23 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1933–2024 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Horne v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Horne v. State, 262 Ga. App. 604, 606 (1) ( 586 SE2d 13 ) (2003) (the admission of evidence bolstering a witness’ credibility is not the kind of error that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of a judicial proceeding). (b) Admission of prior difficulties evidence Mullins argues that the trial court erred in failing to give a sua sponte limiting instruction following McCurry’s testimony about prior difficulties between Solley and him. 2009See Horne v. State, 262 Ga. App. 604, 606 (1) ( 586 SE2d 13 ) (2003) (the admission of evidence bolstering a witness’ credibility is not the kind of error that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of a judicial proceeding). (b) Admission of prior difficulties evidence Mullins argues that the trial court erred in failing to give a sua sponte limiting instruction following McCurry’s testimony about prior difficulties between Solley and him. | 4 | 6 |
Frazier v. Stategreen2 sentences2007(Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Frazier v. State, 278 Ga.App. 685, 687 (1)(a), 629 S.E.2d 568 (2006). 2007(Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Frazier v. State, 278 Ga.App. 685, 687 (1)(a), 629 S.E.2d 568 (2006). | 2 | 2 |
Rogers v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See also Rogers v. State, 247 Ga. App. 219, 226-227 (9) ( 543 SE2d 81 ) (2000). 2006See also Rogers v. State, 247 Ga. App. 219, 226-227 (9) ( 543 SE2d 81 ) (2000). | 2 | 2 |
Elkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See id. at 333 (3) (g). 34 have elsewhere held is required in determining whether an old code rule carries forward. 2024See id. at 333 (3) (g). 34 have elsewhere held is required in determining whether an old code rule carries forward. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 94-70green2 sentences2023See Inquiry Concerning Baker, 313 Ga. at 361 (1), 362-363 (2) (Court finding itself unable to conclude, without additional information, that judge violated Rule 1.2 (A) by receiving assistance from court staff on personal matters, giving city solicitor feedback on prosecutors’ performance, and requesting reassignment of certain prosecutors); Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 94-70, 265 Ga. 326, 329 (3) (454 SE2d 780) (1995) (concluding that magistrate obtaining felony warrants for entire board of commissioners in the midst of a political squabble 23 involving her salary violated former 2023See Inquiry Concerning Baker, 313 Ga. at 361 (1), 362-363 (2) (Court finding itself unable to conclude, without additional information, that judge violated Rule 1.2 (A) by receiving assistance from court staff on personal matters, giving city solicitor feedback on prosecutors’ performance, and requesting reassignment of certain prosecutors); Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 94-70, 265 Ga. 326, 329 (3) (454 SE2d 780) (1995) (concluding that magistrate obtaining felony warrants for entire board of commissioners in the midst of a political squabble 23 involving her salary violated former | 1 | 1 |
Marbury v. Madisongreen1 sentence2023This kind of analysis is especially difficult when the language in question was first enacted long ago and rarely interpreted since, because those important contextual clues can be more difficult to unearth, and the ordinary meaning of language can change over time.” (citation omitted)). 14 “interpret” and “apply . . . to particular cases.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-177 (2 LE 60) (1803). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lanegreen2 sentences2023Even assuming that any error in seating Juror No. 22 is the kind of error that we can aggregate with evidentiary errors (which we have not identified here) or trial- counsel deficiencies (one of which we have presumed), Young has not provided any argument or otherwise “demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for these [alleged] failures, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 334 (4) (877 SE2d 202) (2022) (cumulative effect of a presumed clear error by the trial court not giving an accomplice corroboration charge, a presumed deficiency by 2023Even assuming that any error in seating Juror No. 22 is the kind of error that we can aggregate with evidentiary errors (which we have not identified here) or trial- counsel deficiencies (one of which we have presumed), Young has not provided any argument or otherwise “demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for these [alleged] failures, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 334 (4) (877 SE2d 202) (2022) (cumulative effect of a presumed clear error by the trial court not giving an accomplice corroboration charge, a presumed deficiency by | 1 | 1 |
