kind claim in Oregon

2020The test for whether a holding constitutes a water- shed rule “is a demanding one, so much so that [the United States Supreme] Court has yet to announce a new rule of criminal procedure capable of meeting it.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , ___, 140 S Ct 1390, 1407 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020).1 1 The United States Supreme Court “has pointed only to the right to counsel recognized in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 US 335 , 83 S Ct 792 , 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963), as the kind of rule that would qualify.” Miller v. Lampert, 340 Or 1, 9 , 125 P3d 1260 (2006).

2020The test for whether a holding constitutes a water- shed rule “is a demanding one, so much so that [the United States Supreme] Court has yet to announce a new rule of criminal procedure capable of meeting it.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , ___, 140 S Ct 1390, 1407 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020).1 1 The United States Supreme Court “has pointed only to the right to counsel recognized in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 US 335 , 83 S Ct 792 , 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963), as the kind of rule that would qualify.” Miller v. Lampert, 340 Or 1, 9 , 125 P3d 1260 (2006).

2019Although the court ultimately concluded that *626 the waiver analysis under ORS 419C.349(3) is more focused than it is under the parallel Kent criteria from which the legislature drew ORS 419C.349(3), the court characterized the statute as a "commitment to the kind of inquiry contemplated by the Kent criterion." Id. at 585 , 380 P.3d 248 .

2019Although the court ultimately concluded that *626 the waiver analysis under ORS 419C.349(3) is more focused than it is under the parallel Kent criteria from which the legislature drew ORS 419C.349(3), the court characterized the statute as a "commitment to the kind of inquiry contemplated by the Kent criterion." Id. at 585 , 380 P.3d 248 .

2001The court reiterated its previously announced standard for post-verdict judicial review: “ ‘[T]he standard for post-verdict judicial review of an award of punitive damages is as follows: A jury’s award of *48 punitive damages shall not be disturbed when it is within the range that a rational juror would be entitled to award in the light of the record as a whole; the range that a rational juror would be entitled to award depends, in turn, on the statutory and common law factors that allow an award of punitive damages for the specific kind of claim at issue.’ ” Id. at 548 (quoting Honda Motor Co

2001The court reiterated its previously announced standard for post-verdict judicial review: “ ‘[T]he standard for post-verdict judicial review of an award of punitive damages is as follows: A jury’s award of *48 punitive damages shall not be disturbed when it is within the range that a rational juror would be entitled to award in the light of the record as a whole; the range that a rational juror would be entitled to award depends, in turn, on the statutory and common law factors that allow an award of punitive damages for the specific kind of claim at issue.’ ” Id. at 548 (quoting Honda Motor Co

2023Liberty, 342 Or at 20 .

2023Liberty, 342 Or at 20 .

2001The court reiterated its previously announced standard for post-verdict judicial review: “ ‘[T]he standard for post-verdict judicial review of an award of punitive damages is as follows: A jury’s award of *48 punitive damages shall not be disturbed when it is within the range that a rational juror would be entitled to award in the light of the record as a whole; the range that a rational juror would be entitled to award depends, in turn, on the statutory and common law factors that allow an award of punitive damages for the specific kind of claim at issue.’ ” Id. at 548 (quoting Honda Motor Co

2000On review of a claim that a punitive damage award is excessive, we examine “statutory and common law factors that allow an award of punitive damages for the specific kind of claim at issue.” Oberg v. Honda Motors Co., 320 Or 544, 549 , 888 P2d 8 (1995), cert den 517 US 1219 (1996).

1987As the court held in Jack v. Hunt et ux, supra, 200 Or at 269 : “We are of the opinion that in matters of this kind the rule should be less strict than that of absolute and indispensable necessity.

1971This leaves for consideration the factor of “the extent of necessity of the easement to the claimant.” *122 We have previously held in Dressler v. Isaacs, supra, at 598: “Reasonable need for the use of an easement is a flexible concept which may be described by an infinite range of circumstances; at one extreme it could mean that without the claimed right no effective use could be made of the alleged dominant estate, and at the other extreme it could mean that the use of that estate would be less convenient only. * * # As also held by this court in Jack v. Hunt et ux, 200 Or 263 , 264 P2d 461

1983In State v. Weston, 155 Or 556, 581 , 64 P2d 536 (1937), the court stated: “An abstract instruction is deemed erroneous because it may cause the jury to assume that evidence has been given of the kind to which the instruction is applicable.” The instruction invited the jury to convict defendant on the basis of a test result that was not in evidence, and that was prejudicial.

1983In State v. Weston, 155 Or 556, 581 , 64 P2d 536 (1937), the court stated: “An abstract instruction is deemed erroneous because it may cause the jury to assume that evidence has been given of the kind to which the instruction is applicable.” The instruction invited the jury to convict defendant on the basis of a test result that was not in evidence, and that was prejudicial.

1975The purpose of this kind of hearing is ‘simply to permit the making of remonstrances.’ Mohr v. State Board of Education, 236 Or 398, 401 , 388 P2d 463 (1964). ‘Informational’ hearings are conducted like hearings before legislative committees that are considering proposed legislation.

1975The purpose of this kind of hearing is ‘simply to permit the making of remonstrances.’ Mohr v. State Board of Education, 236 Or 398, 401 , 388 P2d 463 (1964). ‘Informational’ hearings are conducted like hearings before legislative committees that are considering proposed legislation.

