purposes rule in Colorado

1967See Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp., 51 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.

1967See Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp., 51 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.

2014We therefore concluded that the lesson to be drawn from Aichison was that the rule against perpetuities will be applied to preemptive rights "only where the purposes of the rule, such as preventing a practical restraint upon alienation or encouraging improvement of the property, are served." Id. at 541 (citing Crossroads Shopping Cir., 646 P.2d at 882 ). 143 We then observed that, unlike an option that gives the holder the power to force a sale, the preemptive right at issue in Cambridge could not be exercised unless the owner first desired to sell; thus, the only effect of the preemption, if

1985See also Crossroads Shopping Center, 646 P.2d at 332 (option in lease to acquire more space violates rule against perpetuities because the option will adversely affect alien-ability and beneficial use of property). 5 In the present case, the preemptive right may be exercised only after the owner of a condominium unit formulates a desire to sell, and it must be exercised upon terms and conditions that the owner already has found acceptable.

2026See Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc., 2018 CO 3, ¶ 7 . 14 taxes into its cost analysis.” And while it’s true that when the government enacts a fee, the fee amount must be “reasonably designed to meet the overall cost of the service [or activity] for which the fee is imposed,” Bloom, 784 P.2d at 310 , that doesn’t mean that the fee calculation must take other tax revenue into consideration.

2026See, e.g., People v. Casper, 2025 COA 69, ¶ 48 . 6 fight like I used to fight.

2026See Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc., 2018 CO 3, ¶ 7 . 14 taxes into its cost analysis.” And while it’s true that when the government enacts a fee, the fee amount must be “reasonably designed to meet the overall cost of the service [or activity] for which the fee is imposed,” Bloom, 784 P.2d at 310 , that doesn’t mean that the fee calculation must take other tax revenue into consideration.

2025See People v. Hoggard, 2017 COA 88, ¶ 44 (“[A]ttempt usually shares the same mental state required for the predicate offense.”), aff’d, 2020 CO 54 ; see also § 18-2-101(1). 14 conduct and result: A person may not “use a threat or an act constituting harassment,” directed to or committed upon a witness or victim, as retaliation or retribution against the witness or victim. ¶ 31 The problem is that these instructions, even when read together, did not inform the jury that the retaliation or retribution must be because of the witness’s or victim’s status as such.

2025See People v. Hoggard, 2017 COA 88, ¶ 44 (“[A]ttempt usually shares the same mental state required for the predicate offense.”), aff’d, 2020 CO 54 ; see also § 18-2-101(1). 14 conduct and result: A person may not “use a threat or an act constituting harassment,” directed to or committed upon a witness or victim, as retaliation or retribution against the witness or victim. ¶ 31 The problem is that these instructions, even when read together, did not inform the jury that the retaliation or retribution must be because of the witness’s or victim’s status as such.

2019GM counters with the Colorado Supreme Court’s observation that the Restatement’s “concept of a ‘transaction, or series of connected transactions’ is incapable of mathematical precision and instead contemplates a pragmatic standard, to be applied with attention to the facts of each case.” In re Greene, 2013 CO 29, ¶ 10 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. b (1982)).

2019If it is not “upon the same cause of action,” it is untimely. ¶ 24 Drawing largely on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and case law construing the phrase for the purposes of claim preclusion, Park Meadows urges us to adopt a transactional view of “cause of action.” Under this approach, a “cause of action” is “bounded by the injury for which relief is demanded, and not by the legal theory on which the person asserting the claims relies.” Farmers High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189, 199 (Colo. 1999).

2014See Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 799 (Colo.2000) (taking the allegations in the complaint as true for the purposes of determining whether the injured party established that a public entity waived immunity under the CGIA).

2013See Friedland, 105 P.3d at 647-48 , The concrete company then presented evidence to overcome this presumption, including the following: e The concrete company's liability to the general - contractor was - "reasonably clear," see id; at 648, because it owed damages to the contractor for the project's delay under the parties' construe tion contract. ® The concrete company's chairman testified that; ' , e It was "expensive for [the general contractor] to operate a job site ... so whenever you cause an incident that's going to result in delay, you know it's going to get expensive," 20 e "[The buil

2013See People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Colo.1994) ("A court ... may consider the consequences of a particular construction when determining the legislature's intent."); see also § 2-4-203.

