104 California opinions name it 3 courts 1924–2026 17 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hope v. Arrowhead & Puritas Waters, Inc.green2 sentences1976He notes that not allowing him to cross-examine them in that fashion “permitted the defense experts to testify that the working conditions were safe and met the standard of care in the construction industry when they knew that there were two direct violations of Safety Orders.” In support of his position, plaintiff cites Hope v. Arrowhead & Puritas Waters, Inc., 174 Cal.App.2d 222, 230 [ 344 P.2d 428 ]: “Once an expert offers his opinion ... he exposes himself to the kind of inquiry which ordinarily would have no place in the cross-examination of a *858 factual witness. 1976He notes that not allowing him to cross-examine them in that fashion “permitted the defense experts to testify that the working conditions were safe and met the standard of care in the construction industry when they knew that there were two direct violations of Safety Orders.” In support of his position, plaintiff cites Hope v. Arrowhead & Puritas Waters, Inc., 174 Cal.App.2d 222, 230 [ 344 P.2d 428 ]: “Once an expert offers his opinion ... he exposes himself to the kind of inquiry which ordinarily would have no place in the cross-examination of a *858 factual witness. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Watsongreen2 sentences2022Rules Crim.Proc., rule 52(b), 18 U.S.C. [the “presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations is not the kind of error that ‘affect[s] substantial rights’ independent of its prejudicial impact”].) “[I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis.” (Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 579 .)39 “ ‘Under article VI, section 13 of our state Constitution, trial error does not merit reversal of a judgment unless “the error complained of has resulted in a m 2022Rules Crim.Proc., rule 52(b), 18 U.S.C. [the “presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations is not the kind of error that ‘affect[s] substantial rights’ independent of its prejudicial impact”].) “[I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis.” (Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 579 .)39 “ ‘Under article VI, section 13 of our state Constitution, trial error does not merit reversal of a judgment unless “the error complained of has resulted in a m | 2 | 3 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences1988In Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393, 399 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 , 107 S.Ct. 1821, 1824 ], the United States Supreme Court suggested that the kind of error under consideration here may be held nonprejudicial only when “it had no effect on the jury . . . .” (Cf. Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. _ , _-_ [ 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 108 , S. Ct. 1792] (holding that errors of federal constitutional dimension occurring at the penalty phase of a capital trial are generally subject to harmless-error review under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L. 1988In Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393, 399 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 , 107 S.Ct. 1821, 1824 ], the United States Supreme Court suggested that the kind of error under consideration here may be held nonprejudicial only when “it had no effect on the jury . . . .” (Cf. Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. _ , _-_ [ 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 108 , S. Ct. 1792] (holding that errors of federal constitutional dimension occurring at the penalty phase of a capital trial are generally subject to harmless-error review under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L. | 2 | 2 |
Wisler v. California State Board of Accountancygreen2 sentences1966“Since it was incumbent upon the petitioner—both in mandate and certiorari—to prepare and file in the superior court a tran *579 script of such testimony if he wished to contend that the evidence was insufficient, his failure to do so precludes an attack on the evidence on this appeal.” (Fickeisen v. Civil Service Com., 98 Cal.App.2d 419, 420-421 [ 220 P.2d 605 ]; see Black v. State Personnel Board, 136 Cal.App.2d 904, 909 [ 289 P.2d 863 ].) “It is well settled that in a proceeding of this kind the hearing is a type of de novo trial but that the administrative record must be presented to the c 1966“Since it was incumbent upon the petitioner—both in mandate and certiorari—to prepare and file in the superior court a tran *579 script of such testimony if he wished to contend that the evidence was insufficient, his failure to do so precludes an attack on the evidence on this appeal.” (Fickeisen v. Civil Service Com., 98 Cal.App.2d 419, 420-421 [ 220 P.2d 605 ]; see Black v. State Personnel Board, 136 Cal.App.2d 904, 909 [ 289 P.2d 863 ].) “It is well settled that in a proceeding of this kind the hearing is a type of de novo trial but that the administrative record must be presented to the c | 2 | 2 |
Sponable v. Daregreen2 sentences1959(Estate of Dare, 196 Cal. 29, 41 [ 235 P. 725 ].) In our opinion, the “rents, issues and profits,” in the absence of any other specification or explanatory material in the will, is substantially synonjonous with the word “income” in a matter of the kind here at bar. 1959(Estate of Dare, 196 Cal. 29, 41 [ 235 P. 725 ].) In our opinion, the “rents, issues and profits,” in the absence of any other specification or explanatory material in the will, is substantially synonjonous with the word “income” in a matter of the kind here at bar. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Guitongreen2 sentences2026The first theory (inherently) is incorrect, but the second theory (as used) is correct.” (Id. at p. 7.) 6 The Supreme Court has “considered the consequences when a court instructs on two theories of guilt, one correct and the other incorrect.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 7 .) The Supreme Court “call[ed] this kind of error ‘alternative-theory error’” and “distinguished between two categories of incorrect theories.” (Id. at p. 7 & fn. 3.) A theory is ‘“factually inadequate”’ if “the theory is incorrect only because the evidence does not support it.” (Id. at p. 7.) If “‘the inadequacy of pr 2019Based on the state of the law at the time, in Guiton , we said that legal error is "subject to the rule generally requiring reversal." ( Guiton , supra , 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) But we also said that this does not mean that reversal is always required when the error is legal. ( Id . at p. 1129, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) Because the error in Guiton was purely factual, and thus subject to the lenient standard of review applicable to factually inadequate theories, we did not need to decide the exact standard of review of cases involving legal error. ( | 1 | 3 |
