004People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 347 (2001); see also People v. Kaczmarek, 207 Ill. 2d 288, 302 (2003); People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 371-72 (2003); accord People v. Vida, 339 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Crespogreen2 sentences2004People v. Crespo , 203 Ill. 2d 335, 347 (2001) ; see also People v. Kaczmarek , 207 Ill. 2d 288, 302 (2003); People v. Thurow , 203 Ill. 2d 352, 371-72 (2003); accord People v. Vida , 339 Ill. 2004People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 347 (2001); see also People v. Kaczmarek, 207 Ill. 2d 288, 302 (2003); People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 371-72 (2003); accord People v. Vida, 339 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2001People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 159 (1989). 2001People v. Harris , 129 Ill. 2d 123, 159 (1989). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hilliardgreen2 sentences2026See Horshaw, 2024 IL App (1st) 182047-B, ¶ 62 (citing People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶¶ 27-28 ; Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶¶ 40-42 ; Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶¶ 88, 92-93 ; and People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 ). 2025The proportionate-penalties clause recognizes that the community’s moral sense “ ‘ “evolves” ’ ” over time, as a function of our evolving “ ‘ “concepts of elemental decency and fairness.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 20 , quoting Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 339 ). ¶ 92 The parties both assume that a mandatory life sentence is essential to the kind of claim that petitioner raises here under the proportionate-penalties clause. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Pottsgreen2 sentences2026People v. Potts, 2021 IL App (1st) 161219, ¶ 184 (“These are good reasons why the defense might not want this kind of instruction, no matter what issues it includes— 20 and especially when one of those issues is propensity.”). 2023There are “good reasons why the defense might not want this kind of instruction, *** especially when one of th[e] issues is propensity.” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 59 Here, we need not infer or presume that trial counsel’s decision to not seek IPI 3.14 was the result of trial strategy. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Glaspergreen2 sentences2012The supreme court has equated the second prong of the plain-error doctrine with structural error, which is "a systemic error which serves to erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the fairness of the defendant's trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 613-14 , 345 Ill.Dec. 560 , 939 N.E.2d 403 (quoting People v. Glasper, 234 Ill.2d 173, 197-98 , 334 Ill.Dec. 575 , 917 N.E.2d 401 (2009)). ¶ 21 The question, then, is whether the trial court's failure to poll the jury on defendant's request is the kind of error that mandates reversal regardless of whether defendant w 2012The supreme court has equated the second prong of the plain-error doctrine with structural error, which is "a systemic error which serves to erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the fairness of the defendant's trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 613-14 , 345 Ill.Dec. 560 , 939 N.E.2d 403 (quoting People v. Glasper, 234 Ill.2d 173, 197-98 , 334 Ill.Dec. 575 , 917 N.E.2d 401 (2009)). ¶ 21 The question, then, is whether the trial court's failure to poll the jury on defendant's request is the kind of error that mandates reversal regardless of whether defendant w | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Clarkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hanson v. De Kalb County State's Attorney's Officegreen | 1 | 1 |
| The People v. Scottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lavalliergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Enochgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Spreitzergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commercial National Bank of Chicago v. City of Chicagogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Murphy v. Cuesta, Rey & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rivera v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2015“Trial before a biased tribunal would deprive defendant of a substantial right and constitute structural error requiring reversal.” People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 102 (2009) (citing People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2007), aff’d, 556 U.S. 148 (2009)). 2015"Trial before a biased tribunal would deprive defendant of a substantial right and constitute structural error requiring reversal." People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 102 (2009) (citing People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2007), aff'd, 556 U.S. 148 (2009)). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2015Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 . 2014Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 . | 2 | 2014–2015 |
White Way Sign & Maintenance Co. v. Montclare Lanes, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014In other words, when affidavits would be an illogical way to prove the matter at issue, courts have not required them. -7- 2014 IL App (2d) 130948 ¶ 26 The classic authority on this point is White Way Sign & Maintenance Co. v. Montclare Lanes, Inc., 42 Ill. 2014In other words, when affidavits would be an illogical way to prove the matter at issue, courts have not required them. ¶ 26 The classic authority on this point is White Way Sign & Maintenance Co. v. Montclare Lanes, Inc., 42 Ill. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2012The supreme court has equated the second prong of the plain-error doctrine with structural error, which is "a systemic error which serves to erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the fairness of the defendant's trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 613-14 , 345 Ill.Dec. 560 , 939 N.E.2d 403 (quoting People v. Glasper, 234 Ill.2d 173, 197-98 , 334 Ill.Dec. 575 , 917 N.E.2d 401 (2009)). ¶ 21 The question, then, is whether the trial court's failure to poll the jury on defendant's request is the kind of error that mandates reversal regardless of whether defendant w 2012The supreme court has equated the second prong of the plain-error doctrine with structural error, which is "a systemic error which serves to erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the fairness of the defendant's trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 613-14 , 345 Ill.Dec. 560 , 939 N.E.2d 403 (quoting People v. Glasper, 234 Ill.2d 173, 197-98 , 334 Ill.Dec. 575 , 917 N.E.2d 401 (2009)). ¶ 21 The question, then, is whether the trial court's failure to poll the jury on defendant's request is the kind of error that mandates reversal regardless of whether defendant w | 2 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Herron
green
2 sentences2006It is the type of error that “erode[s] the integrity of the judicial process and undermine [s] the fairness of the defendant’s trial.” See Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186 . 2006It is the type of error that "erode[s] the integrity of the judicial process and undermine[s] the fairness of the defendant's trial." See Herron, 215 Ill.2d at 186 , 294 Ill.Dec. 55 , 830 N.E.2d 467 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Benson
green
2 sentences2005As a general matter, courts have held that "[i]t is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless." People v. Benson , 266 Ill. 2005As a general matter, courts have held that “[i]t is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless.” People v. Benson, 266 Ill. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Cronic
green
2 sentences2002However, we are unwilling to equate counsel’s effort to obtain a summary acquittal, if that was truly her intent, with the kind of test that allows for the conclusion that the State’s evidence survived the “crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656 , 80 L. 2002However, we are unwilling to equate counsel’s effort to obtain a summary acquittal, if that was truly her intent, with the kind of test that allows for the conclusion that the State’s evidence survived the “crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656 , 80 L. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Gouge v. Central Illinois Public Service Co.
