purposes rule in Florida

2005This court noted that the purposes of rule 1.420 "are (1) to require prompt and efficient prosecution of cases until submitted for disposition or determination by the trial judge or jury, and (2) to prevent the clogging of trial court dockets with litigation that has been abandoned for the stated period." 459 So.2d at 1178 (citing Strader v. Morrill, 360 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)).

1984Id. at 1138 .

1983See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (privilege against self-incrimination obtains in juvenile delinquency proceedings); Aaron v. State, 284 So.2d 673 (Fla.1973) (criminal contempt proceedings effectively criminal in nature and persons accused entitled to basic constitutional rights).

1983See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (privilege against self-incrimination obtains in juvenile delinquency proceedings); Aaron v. State, 284 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1973) (criminal contempt proceedings effectively criminal in nature and persons accused entitled to basic constitutional rights).

1978The routine granting of such motions for severance except for such good cause related to insurance coverage would be a misapprehension of this Court’s holding.” 253 So.2d at 424 .

1977The routine granting of such motions for severance except for such good cause related to insurance coverage would be a misapprehension of this Court’s holding.’ “The interest which plaintiff has in presenting to the jury the truest possible picture of the existence of financial responsibility is much too important to allow the loss of that interest, through the granting of severance for any reason except those enumerated in Stecher [Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1971) ] and repeated in this Court’s first opinion in this cause, to be dismissed as ‘harmless error.’ “For that reason, we

2016See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Proenza, 157 So. 3d 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); Courtney v. Catalina, Ltd., 130 So. 3d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Dep’t of Revenue v. Thurmond, 721 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Falkner v. AmeriFirst 11I note that rule 1.540 is substantially modeled on rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2016See U.S. Bank Natl Ass’n v. Proenza, 157 So.3d 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); Courtney v. Catalina, Ltd., 130 So.3d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Dep’t of Revenue v. Thurmond, 721 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Falkner v. Ameriflrst Fed.

2016See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Proenza, 157 So. 3d 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); Courtney v. Catalina, Ltd., 130 So. 3d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Dep’t of Revenue v. Thurmond, 721 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Falkner v. AmeriFirst 11I note that rule 1.540 is substantially modeled on rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2016See U.S. Bank Natl Ass’n v. Proenza, 157 So.3d 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); Courtney v. Catalina, Ltd., 130 So.3d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Dep’t of Revenue v. Thurmond, 721 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Falkner v. Ameriflrst Fed.

2011See Preuss v. Stevens, 150 Ariz. 6 , 721 P.2d 664 (1986) (holding that a trial court’s entry of summary judgment prior to acceptance of an offer of judgment renders the offer ineffectual for any purpose); Wersch v. Radnor/Landgrant-A Phoenix P’ship, 192 Ariz. 99 , 961 P.2d 1047 (1998) (upholding trial court’s rejection of plaintiffs attempt to accept a Rule 68 offer of judgment made after entry of summary judgment but within the thirty-day period within which such offers remain effective under the state rule); Day v. Krystal Co., 241 F.R.D. 474 (E.D.Tenn.2007) (disagreeing with Perkins , and h

2011See Preuss v. Stevens, 150 Ariz. 6 , 721 P.2d 664 (1986) (holding that a trial court’s entry of summary judgment prior to acceptance of an offer of judgment renders the offer ineffectual for any purpose); Wersch v. Radnor/Landgrant-A Phoenix P’ship, 192 Ariz. 99 , 961 P.2d 1047 (1998) (upholding trial court’s rejection of plaintiffs attempt to accept a Rule 68 offer of judgment made after entry of summary judgment but within the thirty-day period within which such offers remain effective under the state rule); Day v. Krystal Co., 241 F.R.D. 474 (E.D.Tenn.2007) (disagreeing with Perkins , and h

2011See Preuss v. Stevens, 150 Ariz. 6 , 721 P.2d 664 (1986) (holding that a trial court’s entry of summary judgment prior to acceptance of an offer of judgment renders the offer ineffectual for any purpose); Wersch v. Radnor/Landgrant-A Phoenix P’ship, 192 Ariz. 99 , 961 P.2d 1047 (1998) (upholding trial court’s rejection of plaintiffs attempt to accept a Rule 68 offer of judgment made after entry of summary judgment but within the thirty-day period within which such offers remain effective under the state rule); Day v. Krystal Co., 241 F.R.D. 474 (E.D.Tenn.2007) (disagreeing with Perkins , and h

2005See Forcelledo v. State, 898 So.2d 1058 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)(“The State is allowed to give notice under as many classifications as it chooses, where the State is prepared to show the defendant meets the statutory criteria.”); Cooper v. State, 817 So.2d 934 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)(notice deficiency does not render a sentence “illegal” for the purposes of a rule 3.800 petition; claim should have been raised via 3.850 and is now time barred).

2005This court noted that the purposes of rule 1.420 "are (1) to require prompt and efficient prosecution of cases until submitted for disposition or determination by the trial judge or jury, and (2) to prevent the clogging of trial court dockets with litigation that has been abandoned for the stated period." 459 So.2d at 1178 (citing Strader v. Morrill, 360 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)).

2004Ctr., 498 So.2d 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); cf. Wilson v. Salamon, 864 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that an order allowing a foreign attorney to appear as co-counsel pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.061 does not constitute record activity for the purposes of rule 1.420(e)).

2004Ctr., 498 So.2d 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); cf. Wilson v. Salamon, 864 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that an order allowing a foreign attorney to appear as co-counsel pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.061 does not constitute record activity for the purposes of rule 1.420(e)).

2003Therefore, both because a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a sentencing statute involves a pure question of law rather than the erroneous application of a sentencing statute, and because controlling precedent foreclosed relief at the time that the first brief was filed, requiring a motion to correct sentencing error under rule 3.800(b)(2) as a prerequisite to challenging the facial constitutionality of the statute in this case would not serve the purposes for which rule 3.800(b)(2) was adopted. *1067 Finally, I note that in Brannon v. State, 850 So.2d 452 , 2003 WL 21354797 (Fla. J

2003Therefore, both because a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a sentencing statute involves a pure question of law rather than the erroneous application of a sentencing statute, and because controlling precedent foreclosed relief at the time that the first brief was filed, requiring a motion to correct sentencing error under rule 3.800(b)(2) as a prerequisite to challenging the facial constitutionality of the statute in this case would not serve the purposes for which rule 3.800(b)(2) was adopted. *1067 Finally, I note that in Brannon v. State, 850 So.2d 452 , 2003 WL 21354797 (Fla. J

2002In support of his motion for rehearing Sheriff Jenne newly calls our attention to McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 , 117 S.Ct. 1734 , 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997), and argues that our holding conflicts with that decision.

2002In support of his motion for rehearing Sheriff Jenne newly calls our attention to McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 , 117 S.Ct. 1734 , 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997), and argues that our holding conflicts with that decision.