Wayte v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." ( Wayte v. United States (1985) 470 U.S. 598, 607 , 105 S.Ct. 1524 , 84 L.Ed.2d 547 .) Thus, the mere fact that a prosecutor must exercise discretion in determining whether to file a charge under section 707(d) in criminal or juvenile court does not render such decision unconstitutional as a violation of se 2001Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." ( Wayte v. United States (1985) 470 U.S. 598, 607 , 105 S.Ct. 1524 , 84 L.Ed.2d 547 .) Thus, the mere fact that a prosecutor must exercise discretion in determining whether to file a charge under section 707(d) in criminal or juvenile court does not render such decision unconstitutional as a violation of se | 1 | 3 |
People v. Halvorsengreen2 sentences2024Where an “information alleged two multiple-murder special circumstances, one in connection with each murder, and the jury 30 found both true,” our high court has concluded that “only one special circumstance finding is proper” and “one of the findings should be stricken.” (People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 425 .) “In numerous cases involving the same kind of error, [the Supreme Court] ha[s] stricken the superfluous finding and concluded the defendant suffered no prejudice.” (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 422 .) We reach the same conclusion and strike the second multiple murde 2008(See People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 422 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 721 , 165 P.3d 512 ].) “In numerous cases involving the same kind of error, we have stricken the superfluous finding and concluded the defendant suffered no prejudice. [Citations.] We do so again here. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) B. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Avenagreen2 sentences2024Where an “information alleged two multiple-murder special circumstances, one in connection with each murder, and the jury 30 found both true,” our high court has concluded that “only one special circumstance finding is proper” and “one of the findings should be stricken.” (People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 425 .) “In numerous cases involving the same kind of error, [the Supreme Court] ha[s] stricken the superfluous finding and concluded the defendant suffered no prejudice.” (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 422 .) We reach the same conclusion and strike the second multiple murde 2007Superfluous Multiple-murder Special-circumstance Finding Defendant correctly notes that two multiple-murder special-circumstance allegations were erroneously charged and found true in this case. ( People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 425 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 ; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 787 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ; People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 67 , 201 Cal.Rptr. 782 , 679 P.2d 433 .) In numerous cases involving the same kind of error, we have stricken the superfluous finding and concluded the defendant suffered no prejudice. | 1 | 2 |
Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.green2 sentences2011If it concludes, based on these factors, that a class arbitration is likely to be a significantly more effective practical means of vindicating the rights of the affected employees than individual litigation or arbitration, and finds that the disallowance of the class action will likely lead to a less comprehensive enforcement of overtime laws for the employees alleged to be affected by the employer’s violations, it must invalidate the class arbitration waiver to ensure that these employees can ‘vindicate [their] unwaivable rights in an arbitration forum.’ (Little [v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003 2011If it concludes, based on these factors, that a class arbitration is likely to be a significantly more effective practical means of vindicating the rights of the affected employees than individual litigation or arbitration, and finds that the disallowance of the class action will likely lead to a less comprehensive enforcement of overtime laws for the employees alleged to be affected by the employer’s violations, it must invalidate the class arbitration waiver to ensure that these employees can ‘vindicate [their] unwaivable rights in an arbitration forum.’ (Little [v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Sedenogreen2 sentences1993Sometimes it is possible to determine from other portions of the verdict that the jury necessarily found the defendant guilty on a proper theory. ( People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 24 [ 249 Cal. Rptr. 119 , 756 P.2d 843 ]; People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 770 [ 215 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 700 P.2d 782 ]; cf. People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 ] [applying the same analysis to find harmless the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense].) *1131 There may be additional ways by which a court can determine that error in the Green situation is harmless 1993Sometimes it is possible to determine from other portions of the verdict that the jury necessarily found the defendant guilty on a proper theory. ( People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 24 [ 249 Cal. Rptr. 119 , 756 P.2d 843 ]; People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 770 [ 215 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 700 P.2d 782 ]; cf. People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 ] [applying the same analysis to find harmless the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense].) *1131 There may be additional ways by which a court can determine that error in the Green situation is harmless | 1 | 2 |
