purposes rule in Iowa

2019State v. Ogilvie, 310 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa 1981).

2015State v. Ogilvie, 310 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa 1981).

2021And finally, “one of the purposes of the rule is to ‘maintain the fair and independent administration of justice.’ ” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Att’y Doe No. 792, 878 N.W.2d 189, 198 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Iowa R.

2021And finally, “one of the purposes of the rule is to ‘maintain the fair and independent administration of justice.’ ” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Att’y Doe No. 792, 878 N.W.2d 189, 198 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Iowa R.

2017Lee v. State, 815 N.W.2d 731, 739 (Iowa 2012); Mann, 602 N.W.2d at 790–91.

2017Lee v. State, 815 N.W.2d 731, 739 (Iowa 2012); Mann, 602 N.W.2d at 790–91.

2022See State v. Mann, 602 N.W.2d 785, 791 (Iowa 1999) (“We think that in applying our error-preservation rules, we 18 must keep their underlying purpose in mind.”).

2017Lee v. State, 815 N.W.2d 731, 739 (Iowa 2012); Mann, 602 N.W.2d at 790–91.

2025“Sexual behavior” under the rape shield law includes “precursor[s] to sexual activity.” State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 409 (Iowa 2006) (finding skinny- dipping to be a precursor to sexual activity where victim wrapped her arms around a man’s bare shoulders while the two were nude in a river).

2025A.G., 558 N.W.2d at 403 ; see also In re Est. of DeVoss, 474 N.W.2d 539, 541 (Iowa 1991) (discussing “intervention by right”).

2025For the purposes of that rule, sexual behavior means “a volitional or non- volitional physical act that the victim has performed for the purpose of the sexual stimulation or gratification of either the victim or another person or an act that is 8 sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or sexual contact, or an attempt to engage in such an act.” State v. Baker, 679 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Iowa 2004) (citation omitted).

2025Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).

2024See, e.g., United States v. Green, 83 F.4th 696 , 704 (8th Cir. 2023) (affirming the trial court’s ruling declining to play the complete interview video of defendant’s statement to the police, and explaining that “[t]his ‘rule of completeness’ is designed ‘to avoid misleading impressions created by taking matters out of context’ ” and so the “party urging admission must thus specify any portion of the writing or recording that is relevant and ‘that qualifies or 13 explains portions already admitted’ ” (quoting United States v. Ramos-Caraballo, 375 F.3d 797 , 802–03 (8th Cir. 2004))); United St

2024See, e.g., United States v. Green, 83 F.4th 696 , 704 (8th Cir. 2023) (affirming the trial court’s ruling declining to play the complete interview video of defendant’s statement to the police, and explaining that “[t]his ‘rule of completeness’ is designed ‘to avoid misleading impressions created by taking matters out of context’ ” and so the “party urging admission must thus specify any portion of the writing or recording that is relevant and ‘that qualifies or 13 explains portions already admitted’ ” (quoting United States v. Ramos-Caraballo, 375 F.3d 797 , 802–03 (8th Cir. 2004))); United St

2024See, e.g., United States v. Green, 83 F.4th 696 , 704 (8th Cir. 2023) (affirming the trial court’s ruling declining to play the complete interview video of defendant’s statement to the police, and explaining that “[t]his ‘rule of completeness’ is designed ‘to avoid misleading impressions created by taking matters out of context’ ” and so the “party urging admission must thus specify any portion of the writing or recording that is relevant and ‘that qualifies or 13 explains portions already admitted’ ” (quoting United States v. Ramos-Caraballo, 375 F.3d 797 , 802–03 (8th Cir. 2004))); United St

2024Iowa courts further agree on the primary purposes of the doctrine: “public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and justice.” Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 754 (citation omitted).

2022The relevant issue for the purposes of this claim is whether “the procedures available did not provide due process of law.” Dennis v. DeJong, 953 F. Supp. 2d 568, 591 (E.D.

2022See State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Iowa 2003) (“The record made in the district court shows that the purposes of error preservation were accomplished here and there is no unfairness in allowing [the defendant] to argue [the issue] on appeal.”).

2022(Emphases added.) Reading the provision in its entirety, the statute makes clear that it is the taxpayer that obtains an exemption: “A society or organization claiming an exemption . . . .” Iowa Code § 427.1 (14); see Iowa Methodist Hosp., v. Bd. of Rev., 252 N.W.2d 390, 392 (“Under our decisions a charitable organization may be entitled to exemption on some of its property and be subject to taxation on others.

2020The purposes of this rule “may not adequately be served to the extent that the trial court delegates to counsel its own responsibility to scrutinize the record, select apt principles of law, and fully articulate the bases for a sound, fair decision.” Kroblin v. RDR Motels, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Iowa 1984) (discussing the predecessor to rule 1.904, former Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(a)).

2020Id. at 919 ; see also State v. Carberry, 501 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Iowa 1993) (finding an “extremely terse” explanation sufficient where it was “reasonably clear from what was said that the judge imposed consecutive sentences based on his perception of the aggregate culpability of two separate and distinct heinous offenses”).

2015“The exclusion of illegal sentences from the principles of error preservation is limited to those cases in which a trial court has stepped outside the codified bounds of allowable sentencing.” State v. Ceasar, 585 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2015“An illegal sentence is 7 void and, for this reason, is not subject to the usual concepts of waiver, whether from a failure to seek review or other omissions of error preservation.” State v. Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Iowa 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] challenge to an illegal sentence includes claims that the court lacked the power to impose the sentence or that the sentence itself is somehow inherently legally flawed, including claims that the sentence is outside the statutory bound or that the sentence itself is unconstitutional.” Bruegger, 733 N.W.2d at 871. “[T]o be ‘il