kind inquiry in Arkansas

2010What is more, in addressing specifically the error that the defendant’s trial counsel failed to object to a statement made by the prosecutor during sentencing, we said “if the error is predicated on counsel’s failure to object, then it is the kind of error that should be addressed in a Rule 37 proceeding, not in a direct appeal where the issue is admittedly not preserved for appeal.” Buckley, 349 Ark. at 69 , 76 S.W.3d at 835 ; see also Anderson v. State, 353 Ark. 384 , 108 S.W.3d 592 (2003).

2010What is more, in addressing specifically the error that the defendant’s trial counsel failed to object to a statement made by the prosecutor during sentencing, we said “if the error is predicated on counsel’s failure to object, then it is the kind of error that should be addressed in a Rule 37 proceeding, not in a direct appeal where the issue is admittedly not preserved for appeal.” Buckley, 349 Ark. at 69 , 76 S.W.3d at 835 ; see also Anderson v. State, 353 Ark. 384 , 108 S.W.3d 592 (2003).

2025Recognizing an absence of Arkansas case law on point, the supreme court discussed that other jurisdictions had addressed the proffer of a subsequent will and whether it triggers a no-contest clause, and it concluded that “such an action, if not undertaken in good faith, can constitute the kind of challenge that triggers a will’s no-contest clause.” Id. at 364 , 266 S.W.3d at 726 .

2025Recognizing an absence of Arkansas case law on point, the supreme court discussed that other jurisdictions had addressed the proffer of a subsequent will and whether it triggers a no-contest clause, and it concluded that “such an action, if not undertaken in good faith, can constitute the kind of challenge that triggers a will’s no-contest clause.” Id. at 364 , 266 S.W.3d at 726 .

2003In other words, an analysis of a conflict of interest under Mickens requires the same kind of analysis — and the same kind of demonstration of prejudice •— that is required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as opposed to the presumption of prejudice (and the consequent automatic reversal) that was explained in Holloway.

2002In other words, an analysis of a conflict of interest under Mickens requires the same kind of analysis — and the same kind of demonstration of prejudice — that is required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as opposed to the presumption of prejudice (and the consequent automatic reversal) that was explained in Holloway.

2018"In other words, mutuality was deemed lacking because the check casher could litigate the only kind of claim that it might have against a borrower." Reg'l Care , 2014 Ark. 361 , at 8, 444 S.W.3d at 361 .

2018"In other words, mutuality was deemed lacking because the check casher could litigate the only kind of claim that it might have against a borrower." Reg'l Care , 2014 Ark. 361 , at 8, 444 S.W.3d at 361 .

2016McConaughy v. Lockhart, 310 Ark. 585 , 840 S.W.2d 166 (1992). 3 Cite as 2016 Ark. 326 Ineffective assistance is the type of factual issue that requires the kind of inquiry well beyond the facial validity of the commitment.

2016McConaughy v. Lockhart, 310 Ark. 585 , 840 S.W.2d 166 (1992). 3 Cite as 2016 Ark. 326 Ineffective assistance is the type of factual issue that requires the kind of inquiry well beyond the facial validity of the commitment.

2016McConaughy v. Lockhart, 310 Ark. 585 , 840 S.W.2d 166 (1992). 3 Cite as 2016 Ark. 326 Ineffective assistance is the type of factual issue that requires the kind of inquiry well beyond the facial validity of the commitment.

2015Id.

2013Culbertson, 2012 Ark. 112 ; Skinner, 2011 2 Cite as 2013 Ark. 309 Ark. 383; Friend, 364 Ark. at 317 , 219 S.W.3d at 125 .

2013Culbertson, 2012 Ark. 112 ; Skinner, 2011 Ark. 383 ; Friend, 2 Cite as 2013 Ark. 335 364 Ark. at 317 , 219 S.W.3d at 125 .

1999Trimble v. State, 316 Ark. at 169 .

1994See generally Vickers v. State, 313 Ark. 64 , 852 S.W.2d 787 (1993); Manatt v. State, 311 Ark. 17 , 842 S.W.2d 845 (1992).

1994See generally Vickers v. State, 313 Ark. 64 , 852 S.W.2d 787 (1993); Manatt v. State, 311 Ark. 17 , 842 S.W.2d 845 (1992).

1990Appellant contends, however, that this rule was changed by the supreme court’s decision in First State Bank of Morrilton v. Hallett, 291 Ark. 37 , 722 S.W.2d 555 (1987), and certainly language in that case supports appellant’s position.

1990Appellant contends, however, that this rule was changed by the supreme court’s decision in First State Bank of Morrilton v. Hallett, 291 Ark. 37 , 722 S.W.2d 555 (1987), and certainly language in that case supports appellant’s position.

1988An example of the kind of inquiry and further explanation needed when such a universal reason is given can be found in People v. Charron, 193 Cal.App.3d 981 , 238 Cal.Rptr. 660 (1987).

1988An example of the kind of inquiry and further explanation needed when such a universal reason is given can be found in People v. Charron, 193 Cal.App.3d 981 , 238 Cal.Rptr. 660 (1987).

1988We have been concerned with the argument that the peremptory challenge of one potential juror cannot possibly demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination in the sense of showing a “pattern” of discrimination, not as that term was used in Swain v. Alabama, supra, but as it was used in the Batson case.

1966Appellant objects to the giving of appellee’s instruction No. 5 on the ground that it allowed the jury to “determine the difference in the fair market value of the plaintiff’s vehicle immediately before the fire and the fair market value of plaintiff’s vehicle immediately after the fire.” This kind of instruction was approved in the Williams case, supra, and Slaughter v. Barrett (decided November 15, 1965), 239 Ark. 957 , 395 S. W. 2d 552 , and cases therein cited. 6.

1966Appellant objects to the giving of appellee’s instruction No. 5 on the ground that it allowed the jury to “determine the difference in the fair market value of the plaintiff’s vehicle immediately before the fire and the fair market value of plaintiff’s vehicle immediately after the fire.” This kind of instruction was approved in the Williams case, supra, and Slaughter v. Barrett (decided November 15, 1965), 239 Ark. 957 , 395 S. W. 2d 552 , and cases therein cited. 6.

1953Inasmuch as the statute does not specify the notice to be given upon an application of this kind the rule is that the procedure chosen must be “reasonably calculated” to afford the opposite party an opportunity to be heard; Schley v. Dodge, 206 Ark. 1151 , 178 S. W. 2d 851 .

1953Inasmuch as the statute does not specify the notice to be given upon an application of this kind the rule is that the procedure chosen must be “reasonably calculated” to afford the opposite party an opportunity to be heard; Schley v. Dodge, 206 Ark. 1151 , 178 S. W. 2d 851 .

1924In construing this kind of a clause in an accident policy, this court said, in the case of Maloney v. Maryland Casualty Co., 113 Ark. 174 , “she (referring to the beneficiary) could not know whether she had a claim until after' her husband’s death; and she was not required to give notice of the accident on account of which her claim arose before she knew whether or not it would come into existence.” No error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.

1919Attorney General, supra, we said of the statute quoted that it ‘ ‘ does, as before stated, contain a provision for the payment of debts and the distribution of assets, but this does not, for obvious reasons, apply to the recovery of a penalty.” And in the same case it was also said: “Since there is no provision in the statute for the payment of this kind of a claim against a dissolved corporation, it is plain that there can be neither a continuation of the action nor a revival thereof.

1893Co. v. Thompson, 57 Ark. 279 , by Battle, J., held that the failure of the assured to perform an agreement of this kind would bar recovery.