purposes rule in Maryland

2022Rule 8-131(a), “as considerations of both fairness and judicial efficiency ordinarily require that all challenges that a party desires to make to a trial court’s ruling, action, or conduct be presented in the first instance to the trial court”); see also Robinson, 410 Md. at 104 , 976 A.2d at 1079 (“Such prerogative to review an unpreserved claim of 19 error, however, is to be rarely exercised and only when doing so furthers, rather than undermines, the purposes of the rule.”).

2022Rule 8-131(a), “as considerations of both fairness and judicial efficiency ordinarily require that all challenges that a party desires to make to a trial court’s ruling, action, or conduct be presented in the first instance to the trial court”); see also Robinson, 410 Md. at 104 , 976 A.2d at 1079 (“Such prerogative to review an unpreserved claim of 19 error, however, is to be rarely exercised and only when doing so furthers, rather than undermines, the purposes of the rule.”).

2020Such prerogative to review an unpreserved claim of error, however, is to be rarely exercised and only when doing so furthers, rather than undermines, the purposes of the rule.”); Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 714 (2004) (“Although the interests of fairness generally are furthered by requiring the issues to be brought first to the attention of the trial court so that the trial court may pass upon it in the first instance, the appellate court has the discretion to excuse the default and consider the issue.”). 43 Appellant’s unpreserved challenge to the admission of the 40-minute video of Linda Ph

2020Agency, 462 Md. 586, 602 (2019) (quoting Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 714 (2004)).

2020Rule 8-131(a) provides that, apart from jurisdictional challenges, “[o]rdinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court.” The Court’s “prerogative to review an unpreserved claim of error . . . is to be rarely exercised and only when doing so furthers, rather than undermines, the purposes of the rule,” Ray v. State, 435 Md. 1, 22 (2013) (quoting Robinson v. State, 410 Md. 91, 103-04 (2009)), which are “to ensure fairness for the parties involved and to promote orderly judicial administrati

2020In my view, the Court should not consider these arguments in deciding this case.15 Rule 8-131(a) provides: “Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue [besides subject matter and personal jurisdiction] unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.” This Court has often cautioned that its “prerogative to review an unpreserved claim of error is to be rarely exercised and only when doing

2015Although this Court may “address the merits of an unpreserved issue,” that discretion “is to be rarely exercised and only when doing so furthers, rather than *126 undermines, the purposes of the rule.” Robinson v. State, 410 Md. 91, 104 , 976 A.2d 1072 (2009); Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 150 , 729 A.2d 910 (1999).

2015Although this Court may “address the merits of an unpreserved issue,” that discretion “is to be rarely exercised and only when doing so furthers, rather than *126 undermines, the purposes of the rule.” Robinson v. State, 410 Md. 91, 104 , 976 A.2d 1072 (2009); Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 150 , 729 A.2d 910 (1999).

2023We acknowledge that the language in Maryland Rules 4-707 and 4-708 provides “two or more possible alternative interpretations . . . for the purposes of rule construction.” Worsham v. Greenfield, 435 Md. 349 , 361–62, 78 A.3d 358, 366 (2013) (citation omitted).

2023We acknowledge that the language in Maryland Rules 4-707 and 4-708 provides “two or more possible alternative interpretations . . . for the purposes of rule construction.” Worsham v. Greenfield, 435 Md. 349 , 361–62, 78 A.3d 358, 366 (2013) (citation omitted).

2017Accord Peterson v. State, 444 Md. 105, 126 , 118 A.3d 925 (2015) (“ ‘Fairness and the orderly administration of justice is advanced by requiring counsel to bring the position of their client to the attention of the lower court at the trial so that the trial court can pass upon, and possibly correct any errors in the proceedings.’ ”) (quoting Robinson v. State, 410 Md. 91, 103 , 976 A.2d 1072 (2009)).

2017Accord Peterson v. State, 444 Md. 105, 126 , 118 A.3d 925 (2015) (“ ‘Fairness and the orderly administration of justice is advanced by requiring counsel to bring the position of their client to the attention of the lower court at the trial so that the trial court can pass upon, and possibly correct any errors in the proceedings.’ ”) (quoting Robinson v. State, 410 Md. 91, 103 , 976 A.2d 1072 (2009)).

2004The primary purposes of the rule are: “ ‘(a) to require counsel to bring the position of their client to the attention of the lower court at the trial so that the trial court can pass upon, and possibly correct any errors in the proceedings, and (b) to prevent the trial of cases in a piecemeal fashion, thus accelerating the termination of litigation.’ ” Offen, 334 Md. at 509 , 639 A.2d at 1075 (quoting Clayman v. Prince George’s County, 266 Md. 409, 416 , 292 A.2d 689, 693 (1972)).

2004The primary purposes of the rule are: “ ‘(a) to require counsel to bring the position of their client to the attention of the lower court at the trial so that the trial court can pass upon, and possibly correct any errors in the proceedings, and (b) to prevent the trial of cases in a piecemeal fashion, thus accelerating the termination of litigation.’ ” Offen, 334 Md. at 509 , 639 A.2d at 1075 (quoting Clayman v. Prince George’s County, 266 Md. 409, 416 , 292 A.2d 689, 693 (1972)).