Olevik v. Stategreen2 sentences2023See also State v. SASS Group, LLC, 315 Ga. 893, 898 (II) (a) n.7 (885 SE2d 761) (2023) (noting that constitutional interpretation is an “objective” inquiry into the “public” meaning of constitutional language, not a “subjective” inquiry into what constitutional language means to a select few); Olevik, 302 Ga. at 236 (2) (c) (i) (“A provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 2023This kind of analysis is especially difficult when the language in question was first enacted long ago and rarely interpreted since, because those important contextual clues can be more difficult to unearth, and the ordinary meaning of language can change over time.” (citation omitted)). 14 “public” meaning of constitutional language, not a “subjective” inquiry into what constitutional language means to a select few); Olevik, 302 Ga. at 236 (2) (c) (i) (“A provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its a | 1 | 1 |
Inquiry Concerning Judge Jadawnya Bakergreen2 sentences2023See Inquiry Concerning Baker, 313 Ga. at 361 (1), 362-363 (2) (Court finding itself unable to conclude, without additional information, that judge violated Rule 1.2 (A) by receiving assistance from court staff on personal matters, giving city solicitor feedback on prosecutors’ performance, and requesting reassignment of certain prosecutors); Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 94-70, 265 Ga. 326, 329 (3) (454 SE2d 780) (1995) (concluding that magistrate obtaining felony warrants for entire board of commissioners in the midst of a political squabble 23 involving her salary violated former 2023See Inquiry Concerning Baker, 313 Ga. at 361 (1), 362-363 (2) (Court finding itself unable to conclude, without additional information, that judge violated Rule 1.2 (A) by receiving assistance from court staff on personal matters, giving city solicitor feedback on prosecutors’ performance, and requesting reassignment of certain prosecutors); Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 94-70, 265 Ga. 326, 329 (3) ( 454 SE2d 780 ) (1995) (concluding that magistrate obtaining felony warrants for entire board of commissioners in the midst of a political squabble 23 involving her salary violated forme | 1 | 1 |
The STATE v. SASS GROUP, LLC (Two Cases)green1 sentence2023See also State v. SASS Group, LLC, 315 Ga. 893, 898 (II) (a) n.7 (885 SE2d 761) (2023) (noting that constitutional interpretation is an “objective” inquiry into the “public” meaning of constitutional language, not a “subjective” inquiry into what constitutional language means to a select few); Olevik, 302 Ga. at 236 (2) (c) (i) (“A provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Payne v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Even assuming that any error in seating Juror No. 22 is the kind of error that we can aggregate with evidentiary errors (which we have not identified here) or trial- counsel deficiencies (one of which we have presumed), Young has not provided any argument or otherwise “demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for these [alleged] failures, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 334 (4) (877 SE2d 202) (2022) (cumulative effect of a presumed clear error by the trial court not giving an accomplice corroboration charge, a presumed deficiency by 2023Even assuming that any error in seating Juror No. 22 is the kind of error that we can aggregate with evidentiary errors (which we have not identified here) or trial- counsel deficiencies (one of which we have presumed), Young has not provided any argument or otherwise “demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for these [alleged] failures, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 334 (4) (877 SE2d 202) (2022) (cumulative effect of a presumed clear error by the trial court not giving an accomplice corroboration charge, a presumed deficiency by | 1 | 1 |
Gunter v. National City Bankgreen2 sentences2022City Bank, 239 Ga. 496, 497 ( 238 SE2d 48 ) (1977), and “[d]enial of a request to [do so] is not ground for reversal.” Price v. Star Svc. & Petroleum Corp., 119 Ga. App. 171, 179 (3) ( 166 SE2d 593 ) (1969). 2022City Bank, 239 Ga. 496, 497 ( 238 SE2d 48 ) (1977), and “[d]enial of a request to [do so] is not ground for reversal.” Price v. Star Svc. & Petroleum Corp., 119 Ga. App. 171, 179 (3) ( 166 SE2d 593 ) (1969). | 1 | 1 |
Price v. Star Service & Petroleum Corp.green2 sentences2022City Bank, 239 Ga. 496, 497 ( 238 SE2d 48 ) (1977), and “[d]enial of a request to [do so] is not ground for reversal.” Price v. Star Svc. & Petroleum Corp., 119 Ga. App. 171, 179 (3) ( 166 SE2d 593 ) (1969). 2022City Bank, 239 Ga. 496, 497 ( 238 SE2d 48 ) (1977), and “[d]enial of a request to [do so] is not ground for reversal.” Price v. Star Svc. & Petroleum Corp., 119 Ga. App. 171, 179 (3) ( 166 SE2d 593 ) (1969). | 1 | 1 |
Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach Countygreen1 sentence2018"The [Supreme] Court has rejected an assertion of mootness in this kind of challenge only when there is a substantial likelihood that the offending policy will be reinstated if the suit is terminated." (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 1283-1284 (II). | 1 | 1 |