2021Rather, Huffman stands for the more limited proposition that an invalid waiver of an indictment was the kind of error that was Cite as 368 Or 171 (2021) 191 cognizable, as a matter of state common law, in state habeas.13 And, after the enactment of Oregon’s Post-Conviction Hearing Act in 1959, the common-law limitations on state habeas that Huffman addressed in 1952 became largely irrelevant.

2020Cite as 305 Or App 726 (2020) 749 A watershed rule of criminal procedure is “one that is fundamentally necessary to ensure that a criminal defen- dant is not wrongly convicted.” Page v. Palmateer, 336 Or 379, 390 , 84 P3d 133 , cert den, 543 US 866 (2004) (emphasis in original).

2020The test for whether a holding constitutes a water- shed rule “is a demanding one, so much so that [the United States Supreme] Court has yet to announce a new rule of criminal procedure capable of meeting it.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , ___, 140 S Ct 1390, 1407 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020).1 1 The United States Supreme Court “has pointed only to the right to counsel recognized in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 US 335 , 83 S Ct 792 , 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963), as the kind of rule that would qualify.” Miller v. Lampert, 340 Or 1, 9 , 125 P3d 1260 (2006).

2020The test for whether a holding constitutes a water- shed rule “is a demanding one, so much so that [the United States Supreme] Court has yet to announce a new rule of criminal procedure capable of meeting it.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , ___, 140 S Ct 1390, 1407 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020).1 1 The United States Supreme Court “has pointed only to the right to counsel recognized in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 US 335 , 83 S Ct 792 , 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963), as the kind of rule that would qualify.” Miller v. Lampert, 340 Or 1, 9 , 125 P3d 1260 (2006).

2020Cite as 305 Or App 726 (2020) 749 A watershed rule of criminal procedure is “one that is fundamentally necessary to ensure that a criminal defen- dant is not wrongly convicted.” Page v. Palmateer, 336 Or 379, 390 , 84 P3d 133 , cert den, 543 US 866 (2004) (emphasis in original).

2020The test for whether a holding constitutes a water- shed rule “is a demanding one, so much so that [the United States Supreme] Court has yet to announce a new rule of criminal procedure capable of meeting it.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , ___, 140 S Ct 1390, 1407 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020).1 1 The United States Supreme Court “has pointed only to the right to counsel recognized in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 US 335 , 83 S Ct 792 , 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963), as the kind of rule that would qualify.” Miller v. Lampert, 340 Or 1, 9 , 125 P3d 1260 (2006).

2020The test for whether a holding constitutes a water- shed rule “is a demanding one, so much so that [the United States Supreme] Court has yet to announce a new rule of criminal procedure capable of meeting it.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , ___, 140 S Ct 1390, 1407 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020).1 1 The United States Supreme Court “has pointed only to the right to counsel recognized in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 US 335 , 83 S Ct 792 , 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963), as the kind of rule that would qualify.” Miller v. Lampert, 340 Or 1, 9 , 125 P3d 1260 (2006).

2020Cite as 305 Or App 726 (2020) 749 A watershed rule of criminal procedure is “one that is fundamentally necessary to ensure that a criminal defen- dant is not wrongly convicted.” Page v. Palmateer, 336 Or 379, 390 , 84 P3d 133 , cert den, 543 US 866 (2004) (emphasis in original).

2020Cite as 305 Or App 726 (2020) 749 A watershed rule of criminal procedure is “one that is fundamentally necessary to ensure that a criminal defen- dant is not wrongly convicted.” Page v. Palmateer, 336 Or 379, 390 , 84 P3d 133 , cert den, 543 US 866 (2004) (emphasis in original).

2016The Supreme Court has counseled that we cannot, “having recognized [this kind of error], refuse to correct it.” Id.

2014Id. at 343-44 .

2014Shoup, 335 Or at 172 n 2.

2014Second, there is no need for us to engage in an exercise that, in the final analysis, would result only in an interpretation of ambiguous language, when we can remand the case for a more authoritative disambiguation.” Wilson, 243 Or App at 469-70 .

2014But, just as in Wilson , it is not clear whether the court’s “oral colloquy with defendant was intended to be a definitive and carefully reasoned explanation for its decision,” or whether it was instead “the thinking out loud of a judge struggling with a troubling and difficult decision that is not susceptible to (nor intended to be subjected to) the kind of analysis that we apply to statutes or written judicial opinions.” 243 Or App at 469 .

2009The majority recites that a qualifying claim must be one "in equity," citing Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or. 250, 287 , 959 P.2d 49 (1998), and that petitioners' claim satisfies that criterion. 347 Or. at 33-34 , 217 P.3d at 177-78 .

2009The majority recites that a qualifying claim must be one "in equity," citing Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or. 250, 287 , 959 P.2d 49 (1998), and that petitioners' claim satisfies that criterion. 347 Or. at 33-34 , 217 P.3d at 177-78 .

2009The majority recites that a qualifying claim must be one “in equity,” citing Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 287 , 959 P2d 49 (1998), and that petitioners’ claim satisfies that criterion. 347 Or at 33-34.

2009The majority recites that a qualifying claim must be one “in equity,” citing Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 287 , 959 P2d 49 (1998), and that petitioners’ claim satisfies that criterion. 347 Or at 33-34.