kind analysis in Texas

2010Our analysis of whether the evidence is factually sufficient is measured against the elements of the offense with the same kind of analysis as that applied in the test for a hypothetically correct jury 7 charge.4 Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.

2010Our analysis of whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient is measured against the elements of the offense with the same kind of analysis as that applied in the test for a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. 9 Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); see also Grotti v. State, 273 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex.Crim.App.2008).

2010Our analysis of whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient is measured against the elements of the offense with the same kind of analysis as that applied in the test for a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. 9 Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); see also Grotti v. State, 273 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex.Crim.App.2008).

2009Legal and Factual Sufficiency A. The Hypothetically Correct Jury Charge Our analysis of whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient is measured against the elements of the offense with the same kind of analysis as that applied in the test for a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. 1 Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); see also Grotti v. State, 273 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex.Crim.App.2008).

2009Indeed, the court of criminal appeals recently reversed an appellate court’s reversal of a trial court’s overruling of a motion to suppress, stating that although the behavior in question might in a vacuum have appeared to be perfectly innocent, when viewed in light of all of the circumstances, including the officer’s experience in detecting impaired drivers, the “lateness of the hour,” and rational inferences that could be drawn from the facts, the trial court “could have reasonably concluded that the articulated facts gave rise to enough suspicion to justify at least an investigation.” Curti

2009Indeed, the court of criminal appeals recently reversed an appellate court's reversal of a trial court's overruling of a motion to suppress, stating that although the behavior in question might in a vacuum have appeared to be perfectly innocent, when viewed in light of all of the circumstances, including the officer's experience in detecting impaired drivers, the "lateness of the hour," and rational inferences that could be drawn from the facts, the trial court "could have reasonably concluded that the articulated facts gave rise to enough suspicion to justify at least an investigation." Curti

2006Torts such as battery, false imprisonment or conversion probably would fall within the exception to church immunity set out in Sherbert [v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963)] because they pose a “substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.” It is also conceivable that torts such as defamation, infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy might be so unusual or egregious as to fall -within the Sherbert exception....

2006Torts such as battery, false imprisonment or conversion probably would fall within the exception to church immunity set out in Sherbert [v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963)] because they pose a “substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.” It is also conceivable that torts such as defamation, infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy might be so unusual or egregious as to fall -within the Sherbert exception....

1998See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (opinion on rehearing).

1998See Montgomery v. State , 810 S.W.2d 372, 389 (Tex. Crim.

2025Indeed, “[f]ew subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought.” Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C.

2025Indeed, “[f]ew subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought.” Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C.

2014Orgs.Code §§ 21.551-.563. 47 This Court first addressed this kind of a claim in the context of a closely held corporation nearly .sixty years ago in Patton. 279 S.W.2d at 849-53 .

2014CODE §§ 21.551–.563.47 This Court first addressed this kind of a claim in the context of a closely held corporation nearly sixty years ago in Patton. 279 S.W.2d at 849–53.

2000Concerning the application of the harmless error standard found in former TEX.R.APP.P. 81(b)(2) (now Rule 44.2), we held “appellate courts should not foreclose entire categories of error from harmless error review merely because such errors may generally resist a meaningful harmless error determination.” Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)(emphasis in original).

1998The Court of Criminal Appeals has specifically rejected Rachuig’s position that a total failure to admonish pursuant to article 26.13(a)(1) constitutes “structural error.” High v. State, 964 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (per curiam); see also Cain, 947 S.W.2d at 264 .

2025That decision of whether to prosecute involves a consideration of factors—such as the strength of the evidence, the deterrence value, the prosecutor’s available resources, and the office’s existing enforcement priorities—that are “not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” Id.

2025That decision of whether to prosecute involves a consideration of factors—such as the strength of the evidence, the deterrence value, the prosecutor’s available resources, and the office’s existing enforcement priorities—that are “not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” Id.

1956In Morriss-Buick Co. v. Pondrom, 131 Tex. 98 , 113 S.W.2d 889 , at page 890, the court said: “* * *■ true measure in every case of this kind is that rule which gives to the complaining party the actual amount of his loss resulting directly and proximately from the fraud practiced upon him * * We are also of the opinion that there is evidence to support issue (1-H), such reasons being set out in our discussion of point 4 which refers to our opinion on the plea of privilege appealed in this cause.

1956In Morriss-Buick Co. v. Pondrom, 131 Tex. 98 , 113 S.W.2d 889 , at page 890, the court said: “* * *■ true measure in every case of this kind is that rule which gives to the complaining party the actual amount of his loss resulting directly and proximately from the fraud practiced upon him * * We are also of the opinion that there is evidence to support issue (1-H), such reasons being set out in our discussion of point 4 which refers to our opinion on the plea of privilege appealed in this cause.

2000See id. at 700 .

1999Holland v. State, 802 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.Cr.App.1990).

2025To skirt this problem, Appellant pitches the trial court’s error as one of constitutional dimension, likening it to the kind of error presented in Proenza v. State, 541 S.W.3d 786, 798 (Tex. Crim.

2025By requiring relator 10 See also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (the decision to prosecute is “particularly ill-suited to judicial review” because “[s]uch factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake” and would pose “systemic costs of particular concern . . . by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry”); He

2025By requiring relator 10 See also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (the decision to prosecute is “particularly ill-suited to judicial review” because “[s]uch factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake” and would pose “systemic costs of particular concern . . . by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry”); He

2024See Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 622 (holding that because plaintiff was not challenging the validity of the statute but the actions of TxDOT under it, immunity was not waived).

2024“If the employee is protected from liability by official immunity, the employee is not personally liable to the claimant and the government retains its sovereign immunity.” DeWitt, 904 S.W.2d at 653 ; see also K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589, 597 (Tex. 1994) (“Thus, Texas is vicariously liable for the acts of its employees only to the extent its employees are not entitled to official immunity.”).

2023This kind of error is most obvious “when the trial court entirely forecloses the defense from exposing—‘prohibit[s] all inquiry into’—a ‘prototypical form of bias.”’ Id. at 556 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 , 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (1986)); see Austin v. State, No. 02-18- 00484-CR, 2019 WL 6205247 , at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 21, 2019, pet. 4 ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“The test to determine the scope of cross-examination demanded by the Confrontation Clause is whether the defendant could present a vital defense theory without the evidence, no

2023This kind of error is most obvious “when the trial court entirely forecloses the defense from exposing—‘prohibit[s] all inquiry into’—a ‘prototypical form of bias.”’ Id. at 556 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 , 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (1986)); see Austin v. State, No. 02-18- 00484-CR, 2019 WL 6205247 , at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 21, 2019, pet. 4 ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“The test to determine the scope of cross-examination demanded by the Confrontation Clause is whether the defendant could present a vital defense theory without the evidence, no