green
2 sentences1995Gouge v. Central Illinois Public Service Co. (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 535 , 582 N.E.2d 108 . 1995Gouge v. Central Illinois Public Service Co. (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 535 , 582 N.E.2d 108 . | 2 | 1995–1995 |
Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center
green
2 sentences1995(Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 507 , 513 N.E.2d 387 .) In order to recover for a defendant’s violation of a statute or rule designed to protect human life or property, the plaintiff must show: (1) the violation proximately caused plaintiff’s injury; (2) plaintiff belonged to the class of persons whom the rule was intended to protect from injury; and (3) the kind of injury suffered by plaintiff was the kind which the rule sought to prevent. 1995(Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 507 , 513 N.E.2d 387 .) In order to recover for a defendant’s violation of a statute or rule designed to protect human life or property, the plaintiff must show: (1) the violation proximately caused plaintiff’s injury; (2) plaintiff belonged to the class of persons whom the rule was intended to protect from injury; and (3) the kind of injury suffered by plaintiff was the kind which the rule sought to prevent. | 2 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Demeron
green
2 sentences1990App. 3d 440, 446 , 505 N.E.2d 1222 .) This kind of error may be disregarded. (107 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).) One test for harmless error is “whether the evidence is cumulative or merely duplicates properly admitted evidence.” (People v. Wilkerson (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 151, 157 , 429 N.E.2d 526 .) When the hearsay involves identification, the error is harmless unless “it was a substitute for courtroom identification or used to strengthen or corroborate a weak identification.” Lopez (1987), 152 Ill. 1990App.3d 440, 446 , 505 N.E.2d 1222 .) This kind of error may be *431 disregarded. (107 Ill.2d R. 615(a).) One test for harmless error is "whether the evidence is cumulative or merely duplicates properly admitted evidence." ( People v. Wilkerson (1981), 87 Ill.2d 151, 157 , 429 N.E.2d 526 .) When the hearsay involves identification, the error is harmless unless "it was a substitute for courtroom identification or used to strengthen or corroborate a weak identification." Lopez (1987), 152 Ill. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Wilkerson
green
2 sentences1990App. 3d 440, 446 , 505 N.E.2d 1222 .) This kind of error may be disregarded. (107 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).) One test for harmless error is “whether the evidence is cumulative or merely duplicates properly admitted evidence.” (People v. Wilkerson (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 151, 157 , 429 N.E.2d 526 .) When the hearsay involves identification, the error is harmless unless “it was a substitute for courtroom identification or used to strengthen or corroborate a weak identification.” Lopez (1987), 152 Ill. 1990App. 3d 440, 446 , 505 N.E.2d 1222 .) This kind of error may be disregarded. (107 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).) One test for harmless error is “whether the evidence is cumulative or merely duplicates properly admitted evidence.” (People v. Wilkerson (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 151, 157 , 429 N.E.2d 526 .) When the hearsay involves identification, the error is harmless unless “it was a substitute for courtroom identification or used to strengthen or corroborate a weak identification.” Lopez (1987), 152 Ill. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
The People v. Riley
green
2 sentences1982On this kind of a hearing the attorneys must be held accountable for the highest ethical standards and if it can be seen that a breach of such *347 standards has prejudiced a defendant it must be expected that any sentence so attained will be set aside." 376 Ill. 364, 367-68 . 1982On this kind of a hearing the attorneys must be held accountable for the highest ethical standards and if it can be seen that a breach of such standards has prejudiced a defendant it must be expected that any sentence so attained will be set aside.” 376 Ill. 364, 367-68 . | 2 | 1972–1982 |
| People v. Dorsey green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Moore
green
1 sentence2026See Horshaw, 2024 IL App (1st) 182047-B, ¶ 62 (citing People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶¶ 27-28 ; Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶¶ 40-42 ; Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶¶ 88, 92-93 ; and People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 ). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Coleman green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Miller green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Rodriguez green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Magallanes green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Cessna v. City of Danville green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Sebby green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Jae Lee v. United States green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Wanandi v. Black green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Allen green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Vercolio green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Hunter v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Enoch green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Ethyl Corporation v. United Steelworkers of America, Afl-Cio-Clc and Local No. 7441, United Steelworkers of America, Afl-Cio-Clc green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600 green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Downum v. United States green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Lee v. United States green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Lopez green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Johnson v. Oklahoma green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Kerasotes Rialto Theater Corp. v. City of Peoria green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| The People v. Rose neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Town of Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Beauchamp v. Elrod green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Monaghan green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Wright v. Glos neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| People v. Erminie Montgomery green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Keshner v. Keshner green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.