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7 Oklahoma opinions name it 2 courts 1920–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Cartwright v. Hillcrest Investments, Ltd.green2 sentences2016We cannot agree. {15 ANR claims that a "life in being" includes entities such as a corporation and an LLC, based on this Court's determination in Cartwright v. Hillcrest Investments, Ltd., 1981 OK 27, ¶ 10 , 630 P.2d 1253, 1256 , that "at the time the Constitution was adopted, the term 'person' was generally understood to include corporations." ANR's reasoning is faulty due to an association fallacy: because a corporation may be a "person" does not make it a "life in being." [ 16 At common law, a corporation did not qualify as a life in being. 2016We cannot agree. {15 ANR claims that a "life in being" includes entities such as a corporation and an LLC, based on this Court's determination in Cartwright v. Hillcrest Investments, Ltd., 1981 OK 27, ¶ 10 , 630 P.2d 1253, 1256 , that "at the time the Constitution was adopted, the term 'person' was generally understood to include corporations." ANR's reasoning is faulty due to an association fallacy: because a corporation may be a "person" does not make it a "life in being." [ 16 At common law, a corporation did not qualify as a life in being. | 1 | 2 |
Braham v. Carncrossgreen1 sentence1994We recognize that some jurisdictions have held that “a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment prior to acceptance destroys the purposes for which the rule was designed” and have found that after a judgment is pronounced an “offer of judgment [is] ineffectual for any purpose.” Preuss v. Stevens, 150 Ariz. 6 , 721 P.2d 664, 665 (Ct.App.1986); City of Largo v. Barker, 538 So.2d 556, 557 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989); cf. Braham v. Camcross, 514 So.2d 71, 73 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987); Corni ng v. Radley, 25 Misc. 318 , 54 N.Y.S. 565, 566 (City Ct.N.Y.1898). | 1 | 1 |
City of Largo v. Barkergreen1 sentence1994We recognize that some jurisdictions have held that “a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment prior to acceptance destroys the purposes for which the rule was designed” and have found that after a judgment is pronounced an “offer of judgment [is] ineffectual for any purpose.” Preuss v. Stevens, 150 Ariz. 6 , 721 P.2d 664, 665 (Ct.App.1986); City of Largo v. Barker, 538 So.2d 556, 557 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989); cf. Braham v. Camcross, 514 So.2d 71, 73 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987); Corni ng v. Radley, 25 Misc. 318 , 54 N.Y.S. 565, 566 (City Ct.N.Y.1898). | 1 | 1 |
Preuss v. Stevensgreen2 sentences1994We recognize that some jurisdictions have held that “a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment prior to acceptance destroys the purposes for which the rule was designed” and have found that after a judgment is pronounced an “offer of judgment [is] ineffectual for any purpose.” Preuss v. Stevens, 150 Ariz. 6 , 721 P.2d 664, 665 (Ct.App.1986); City of Largo v. Barker, 538 So.2d 556, 557 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989); cf. Braham v. Camcross, 514 So.2d 71, 73 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987); Corni ng v. Radley, 25 Misc. 318 , 54 N.Y.S. 565, 566 (City Ct.N.Y.1898). 1994We recognize that some jurisdictions have held that “a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment prior to acceptance destroys the purposes for which the rule was designed” and have found that after a judgment is pronounced an “offer of judgment [is] ineffectual for any purpose.” Preuss v. Stevens, 150 Ariz. 6 , 721 P.2d 664, 665 (Ct.App.1986); City of Largo v. Barker, 538 So.2d 556, 557 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989); cf. Braham v. Camcross, 514 So.2d 71, 73 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987); Corni ng v. Radley, 25 Misc. 318 , 54 N.Y.S. 565, 566 (City Ct.N.Y.1898). | 1 | 1 |
Corning v. Radleygreen2 sentences1994We recognize that some jurisdictions have held that “a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment prior to acceptance destroys the purposes for which the rule was designed” and have found that after a judgment is pronounced an “offer of judgment [is] ineffectual for any purpose.” Preuss v. Stevens, 150 Ariz. 6 , 721 P.2d 664, 665 (Ct.App.1986); City of Largo v. Barker, 538 So.2d 556, 557 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989); cf. Braham v. Camcross, 514 So.2d 71, 73 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987); Corni ng v. Radley, 25 Misc. 318 , 54 N.Y.S. 565, 566 (City Ct.N.Y.1898). 1994We recognize that some jurisdictions have held that “a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment prior to acceptance destroys the purposes for which the rule was designed” and have found that after a judgment is pronounced an “offer of judgment [is] ineffectual for any purpose.” Preuss v. Stevens, 150 Ariz. 6 , 721 P.2d 664, 665 (Ct.App.1986); City of Largo v. Barker, 538 So.2d 556, 557 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989); cf. Braham v. Camcross, 514 So.2d 71, 73 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987); Corni ng v. Radley, 25 Misc. 318 , 54 N.Y.S. 565, 566 (City Ct.N.Y.1898). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McKart v. United States