2012BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66, 72 (Colo.2004). 123 Our supreme court has identified three factors that aid in determining whether an allegedly violated tort duty arose independently of the parties' contract; (1) whether the relief sought in tort is the same as the contractual relief; (2) whether there is a recognized common law duty of care in tort; and (8) whether the tort duty differs in any way from the contractual duty.

2009We have held that "consent, when given to enter [a home] for the purposes of inquiry, does not justify otherwise impermissible searches and seizures. " People v. Milton, 826 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Colo.1992) (emphasis added); cf. People v. Najjar, 984 P.2d 592, 595 (Colo.1999) (noting a consensual search must be limited to consent actually given).

2009We have held that "consent, when given to enter [a home] for the purposes of inquiry, does not justify otherwise impermissible searches and seigures" People v. Milton, 826 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Colo.1992) (emphasis added); cf. People v. Najjar, 984 P.2d 592, 595 (Colo.1999) (noting a consensual search must be limited to consent actually given).

2009We have held that "consent, when given to enter [a home] for the purposes of inquiry, does not justify otherwise impermissible searches and seizures. " People v. Milton, 826 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Colo.1992) (emphasis added); cf. People v. Najjar, 984 P.2d 592, 595 (Colo.1999) (noting a consensual search must be limited to consent actually given).

2009We have held that "consent, when given to enter [a home] for the purposes of inquiry, does not justify otherwise impermissible searches and seigures" People v. Milton, 826 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Colo.1992) (emphasis added); cf. People v. Najjar, 984 P.2d 592, 595 (Colo.1999) (noting a consensual search must be limited to consent actually given).

2008The purposes of the doctrine are the "preservation of family harmony, the maintenance of legitimate parental authority and control, *408 and the safeguarding of family assets by protecting against asset depletion resulting from a judgment in favor of the child against the parent." Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 796 P.2d 1385, 1389 (Colo.1990); see also Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 156 , 526 P.2d 304, 308 (1974)(immunity waived for willful and wanton parental misconduct); Terror Mining Co. v. Roter, 866 P.2d 929, 933 (Colo.1994) (immunity waived when injury resulted from parental action in a

2008The purposes of the doctrine are the "preservation of family harmony, the maintenance of legitimate parental authority and control, *408 and the safeguarding of family assets by protecting against asset depletion resulting from a judgment in favor of the child against the parent." Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 796 P.2d 1385, 1389 (Colo.1990); see also Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 156 , 526 P.2d 304, 308 (1974)(immunity waived for willful and wanton parental misconduct); Terror Mining Co. v. Roter, 866 P.2d 929, 933 (Colo.1994) (immunity waived when injury resulted from parental action in a

2008The purposes of the doctrine are the "preservation of family harmony, the maintenance of legitimate parental authority and control, *408 and the safeguarding of family assets by protecting against asset depletion resulting from a judgment in favor of the child against the parent." Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 796 P.2d 1385, 1389 (Colo.1990); see also Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 156 , 526 P.2d 304, 308 (1974)(immunity waived for willful and wanton parental misconduct); Terror Mining Co. v. Roter, 866 P.2d 929, 933 (Colo.1994) (immunity waived when injury resulted from parental action in a

2008The purposes of the doctrine are the "preservation of family harmony, the maintenance of legitimate parental authority and control, *408 and the safeguarding of family assets by protecting against asset depletion resulting from a judgment in favor of the child against the parent." Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 796 P.2d 1385, 1389 (Colo.1990); see also Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 156 , 526 P.2d 304, 308 (1974)(immunity waived for willful and wanton parental misconduct); Terror Mining Co. v. Roter, 866 P.2d 929, 933 (Colo.1994) (immunity waived when injury resulted from parental action in a

2004See Bainbridge, Inc. v. Douglas County Bd. of Comm’rs, 55 P.3d 271 (Colo.App.2002)(to be a “prevailing party” for the purposes of rule awarding costs, a party must have succeeded on a significant issue presented by the litigation and must have achieved some of the benefits sought in that action).

2002Corp., su *485 pra, 700 P.2d at 541 (emphasis added).