Hitchcock v. Duggergreen2 sentences1988In Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393, 399 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 , 107 S.Ct. 1821, 1824 ], the United States Supreme Court suggested that the kind of error under consideration here may be held nonprejudicial only when “it had no effect on the jury . . . .” (Cf. Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. _ , _-_ [ 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 108 , S. Ct. 1792] (holding that errors of federal constitutional dimension occurring at the penalty phase of a capital trial are generally subject to harmless-error review under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L. 1988In Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393, 399 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 , 107 S.Ct. 1821, 1824 ], the United States Supreme Court suggested that the kind of error under consideration here may be held nonprejudicial only when “it had no effect on the jury . . . .” (Cf. Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. _ , _-_ [ 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 108 , S. Ct. 1792] (holding that errors of federal constitutional dimension occurring at the penalty phase of a capital trial are generally subject to harmless-error review under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Lancastergreen1 sentence2026The expert invites investigation into the extent of his knowledge, the reasons for his opinion including facts and other matters upon which it is based [citation], and which he took into consideration; and he may be ‘subjected to the most rigid cross-examination’ concerning his qualifications, and his opinion and its sources [citation].” (Italics added.)’ ” ’ ” (People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 26 ; see People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 105 .) Dr. Azizian testified on direct examination that he considered appellant’s arguably limited criminal history in forming his opinion that | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pellegrinogreen1 sentence2025(People v. Pellegrino (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 776, 781 (Pellegrino).) Again, delay of this kind does not bar prosecution. | 1 | 1 |
La Jolla Cove Motel & Hotel Apartments, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2023(See La Jolla Cove Motel & Hotel Apartments, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 773, 777 [court correctly denied disqualification motion where there was “no evidence that [offending lawyers] obtained any confidential information that could give their clients an unfair advantage or impact upon the fairness of the trial or integrity of the judicial system”]; see also Snider, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197 .) Although defendants and the court placed great weight on the fact that the A-Plus employees could not recall the full details of what they disclosed to Rothstein, we are not pe | 1 | 1 |
Richardson v. Superior Court of Tulare Countygreen1 sentence2023(See Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050 [“a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate ‘(1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 5 This is an ideal example of the kind of error that can be remedied if a timely objection is made. | 1 | 1 |
Snider v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2023(See La Jolla Cove Motel & Hotel Apartments, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 773, 777 [court correctly denied disqualification motion where there was “no evidence that [offending lawyers] obtained any confidential information that could give their clients an unfair advantage or impact upon the fairness of the trial or integrity of the judicial system”]; see also Snider, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197 .) Although defendants and the court placed great weight on the fact that the A-Plus employees could not recall the full details of what they disclosed to Rothstein, we are not pe 2023(See La Jolla Cove Motel & Hotel Apartments, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 773, 777 [court correctly denied disqualification motion where there was “no evidence that [offending lawyers] obtained any confidential information that could give their clients an unfair advantage or impact upon the fairness of the trial or integrity of the judicial system”]; see also Snider, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197 .) Although defendants and the court placed great weight on the fact that the A-Plus employees could not recall the full details of what they disclosed to Rothstein, we are not pe | 1 | 1 |
| Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. J.J.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Collinsred | 1 | 1 |
