kind error in New York

2014The provisions of this [section] are intended to expressly waive, opt out of and be in lieu of any rights any Partner or the Partnership may have to ‘unfinished business’ of the Partnership, as the term is defined in Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal.App.3d 171 [203 Cal Rptr 13] (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1984), or as otherwise might be provided in the absence of this provision through the interpretation or application of the [California Uniform Partnership Act of 1994, as amended].” This kind of waiver is referred to as a “Jewel Waiver,” after Jewel v Boxer (156 Cal App 3d 171 [Cal Ct App 1984]), the intermedi

2014The provisions of this [section] are intended to expressly waive, opt out of and be in lieu of any rights any Partner of the Partnership may have to "unfinished business" of the Partnership, as the term is defined in Jewel v Boxer, 156 Cal. App.3d 171 [ 203 Cal. Rptr. 13 ] (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1984), or as otherwise might be provided in the absence of this provision through the interpretation of the [California Uniform Partnership Act of 1994, as amended]." This kind of waiver is referred to as a "Jewel Waiver," - 2 - - 3 - Nos. 136 & 137 after Jewel v Boxer (156 Cal App 3d 171 [Cal Ct App 1984]

2025The Court notes that a taint hearing was ordered in People v. Michael M. , 162 Misc 2d 803 (Sup. Ct., Kings County 1994).

2025The Court notes that a taint hearing was ordered in People v. Michael M. , 162 Misc 2d 803 (Sup. Ct., Kings County 1994).

2018Nevertheless, disregarding the kind of analysis we regularly employ in those cases, the majority concludes that the victim's "slight pain" and "little problems" are legally sufficient to establish "serious physical injury." The requirements set out in Stewart are similar to our approach in the no-fault context, where we have said that "subjective {**32 NY3d at 1100}complaints alone are not sufficient" to establish serious injury, and that claims must be supported by "objective evidence" ( Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys. , 98 NY2d 345, 350-351 [2002]).

2014This kind of error warrants late filing relief (see Matter of Gherardi v City of New York, 294 AD2d 101 [1st Dept 2002]; Tadros v New York City Health & Hosps.

2014This kind of error warrants late filing relief ( see Matter of Gherardi v City of New York , 294 AD2d 101 [1st Dept 2002]; Tadros v New York City Health & Hosps.

2011That legal error, however, would not be the kind of error that implicates “an unlawful use or abuse of the entire action or proceeding as distinguished from an unlawful procedure or error in the action or proceeding itself related to the proper purpose of the action or proceeding” (Matter of State of New York v King, 36 NY2d at 64 ).

2010As the Court of Appeals noted in Lama, under the out-of-pocket rule “the loss of an alternative contractual bargain . . . cannot serve as a basis for fraud or misrepresentation damages because the loss of the bargain was ‘undeterminable and speculative’ ” ( 88 NY2d at 422 , quoting Dress Shirt Sales v Hotel Martinique Assoc., 12 NY2d 339, 344 [1963]; see also Rather v CBS Corp., 68 AD3d 49, 58 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 715 [2010]; Geary v Hunton & Williams, 257 AD2d 482 [1999]; Alpert v Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 AD2d 67, 72 [1990]).

2010As the Court of Appeals noted in Lama, under the out-of-pocket rule “the loss of an alternative contractual bargain . . . cannot serve as a basis for fraud or misrepresentation damages because the loss of the bargain was ‘undeterminable and speculative’ ” ( 88 NY2d at 422 , quoting Dress Shirt Sales v Hotel Martinique Assoc., 12 NY2d 339, 344 [1963]; see also Rather v CBS Corp., 68 AD3d 49, 58 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 715 [2010]; Geary v Hunton & Williams, 257 AD2d 482 [1999]; Alpert v Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 AD2d 67, 72 [1990]).

