purposes doctrine in North Carolina

2001The avoidance of deprivation due to delay is one of the purposes for the rule that interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable. *167 Id. at 251 , 285 S.E.2d at 282 .

2001The avoidance of deprivation due to delay is one of the purposes for the rule that interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable. *167 Id. at 251 , 285 S.E.2d at 282 .

1997Insurance Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Com., 217 N.C. 495 , 8 S.E.2d 619 (1940).

1997Insurance Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Com., 217 N.C. 495 , 8 S.E.2d 619 (1940).

1993App. 379 (citing, Corum v. University of North Carolina, 97 N.C.

1993Corum v. University of North Carolina, 97 N.C.

2022This holding from Squire would come to be known as the “continuous transaction doctrine,” pursuant to which “[a] killing is committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of another felony when there is no break in the chain of events between the felony and the act causing death, so that the felony and homicide are part of the same series of events, forming one continuous transaction.” State v. Wooten, 295 N.C. 378 , 385–86 (1978).

2022This holding from Squire would come to be known as the “continuous transaction doctrine,” pursuant to which “[a] killing is committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of another felony when there is no break in the chain of events between the felony and the act causing death, so that the felony and homicide are part of the same series of events, forming one continuous transaction.” State v. Wooten, 295 N.C. 378 , 385–86 (1978).

2021App. 334, 341 , 497 S.E.2d 82, 87 (1998). “[T]he actions of a city and its officials in investigating and disciplining a city police officer accused of criminal activity are likewise encompassed within the rubric of ‘governmental functions.’ ” Id. at 341 , 497 S.E.2d at 87 . ¶ 51 While police officers are “public officials” for the purposes of governmental immunity, they “are not shielded from liability if their alleged actions were corrupt or malicious . . . .” Shuping v. Barber, 89 N.C.

2021App. 334, 341 , 497 S.E.2d 82, 87 (1998). “[T]he actions of a city and its officials in investigating and disciplining a city police officer accused of criminal activity are likewise encompassed within the rubric of ‘governmental functions.’ ” Id. at 341 , 497 S.E.2d at 87 . ¶ 51 While police officers are “public officials” for the purposes of governmental immunity, they “are not shielded from liability if their alleged actions were corrupt or malicious . . . .” Shuping v. Barber, 89 N.C.

2004Id.

2004Id.

1998Dickens, 110 N.C.

1994Dickens, 110 N.C.

2019Miller, 357 N.C. at 328–29, 584 S.E.2d at 782 .

2019Miller, 357 N.C. at 328–29, 584 S.E.2d at 782 .

2018The dissent relies heavily on the Rule 12(b)(6) standard recited in cases such as Turner v. Hammocks Beach Corp. , 363 N.C. 555 , 559, 681 S.E.2d 770 , 774 (2009), and State ex rel.

2018The dissent relies heavily on the Rule 12(b)(6) standard recited in cases such as Turner v. Hammocks Beach Corp. , 363 N.C. 555 , 559, 681 S.E.2d 770 , 774 (2009), and State ex rel.

2010Official Capacity Claim Plaintiffs in this action did not bring suit against the State of North Carolina; however, “[a]ctions against officers of the State in their official capacities are actions against the State for the purposes of applying the doctrine of [sovereign] immunity.” Epps, 116 N.C.

2010App. at 309 , 447 S.E.2d at 447 ; see also Mullis v. Sechrest, 347 N.C. 548, 554 , 495 S.E.2d 721, 725 (1998) (“[0]fficial-capacity suits are merely another way of pleading an action against the governmental entity.”).

2000Absent such a definition, however, the general rule of statutory construction holds that, absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary, “person” should be defined pursuant to G.S. § 12-3(6) (1999), which provides that the term “person” applies to “bodies politic and corporate, as well as to individuals.” Jackson v. Housing Authority of City of High Point, 316 N.C. 259 , 341 S.E.2d 523 (1986).

2000Absent such a definition, however, the general rule of statutory construction holds that, absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary, “person” should be defined pursuant to G.S. § 12-3(6) (1999), which provides that the term “person” applies to “bodies politic and corporate, as well as to individuals.” Jackson v. Housing Authority of City of High Point, 316 N.C. 259 , 341 S.E.2d 523 (1986).

1996G.S. § 143-291 (a); Branch Banking Trust Co. v. Wilson County Bd. of Educ. , 251 N.C. 603 , 608 , 111 S.E.2d 844 (1960).

1996G.S. § 143-291 (a); Branch Banking Trust Co. v. Wilson County Bd. of Educ. , 251 N.C. 603 , 608 , 111 S.E.2d 844 (1960).

1994North Carolina State Highway Comm’n v. Nuckles, 271 N.C. 1 , 155 S.E.2d 772 (1967).

1994North Carolina State Highway Comm’n v. Nuckles, 271 N.C. 1 , 155 S.E.2d 772 (1967).

1994As *430 stated by our Supreme Court in Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357 , 57 S.E.2d 377 (1949), “[t]here is no more effective way to procrastinate the administration of justice than that of bringing cases to an appellate court piecemeal through the medium of successive appeals from intermediate orders.” Id. at 363 .

1994As *430 stated by our Supreme Court in Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357 , 57 S.E.2d 377 (1949), “[t]here is no more effective way to procrastinate the administration of justice than that of bringing cases to an appellate court piecemeal through the medium of successive appeals from intermediate orders.” Id. at 363 .

1987Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D.

1987Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 2388, 2391 (1971) (piecemeal trial of separate issues in a single suit is not the usual course but is authorized when the court believes that separation will achieve the purposes of the rule) (citing Emerick v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 750 F. 2d 19 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F. 2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 300 (1983)). *743 A bifurcated trial is particularly appropriate where separate submission of issues avoids confusion and promotes a logical presentation to the jury, Pearl

1987Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 2388, 2391 (1971) (piecemeal trial of separate issues in a single suit is not the usual course but is authorized when the court believes that separation will achieve the purposes of the rule) (citing Emerick v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 750 F. 2d 19 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F. 2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 300 (1983)). *743 A bifurcated trial is particularly appropriate where separate submission of issues avoids confusion and promotes a logical presentation to the jury, Pearl

1987Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 2388, 2391 (1971) (piecemeal trial of separate issues in a single suit is not the usual course but is authorized when the court believes that separation will achieve the purposes of the rule) (citing Emerick v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 750 F. 2d 19 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F. 2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 300 (1983)). *743 A bifurcated trial is particularly appropriate where separate submission of issues avoids confusion and promotes a logical presentation to the jury, Pearl

1987Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 2388, 2391 (1971) (piecemeal trial of separate issues in a single suit is not the usual course but is authorized when the court believes that separation will achieve the purposes of the rule) (citing Emerick v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 750 F. 2d 19 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F. 2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 300 (1983)). *743 A bifurcated trial is particularly appropriate where separate submission of issues avoids confusion and promotes a logical presentation to the jury, Pearl