kind inquiry in Michigan

2025Setting aside the debate of what exactly constitutes Michigan’s public policy as it relates to the exercise of discretion by county prosecutors and accepting the majority’s newly declared basis for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, I nonetheless disagree that this Court ought not decide whether there exists record evidence to support the first two prongs of the newly created public-policy claim described in the majority 38 Suchodolski, 412 Mich at 696 . 21 opinion. 39 As for the first prong, plaintiff must present proof that the law was or would have been violated.

2014The Supreme Court determined that the matter before it involved only a corporate management dispute and that the dispute lacked “the kind of violation of a clearly mandated public policy that would support an action for retaliatory discharge.” Id. at 696 .

2022When the police knock on a door but the occupants choose not to respond or to speak, “the investigation will have reached a conspicuously low 4 Sergeant Glaza did not testify at trial. 5 Officer Lyons later received immunity from prosecution. -4- point,” and the occupants “will have the kind of warning that even the most elaborate security system cannot provide.” [United States v] Chambers, 395 F3d [563], at 577 (Sutton, J, dissenting) [(CA 6, 2005), abrogated King, 563 US at 462 ].

2022When the police knock on a door but the occupants choose not to respond or to speak, “the investigation will have reached a conspicuously low 4 Sergeant Glaza did not testify at trial. 5 Officer Lyons later received immunity from prosecution. -4- point,” and the occupants “will have the kind of warning that even the most elaborate security system cannot provide.” [United States v] Chambers, 395 F3d [563], at 577 (Sutton, J, dissenting) [(CA 6, 2005), abrogated King, 563 US at 462 ].

2022And even if an occupant chooses to open the door and speak with the officers, the occupant need not allow the officers to enter the premises and may refuse to answer any questions at any time. [King, 563 US at 469-470 .] This Court has described “the knock and talk procedure . . . [as] a law enforcement tactic in which the police, who possess some information that they believe warrants further investigation, but that is insufficient to constitute probable cause for a search warrant, approach the person suspected of engaging in illegal activity at the person’s residence (even knock on the front

2022And even if an occupant chooses to open the door and speak with the officers, the occupant need not allow the officers to enter the premises and may refuse to answer any questions at any time. [King, 563 US at 469-470 .] This Court has described “the knock and talk procedure . . . [as] a law enforcement tactic in which the police, who possess some information that they believe warrants further investigation, but that is insufficient to constitute probable cause for a search warrant, approach the person suspected of engaging in illegal activity at the person’s residence (even knock on the front

2023INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 2 Although Singleton has arguably abandoned the issue because he failed to cite authority supporting his argument for this issue (except a general statement regarding prosecutorial misconduct), and provided minimal substantive argument, see People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641 ; 588 NW2d 480 (1998), we address the issue. 3 Our Supreme Court recently stated, “The harmless-error and plain-error standards require the same kind of inquiry[] because they both require appellate courts to assess the effect of the error on the outcome of the trial court proceedin

2023INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 2 Although Singleton has arguably abandoned the issue because he failed to cite authority supporting his argument for this issue (except a general statement regarding prosecutorial misconduct), and provided minimal substantive argument, see People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641 ; 588 NW2d 480 (1998), we address the issue. 3 Our Supreme Court recently stated, “The harmless-error and plain-error standards require the same kind of inquiry[] because they both require appellate courts to assess the effect of the error on the outcome of the trial court proceedin

2022Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 198 ; 649 NW2d 47 (2002). “[I]t is the responsibility of the party seeking to impose liability on a governmental agency to demonstrate that its case falls within one of the exceptions [to governmental immunity].” Id. at 201 . -5- * * * In MCL 600.6431(1), the Legislature has qualified a claimant’s ability to bring a claim against the state by requiring that “the claim or notice shall be signed and verified by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.” While the Court of Appeals observed that “[t]he statute does not prescribe the kind of inquir

2022Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 198 ; 649 NW2d 47 (2002). “[I]t is the responsibility of the party seeking to impose liability on a governmental agency to demonstrate that its case falls within one of the exceptions [to governmental immunity].” Id. at 201 . -5- * * * In MCL 600.6431(1), the Legislature has qualified a claimant’s ability to bring a claim against the state by requiring that “the claim or notice shall be signed and verified by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.” While the Court of Appeals observed that “[t]he statute does not prescribe the kind of inquir

2022In re Moroun, 295 Mich App at 331-332 .