| San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Carlos R.green | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. City of Santa Monicagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Marshallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Friendgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sivongxxaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Moralesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| L. A. Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. C.P. (In re J.P.)green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Whaleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Valdezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bradygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Moralesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Alexandergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rodriguez v. Otogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Nyegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mickeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Braxtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Dennisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| At&T Mobility LLC v. Concepciongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1277 v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mancebogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Edwardsgreen1 sentence2025It would be inappropriate and a violation of due process and equal 4 People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183 (Edwards), overruled by Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at page 137, footnote 12. 11 protection to not afford [defendant] the same kind of hearing someone convicted of murder would get. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rose v. Clark
green
2 sentences2022Rules Crim.Proc., rule 52(b), 18 U.S.C. [the “presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations is not the kind of error that ‘affect[s] substantial rights’ independent of its prejudicial impact”].) “[I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis.” (Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 579 .)39 “ ‘Under article VI, section 13 of our state Constitution, trial error does not merit reversal of a judgment unless “the error complained of has resulted in a m 1987Harmless-error analysis thus presupposes a trial, at which the defendant, represented by counsel, may present evidence and argument before an impartial judge and jury.” (Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 470 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 ], citations and fn. omitted.) Defendant claims that the court reporter’s erroneous presence in the jury room during deliberations is the kind of error which necessarily renders a trial fundamentally unfair and hence requires automatic reversal. | 2 | 1987–2022 |
Rice v. Downs
green
2 sentences2018(See Rice, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 186, 188.) Nor is this a dispute about whether the number of shares Howard received, at the time they were originally issued to him, had been improperly calculated, which is exactly the kind of claim Howard released away in 2013. 2018(See Rice , supra , 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 186, 188, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 .) Nor is this a dispute about whether the number of shares Howard received, at the time they were originally issued to him, had been improperly calculated, which is exactly the kind of claim Howard released away in 2013. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2011If it concludes, based on these factors, that a class arbitration is likely to be a significantly more effective practical means of vindicating the rights of the affected employees than individual litigation or arbitration, and finds that the disallowance of the class action will likely lead to a less comprehensive enforcement of overtime laws for the employees alleged to be affected by the employer’s violations, it must invalidate the class arbitration waiver to ensure that these employees can ‘vindicate [their] unwaivable rights in an arbitration forum.’ (Little [v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003 2011If it concludes, based on these factors, that a class arbitration is likely to be a significantly more effective practical means of vindicating the rights of the affected employees than individual litigation or arbitration, and finds that the disallowance of the class action will likely lead to a less comprehensive enforcement of overtime laws for the employees alleged to be affected by the employer’s violations, it must invalidate the class arbitration waiver to ensure that these employees can ‘vindicate [their] unwaivable rights in an arbitration forum.’ (Little [v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003 | 2 | 2007–2011 |
Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011If it concludes, based on these factors, that a class arbitration is likely to be a significantly more effective practical means of vindicating the rights of the affected employees than individual litigation or arbitration, and finds that the disallowance of the class action will likely lead to a less comprehensive enforcement of overtime laws for the employees alleged to be affected by the employer’s violations, it must invalidate the class arbitration waiver to ensure that these employees can ‘vindicate [their] unwaivable rights in an arbitration forum.’ (Little [v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003 2011If it concludes, based on these factors, that a class arbitration is likely to be a significantly more effective practical means of vindicating the rights of the affected employees than individual litigation or arbitration, and finds that the disallowance of the class action will likely lead to a less comprehensive enforcement of overtime laws for the employees alleged to be affected by the employer’s violations, it must invalidate the class arbitration waiver to ensure that these employees can ‘vindicate [their] unwaivable rights in an arbitration forum.’ (Little [v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003 | 2 | 2007–2011 |
Satterwhite v. Texas
green
2 sentences1988(Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. 249 , [ 100 L.Ed.2d 284 , 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1797-1798 ].) In Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 347 , 107 S.Ct. 1821 ], the United States Supreme Court suggested that the kind of error under consideration here is subject to review under the Chapman test. 1988In Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393, 399 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 , 107 S.Ct. 1821, 1824 ], the United States Supreme Court suggested that the kind of error under consideration here may be held nonprejudicial only when “it had no effect on the jury . . . .” (Cf. Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. _ , _-_ [ 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 108 , S. Ct. 1792] (holding that errors of federal constitutional dimension occurring at the penalty phase of a capital trial are generally subject to harmless-error review under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L. | 2 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Henriquez