1999Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” (Wayte v United States, 470 US 598, 607 [1985].) In terms of challenging a District Attorney’s decision not to prosecute, the court in Matter of Hassan v Magistrates’ Ct. ( 20 Misc 2d 509 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1959], appeal dismissed 10 AD2d 908 [2d Dept 1960], Iv dismissed 8 NY2d 750 [1960], cert denied 3

1999Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” (Wayte v United States, 470 US 598, 607 [1985].) In terms of challenging a District Attorney’s decision not to prosecute, the court in Matter of Hassan v Magistrates’ Ct. ( 20 Misc 2d 509 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1959], appeal dismissed 10 AD2d 908 [2d Dept 1960], Iv dismissed 8 NY2d 750 [1960], cert denied 3

1999Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” (Wayte v United States, 470 US 598, 607 [1985].) In terms of challenging a District Attorney’s decision not to prosecute, the court in Matter of Hassan v Magistrates’ Ct. ( 20 Misc 2d 509 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1959], appeal dismissed 10 AD2d 908 [2d Dept 1960], Iv dismissed 8 NY2d 750 [1960], cert denied 3

1999Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” (Wayte v United States, 470 US 598, 607 [1985].) In terms of challenging a District Attorney’s decision not to prosecute, the court in Matter of Hassan v Magistrates’ Ct. ( 20 Misc 2d 509 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1959], appeal dismissed 10 AD2d 908 [2d Dept 1960], Iv dismissed 8 NY2d 750 [1960], cert denied 3

1998Prosecutors in capital cases are not held to a higher standard of accountability. “[T]he policy considerations behind a prosecutor’s traditionally ‘wide discretion’ suggest the impropriety of our requiring prosecutors to defend their decisions to seek death penalties” (McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279, 296 [1987]; Proffitt v Florida, 428 US 242 [1976]; Jurek v Texas, 428 US 262 [1976]).

1998Prosecutors in capital cases are not held to a higher standard of accountability. “[T]he policy considerations behind a prosecutor’s traditionally ‘wide discretion’ suggest the impropriety of our requiring prosecutors to defend their decisions to seek death penalties” (McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279, 296 [1987]; Proffitt v Florida, 428 US 242 [1976]; Jurek v Texas, 428 US 262 [1976]).

1997The court’s attempt to rectify this kind of error at sentencing comes too late and exceeds the scope of its authority (see, CPL 320.20 [4]; People v Carter, 63 NY2d 530, 538 ; People v Colon, 65 NY2d 888 , 890; People v Ford, 62 NY2d 275 ; cf., People v Boettcher, 69 NY2d 174, 180 ).

1997After formal rendition of a verdict at a bench trial, a trial court lacks authority to reweigh the factual evidence and reconsider the verdict (see, People v Carter, supra, 63 NY2d, at 538-539 ; People v Goodfriend, 64 NY2d 695, 697 ; People v Ventura, 66 NY2d 693, 694-695 ; cf ., CPL 330.30 [1], People v Alfaro, 66 NY2d 985, 987 ).

1997After formal rendition of a verdict at a bench trial, a trial court lacks authority to reweigh the factual evidence and reconsider the verdict (see, People v Carter, supra, 63 NY2d, at 538-539 ; People v Goodfriend, 64 NY2d 695, 697 ; People v Ventura, 66 NY2d 693, 694-695 ; cf ., CPL 330.30 [1], People v Alfaro, 66 NY2d 985, 987 ).

1997The court’s attempt to rectify this kind of error at sentencing comes too late and exceeds the scope of its authority (see, CPL 320.20 [4]; People v Carter, 63 NY2d 530, 538 ; People v Colon, 65 NY2d 888 , 890; People v Ford, 62 NY2d 275 ; cf., People v Boettcher, 69 NY2d 174, 180 ).

1997The court’s attempt to rectify this kind of error at sentencing comes too late and exceeds the scope of its authority (see, CPL 320.20 [4]; People v Carter, 63 NY2d 530, 538 ; People v Colon, 65 NY2d 888 , 890; People v Ford, 62 NY2d 275 ; cf., People v Boettcher, 69 NY2d 174, 180 ).

1997After formal rendition of a verdict at a bench trial, a trial court lacks authority to reweigh the factual evidence and reconsider the verdict (see, People v Carter, supra, 63 NY2d, at 538-539 ; People v Goodfriend, 64 NY2d 695, 697 ; People v Ventura, 66 NY2d 693, 694-695 ; cf ., CPL 330.30 [1], People v Alfaro, 66 NY2d 985, 987 ).