2014“Our Supreme Court’s enumeration [in Suchodolski] of ‘public policies’ that might forbid termination of at-will employees was not phrased as if it was an exhaustive list.” Kimmelman v Heather Downs Mgt Ltd, 278 Mich App 569, 573 ; 753 NW2d 265 (2008).

2014“Our Supreme Court’s enumeration [in Suchodolski] of ‘public policies’ that might forbid termination of at-will employees was not phrased as if it was an exhaustive list.” Kimmelman v Heather Downs Mgt Ltd, 278 Mich App 569, 573 ; 753 NW2d 265 (2008).

1984See id.; Comment, Prospective Determinations of Derived Use, fn 7 supra. Because a question regarding the kind of immunity necessary to supplant the state privilege is not presented, and Watson has not been overruled, the language of the majority opinion concerning the relationship between the Fifth Amendment and the state privilege against compelled self-incrimination should be read in the context of the issue decided today. [22] See, e.g., D H Overmyer Co, Inc, of Ohio v Frick Co, 405 US 174, 185-186 ; 92 S Ct 775 ; 31 L Ed 2d 124 (1972).

1984See id.; Comment, Prospective Determinations of Derived Use, fn 7 supra. Because a question regarding the kind of immunity necessary to supplant the state privilege is not presented, and Watson has not been overruled, the language of the majority opinion concerning the relationship between the Fifth Amendment and the state privilege against compelled self-incrimination should be read in the context of the issue decided today. [22] See, e.g., D H Overmyer Co, Inc, of Ohio v Frick Co, 405 US 174, 185-186 ; 92 S Ct 775 ; 31 L Ed 2d 124 (1972).

1977People v Peterson, 62 Mich App 258 ; 233 NW2d 250 (1975).

1977People v Peterson, 62 Mich App 258 ; 233 NW2d 250 (1975).

1974This unintentional slip of the tongue must be distinguished from the kind of error involved in People v Neumann, 35 Mich App 193 ; 192 NW2d 345 (1971).

1974This unintentional slip of the tongue must be distinguished from the kind of error involved in People v Neumann, 35 Mich App 193 ; 192 NW2d 345 (1971).

1970In People v. Byrd, supra, p 229 , I suggested that in claims of this kind the test should not be whether the defendant establishes the truth of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence but whether the judge entertains a reasonable doubt that the plea was encouraged by a false promise of lieniency in sentencing; I observed that under existing precedent the judge must decide whether to believe the convicted criminal or a member of the profession, but that under a reasonable doubt standard he would not be put to that choice and could, if in doubt, give the defendant the benefit of the doubt.

1970In People v. Byrd, supra, p 229 , I suggested that in claims of this kind the test should not be whether the defendant establishes the truth of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence but whether the judge entertains a reasonable doubt that the plea was encouraged by a false promise of lieniency in sentencing; I observed that under existing precedent the judge must decide whether to believe the convicted criminal or a member of the profession, but that under a reasonable doubt standard he would not be put to that choice and could, if in doubt, give the defendant the benefit of the doubt.

1919Plaintiff’s second position is that unless defendants show prejudice by the delay of notice, there can be no estoppel; and that prejudice has not been shown; that the basis of a defense of this kind is the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and it is conceded that where a bank can show that by reason of the delay in obtaining notice, it was deprived of an opportunity to collect from the forger, as was shown in Brown v. National Bank, 170 Mich. 416 (40 L.