green
1 sentence2026The expert invites investigation into the extent of his knowledge, the reasons for his opinion including facts and other matters upon which it is based [citation], and which he took into consideration; and he may be ‘subjected to the most rigid cross-examination’ concerning his qualifications, and his opinion and its sources [citation].” (Italics added.)’ ” ’ ” (People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 26 ; see People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 105 .) Dr. Azizian testified on direct examination that he considered appellant’s arguably limited criminal history in forming his opinion that | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission
green
1 sentence2026(Nash, supra, 389 U.S. at p. 238 .) Although T-Alexander refers generally to a right to file a federal disability complaint, he does not identify any specific statutory authority immunizing his federal litigation activity from the operation of section 391 et seq.7 In any event, California’s vexatious litigant statutes do not preclude the filing of federal disability, or other, complaints. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Aledamat
green
2 sentences2026The first theory (inherently) is incorrect, but the second theory (as used) is correct.” (Id. at p. 7.) 6 The Supreme Court has “considered the consequences when a court instructs on two theories of guilt, one correct and the other incorrect.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 7 .) The Supreme Court “call[ed] this kind of error ‘alternative-theory error’” and “distinguished between two categories of incorrect theories.” (Id. at p. 7 & fn. 3.) A theory is ‘“factually inadequate”’ if “the theory is incorrect only because the evidence does not support it.” (Id. at p. 7.) If “‘the inadequacy of pr 2026The first theory (inherently) is incorrect, but the second theory (as used) is correct.” (Id. at p. 7.) 6 The Supreme Court has “considered the consequences when a court instructs on two theories of guilt, one correct and the other incorrect.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 7 .) The Supreme Court “call[ed] this kind of error ‘alternative-theory error’” and “distinguished between two categories of incorrect theories.” (Id. at p. 7 & fn. 3.) A theory is ‘“factually inadequate”’ if “the theory is incorrect only because the evidence does not support it.” (Id. at p. 7.) If “‘the inadequacy of pr | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Ramirez
green
1 sentence2025(Ramirez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1042 .) Indeed, the rule that we do not make this kind of presumption is especially apt here, where the trial court’s statements were made on the fly in response to a request by the prosecutor to clarify an entirely different point. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Hartman
green
1 sentence2025But it will be given minimal weight in the balancing test against prejudice to the defendant.17 People v. Hartman (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 572 (Hartman) illustrates how the principles we have discussed, put together, work in practice. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Sealfon v. United States
green
1 sentence2023He asserts that if the People are seeking a “non-bifurcated ‘trial by the jury’ on aggravating factors, then the only way to avoid violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause would be for the entire judgment” to be reversed, because Galvan “knows of no authority for retrial of a part of the charge.” Galvan cites Sealfon v. U.S. (1948) 332 U.S. 575 for the proposition that a “prior verdict of acquittal ‘operates to conclude those matters in issue which have been determined by a previous verdict, even though the offenses be different.’ ” Sealfon held that a defendant who had been acquitted of conspi | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
green
1 sentence2023(Tahoe-Sierra Presentation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) 535 U.S. 302, 330 .) “Anything less than a ‘complete elimination of value,’ or a ‘total loss,’ … would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn Central.” (Tahoe-Sierra, at p. 330.) Ramsey fails to demonstrate how the alleged inability to expand a nonconforming use currently renders his property valueless. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| In Re Giovanni F. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Ramos v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Apodaca v. Oregon red | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Pearson green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Rodriguez green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Crandell green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Hedgpeth v. Pulido green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Stutelberg green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Snyder v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Thomson v. Call green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Baral v. Schnitt green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Cummings green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Sullivan v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Neder v. United States green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Gainer green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Bahl v. Bank of America green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Lerma v. County of Orange green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Utz v. Aureguy green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Toro green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Arias green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Guiuan green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Gentry v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.