Dart v. Houstongreen2 sentences1974The funds of a school board are public property and not subject to process, Dart v. Houston, 22 Ga. 506, 532, 535 , or to garnishment, Fleishel v. Hightower, 62 Ga. 324 (2), supra. Moreover, the remedy of mandamus could not avail because of the constitutional prohibition against payment of this kind of claim from school taxation. 1974The funds of a school board are public property and not subject to process, Dart v. Houston, 22 Ga. 506, 532, 535 , or to garnishment, Fleishel v. Hightower, 62 Ga. 324 (2), supra. Moreover, the remedy of mandamus could not avail because of the constitutional prohibition against payment of this kind of claim from school taxation. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt
green
2 sentences2023We conclude that Taylor has not satisfied that burden here. 2 Following the framework this Court laid out in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731 (691 SE2d 218) (2010), and earlier cases addressing Georgia’s constitutional right to trial by jury, we conclude that although Taylor’s claim for premises liability would have been available in Georgia in 1798,2 and although juries were authorized to award in certain instances damages to punish the defendant and not merely to compensate the plaintiff, Taylor has failed to show that a Georgia jury in 1798 was authorized to awa 2023We conclude that Taylor has not satisfied that burden here. 2 Following the framework this Court laid out in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731 (691 SE2d 218) (2010), and earlier cases addressing Georgia’s constitutional right to trial by jury, we conclude that although Taylor’s claim for premises liability would have been available in Georgia in 1798,2 and although juries were authorized to award in certain instances damages to punish the defendant and not merely to compensate the plaintiff, Taylor has failed to show that a Georgia jury in 1798 was authorized to awa | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Minnesota v. Murphy
green
1 sentence2012In Mann v. State, 154 Ga. App. 677,681 (4) ( 269 SE2d 863 ) (1980), we held that a probation “condition requiring the probationer to submit to polygraph'tests does not violate the [probationer’s] Fifth Amendment rights.” We reasoned that “[t]he intrusion into the area of self-incrimination is no greater than a requirement that a probationer answer all reasonable inquiries of his probation officer” (citation and punctuation omitted), id., the kind of requirement the United States Supreme Court tacitly approved in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U. S. 420 (104 SC 1136, 79 LE2d 409) (1984). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Mann v. State
green
2 sentences2012In Mann v. State, 154 Ga. App. 677,681 (4) ( 269 SE2d 863 ) (1980), we held that a probation “condition requiring the probationer to submit to polygraph'tests does not violate the [probationer’s] Fifth Amendment rights.” We reasoned that “[t]he intrusion into the area of self-incrimination is no greater than a requirement that a probationer answer all reasonable inquiries of his probation officer” (citation and punctuation omitted), id., the kind of requirement the United States Supreme Court tacitly approved in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U. S. 420 (104 SC 1136, 79 LE2d 409) (1984). 2012In Mann v. State, 154 Ga. App. 677,681 (4) ( 269 SE2d 863 ) (1980), we held that a probation “condition requiring the probationer to submit to polygraph'tests does not violate the [probationer’s] Fifth Amendment rights.” We reasoned that “[t]he intrusion into the area of self-incrimination is no greater than a requirement that a probationer answer all reasonable inquiries of his probation officer” (citation and punctuation omitted), id., the kind of requirement the United States Supreme Court tacitly approved in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U. S. 420 (104 SC 1136, 79 LE2d 409) (1984). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences1987Barker v. Wingo, supra, identifies four factors relevant to this kind of claim, viz: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.” Perry v. Mitchell, supra. Although the delay in this case was lengthy, it “does not. . . evidence that most serious abuse — ‘A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense . . .’ Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U. S. at 531 .” Perry v. Mitchell, supra at 594-95. 1987Barker v. Wingo, supra, identifies four factors relevant to this kind of claim, viz: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.” Perry v. Mitchell, supra. Although the delay in this case was lengthy, it “does not. . . evidence that most serious abuse — ‘A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense . . .’ Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U. S. at 531 .” Perry v. Mitchell, supra at 594-95. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Woodard v. State
green