green
2 sentences1980In McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 , 89 S.Ct. 1657 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969), the United States Supreme Court discussed the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine as it applies to federal agencies and outlined the various purposes of the doctrine: (1)that it is desirable for the agency to develop a factual background and judicial review may be hindered without it; (2) agency decisions require discretion and expertise that the agency should have the first chance to exercise; (3) it is more efficient to let the administrative process go forward without interruption; (4) the agency sh 1980In McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 , 89 S.Ct. 1657 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969), the United States Supreme Court discussed the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine as it applies to federal agencies and outlined the various purposes of the doctrine: (1)that it is desirable for the agency to develop a factual background and judicial review may be hindered without it; (2) agency decisions require discretion and expertise that the agency should have the first chance to exercise; (3) it is more efficient to let the administrative process go forward without interruption; (4) the agency sh | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Sofge v. Lowe
green
1 sentence1945In Sofge v. Lowe, 131 Tenn. 626 , L. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Tiger v. Lozier
green
2 sentences1929The doctrine of relation may be only a legal fiction, but it is resorted to'with the view of accomplishing justice.” The case of Tiger v. Lozier, 124 Okla. 260 , 256 Pac. 727 , refers to and otherwise quotes from Lykins v. McGrath, supra. In the case of McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. 1 , 205 Pac. 917 ( 260 U. S. 694 , 67 L. 1929The doctrine of relation may be only a legal fiction, but it is resorted to'with the view of accomplishing justice.” The case of Tiger v. Lozier, 124 Okla. 260 , 256 Pac. 727 , refers to and otherwise quotes from Lykins v. McGrath, supra. In the case of McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. 1 , 205 Pac. 917 ( 260 U. S. 694 , 67 L. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
McIntosh v. Dill
green
2 sentences1929The doctrine of relation may be only a legal fiction, but it is resorted to'with the view of accomplishing justice.” The case of Tiger v. Lozier, 124 Okla. 260 , 256 Pac. 727 , refers to and otherwise quotes from Lykins v. McGrath, supra. In the case of McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. 1 , 205 Pac. 917 ( 260 U. S. 694 , 67 L. 1929The doctrine of relation may be only a legal fiction, but it is resorted to'with the view of accomplishing justice.” The case of Tiger v. Lozier, 124 Okla. 260 , 256 Pac. 727 , refers to and otherwise quotes from Lykins v. McGrath, supra. In the case of McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. 1 , 205 Pac. 917 ( 260 U. S. 694 , 67 L. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Gettys v. Newburger
neutral
1 sentence1929The doctrine of relation may be only a legal fiction, but it is resorted to'with the view of accomplishing justice.” The case of Tiger v. Lozier, 124 Okla. 260 , 256 Pac. 727 , refers to and otherwise quotes from Lykins v. McGrath, supra. In the case of McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. 1 , 205 Pac. 917 ( 260 U. S. 694 , 67 L. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
McIntosh v. Dill
neutral
1 sentence1929The doctrine of relation may be only a legal fiction, but it is resorted to'with the view of accomplishing justice.” The case of Tiger v. Lozier, 124 Okla. 260 , 256 Pac. 727 , refers to and otherwise quotes from Lykins v. McGrath, supra. In the case of McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. 1 , 205 Pac. 917 ( 260 U. S. 694 , 67 L. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Crisman v. Heiderer
neutral
1 sentence1920Crisman v. Heiderer, 5 Colo. 589, 594 . | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.