2012Courts have found guidance in considering the underlying purposes of the immunity shield, stating that "[t]he proper approach is to consider the precise function at issue, and to determine whether the officer is likely to be unduly inhibited in the performance of that function by the threat of liability for tortious conduct." McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir.1972); see Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224 , 108 S.Ct. at 542 , 98 L.Ed.2d at 563 (discussing the analysis of the immunity shield and noting that "we examine the nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of off

2012Courts have found guidance in considering the underlying purposes of the immunity shield, stating that "[t]he proper approach is to consider the precise function at issue, and to determine whether the officer is likely to be unduly inhibited in the performance of that function by the threat of liability for tortious conduct." McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir.1972); see Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224 , 108 S.Ct. at 542 , 98 L.Ed.2d at 563 (discussing the analysis of the immunity shield and noting that "we examine the nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of off

2001Cf. Kinsey v. Drury, 146 Md. 227, 232 , Cramer v. Roderick, 128 Md. 422, 429 , and Valentine v. Seiss, 79 Md. 187 .

1985Cf. Kinsey v. Drury, 146 Md. 227, 232 [ 126 A. 125 ], Cramer v. Roderick, 128 Md. 422, 429 [ 98 A. 42 ], and Valentine v. Seiss, 79 Md. 187 [ 28 A. 892 ]. ‘The effect of such a contract is to vest the equitable ownership of the property in the vendee, subject to the vendor’s lien for unpaid purchase money, and to leave only the legal title in the vendor pending the fulfilment of the contract and the formal conveyance of the estate.

2001Cf. Kinsey v. Drury, 146 Md. 227, 232 , Cramer v. Roderick, 128 Md. 422, 429 , and Valentine v. Seiss, 79 Md. 187 .

1985Cf. Kinsey v. Drury, 146 Md. 227, 232 [ 126 A. 125 ], Cramer v. Roderick, 128 Md. 422, 429 [ 98 A. 42 ], and Valentine v. Seiss, 79 Md. 187 [ 28 A. 892 ]. ‘The effect of such a contract is to vest the equitable ownership of the property in the vendee, subject to the vendor’s lien for unpaid purchase money, and to leave only the legal title in the vendor pending the fulfilment of the contract and the formal conveyance of the estate.

2022See Driggs Corp., 348 Md. at 407 , 704 A.2d at 443 .

2022See Driggs Corp., 348 Md. at 407 , 704 A.2d at 443 .

2020In my view, the Court should not consider these arguments in deciding this case.15 Rule 8-131(a) provides: “Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue [besides subject matter and personal jurisdiction] unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.” This Court has often cautioned that its “prerogative to review an unpreserved claim of error is to be rarely exercised and only when doing

2020We conclude that if there is evidence that the client placed his trust in the attorney because of the representation, an attorney-client relationship exists for the purposes of rule 5-101 even if the representation has otherwise ended.” Id. at 1166–67; see also In re Imming, 545 N.E.2d at 721 (regarding loans from “former” clients for an attorney’s non-legal business, noting as significant that some of the clients had “directly invested the proceeds of the legal work respondent performed for them”); Williams, 498 So.2d at 728 (stating that “an unsophisticated client who is asked for a loan by

2020And, the Court reasoned, once the agency’s prior discretionary practice of paying standby pay became a contractual obligation, it was no longer a policy “over which DHR management had control.” Id. at 422 . - 15 - For the purposes of our analysis, we can accept Lodge 146’s reading of Walker insofar as it uses the case to show that by contracting about holiday-leave hours—Lodge 146’s theory of what happened here—the parties placed what once might have been a policy within the University management’s control to one outside of that control.

2020See id. at 421– 423.6 And, in extremely broad strokes, Walker also suggests that when a dispute arises about how to interpret an agreement between two parties, the parties may be required to resort to a dispute-resolution mechanism provided for by the terms of the agreement itself.

2020Law § 13-104(1)’s exemption to “lawyers” applied to the activities of the law firm at issue in the case, the Court distinguished between services that require a professional license, which are exempt, from those that were performed by the law firm but may also “be performed by any collection agency,” which are not.) For the purposes of our analysis, we need not address whether a license as a real estate broker or associate broker is required to post an abandonment notice. 8 nonetheless fail to afford relief to the plaintiff.” Allied Investment Corp. v. Jasen, 354 Md. 547, 555 (1999) (cleaned u

2020Agency, 462 Md. 586, 602 (2019) (quoting Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 714 (2004)).

2020When reviewing a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, we “assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint, as well as all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from them.” O’Brien & Gere Engineers, Inc. v. City of Salisbury, 447 Md. 394, 404 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2020We conclude that if there is evidence that the client placed his trust in the attorney because of the representation, an attorney-client relationship exists for the purposes of rule 5-101 even if the representation has otherwise ended.” Id. at 1166–67; see also In re Imming, 545 N.E.2d at 721 (regarding loans from “former” clients for an attorney’s non-legal business, noting as significant that some of the clients had “directly invested the proceeds of the legal work respondent performed for them”); Williams, 498 So.2d at 728 (stating that “an unsophisticated client who is asked for a loan by

2020In Lewis v. State, the Court of Appeals outlined: We usually elect to review an unpreserved issue only after it has been thoroughly briefed and argued, and where a decision would (1) help correct a recurring error, (2) provide guidance when there is likely to be a new trial, or (3) offer assistance if there is a subsequent collateral attack on the conviction. 42 Lewis v. State, 452 Md. 663, 699 (2017) (quoting Ray v. State, 435 Md. 1, 22 (2013)).

2017As the Weaver Court explained, “An error can count as structural even if the error does not lead to fundamental unfairness in every case.” 137 S.Ct. at 1908 ; see also Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n.4, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (rejecting the idea that structural errors must “always or necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair and unreliable” (emphasis in original)).

2017As the Weaver Court explained, “An error can count as structural even if the error does not lead to fundamental unfairness in every case.” 137 S.Ct. at 1908 ; see also Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n.4, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (rejecting the idea that structural errors must “always or necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair and unreliable” (emphasis in original)).