2 sentences1977Drake argues that Stapleton v. State, 235 Ga. 513 ( 220 SE2d 269 ) (1975) and Woodard v. State, 234 Ga. 901 ( 218 SE2d 629 ) (1975) approved the kind of instruction given, but that in neither of those cases was there the added aggravation as here of the judge's statement in the jury's presence that counsel wanted to advise defendant of his right not to testify. 1977Drake argues that Stapleton v. State, 235 Ga. 513 ( 220 SE2d 269 ) (1975) and Woodard v. State, 234 Ga. 901 ( 218 SE2d 629 ) (1975) approved the kind of instruction given, but that in neither of those cases was there the added aggravation as here of the judge's statement in the jury's presence that counsel wanted to advise defendant of his right not to testify. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Wynn v. State
green
2 sentences1977Drake argues that in this situation we should follow Wynn v. State, 230 Ga. 202 ( 196 SE2d 401 ) (1973), in which error was found where "the trial judge, already aware that the defendant had elected to make an unsworn statement, insisted on advising him in the presence of the jury concerning his right to be sworn as a witness and to make an unsworn statement." Id. at 203 . 1977Drake argues that in this situation we should follow Wynn v. State, 230 Ga. 202 ( 196 SE2d 401 ) (1973), in which error was found where "the trial judge, already aware that the defendant had elected to make an unsworn statement, insisted on advising him in the presence of the jury concerning his right to be sworn as a witness and to make an unsworn statement." Id. at 203 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Stapleton v. State
green
2 sentences1977Drake argues that Stapleton v. State, 235 Ga. 513 ( 220 SE2d 269 ) (1975) and Woodard v. State, 234 Ga. 901 ( 218 SE2d 629 ) (1975) approved the kind of instruction given, but that in neither of those cases was there the added aggravation as here of the judge's statement in the jury's presence that counsel wanted to advise defendant of his right not to testify. 1977Drake argues that Stapleton v. State, 235 Ga. 513 ( 220 SE2d 269 ) (1975) and Woodard v. State, 234 Ga. 901 ( 218 SE2d 629 ) (1975) approved the kind of instruction given, but that in neither of those cases was there the added aggravation as here of the judge's statement in the jury's presence that counsel wanted to advise defendant of his right not to testify. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Coleman v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1975Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing assumes increased importance and the procedures become more complex, the likelihood that it can be held promptly after arrest diminishes... 1975Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing assumes increased importance and the procedures become more complex, the likelihood that it can be held promptly after arrest diminishes ... | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Fleishel v. Hightower
neutral
2 sentences1974The funds of a school board are public property and not subject to process, Dart v. Houston, 22 Ga. 506, 532, 535 , or to garnishment, Fleishel v. Hightower, 62 Ga. 324 (2), supra. Moreover, the remedy of mandamus could not avail because of the constitutional prohibition against payment of this kind of claim from school taxation. 1974The funds of a school board are public property and not subject to process, Dart v. Houston, 22 Ga. 506, 532, 535 , or to garnishment, Fleishel v. Hightower, 62 Ga. 324 (2), supra. Moreover, the remedy of mandamus could not avail because of the constitutional prohibition against payment of this kind of claim from school taxation. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Underwood v. Atlanta & West Point Railroad
green
2 sentences1972Co., 105 Ga. App. 340 (5) ( 124 SE2d 758 ) the plaintiff sought to establish the kind of warning device used in grade crossings other than that at the location involved. 1972Co., 105 Ga. App. 340 (5) ( 124 SE2d 758 ) the plaintiff sought to establish the kind of warning device used in grade crossings other than that at the location involved. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Vulcan Materials Co. v. Griffith
green
1 sentence1965The kind of hearing is not prescribed, and irrespective of what is shown at such hearings, the authorities are given absolute power to proceed as they choose in total disregard of what such hearings reveal.” Vulcan Materials Co. v. Griffith, 215 Ga. 811, 815 , supra. The court did not err in sustaining the general demurrers of the separate defendants. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Peerless Mineral Springs Co. v. German American Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1933In the case of Peerless Mineral Springs Company v. German American Insurance Company of New York, 151 Wis. 352 ( 138 N. W. 1023 ), it was said: "When the defendant executed this policy making the loss, if any, payable to D. 1933In the case of Peerless Mineral Springs Company v. German American Insurance Company of New York, 151 Wis. 352 ( 138 N. W. 1023 ), it was said: "When the defendant executed this policy making the loss, if any, payable to D. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.