kind analysis in Maryland

2001Dickson v. Bober, 269 Minn. 334 , 130 N.W.2d 526 (1964) arose from a collision between a motorcycle, driven by the plaintiff, and an automobile.

2001Dickson v. Bober, 269 Minn. 334 , 130 N.W.2d 526 (1964) arose from a collision between a motorcycle, driven by the plaintiff, and an automobile.

2001The Watkins Court noted that ‘‘[h]e did not present to the court any particular instruction but apparently had in mind the kind of instruction that the Court of Special Appeals held should have been given in Mumford that, if the jury were to find that Watkins could not have anticipated that Jenkins would kill [the co-felon], it must acquit him of [that] murder." Id. at 264-65, 313 A.2d 563 .

1993In Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 224 Md. 195 , 167 A.2d 96 (1961), the plaintiffs attempted to attribute a disappointingly low recovery to the trial court’s refusal to propound the following question on voir dire: “Have you read any article or literature or have you heard any discussion recently on amounts of verdicts in negligence cases, and, if so, have you formed any ideas with reference to amounts of jury verdicts?” They complained on appeal that the question was “motivated by their desire to counteract what they characterize as a ‘steady stream of indoctrination’ flowing from the insur

1993In Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 224 Md. 195 , 167 A.2d 96 (1961), the plaintiffs attempted to attribute a disappointingly low recovery to the trial court’s refusal to propound the following question on voir dire: “Have you read any article or literature or have you heard any discussion recently on amounts of verdicts in negligence cases, and, if so, have you formed any ideas with reference to amounts of jury verdicts?” They complained on appeal that the question was “motivated by their desire to counteract what they characterize as a ‘steady stream of indoctrination’ flowing from the insur

1986The same kind of analysis, and language, was used in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), decided the same day as Janis .

1986The same kind of analysis, and language, was used in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), decided the same day as Janis .

1978If not, why did the Supreme Court expressly reserve the question in Greene v. Massey, 437 U. S. 19 , 98 S. Ct. 2151 , 2155 n. 9 (1978)?

1978If not, why did the Supreme Court expressly reserve the question in Greene v. Massey, 437 U. S. 19 , 98 S. Ct. 2151 , 2155 n. 9 (1978)?

1969We must assume that this rebuke and admonition removed any prejudice carried by the argument.” In Garza v. State, 94 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.), where the appellant was convicted of larceny, the prosecutor told the jury: “I don’t believe that this defendant ever thought of offering this kind of defense until he talked with counsel for the defense.” Upon objection to this statement by defense attorney, the trial judge said, “Let’s not have any mudslinging in this case,” and turning to the jury said, “Gentlemen, I think counsel for the defense is all right; if I hadn’t, I would never have appointed him t

1881Stiebel, 31 Md., 34 , said that the language of this Act must be accorded the same construction which had been given to the same language when used in the attachment law.