purposes analysis in Georgia

2019Wallace v. State , 272 Ga. 501 , 504 (3) (a), 530 S.E.2d 721 (2000). (e) Williams contends his counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing such that prejudice should be presumed for the purposes of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 10 Specifically, Williams contends that, "for a great deal of the trial," his defense lawyer "could not hear what was happening and continually told witnesses he could not understand them." Williams argues that his counsel's inability to hear compromised his ability to advocate for his client.

2019Wallace v. State , 272 Ga. 501 , 504 (3) (a), 530 S.E.2d 721 (2000). (e) Williams contends his counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing such that prejudice should be presumed for the purposes of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 10 Specifically, Williams contends that, "for a great deal of the trial," his defense lawyer "could not hear what was happening and continually told witnesses he could not understand them." Williams argues that his counsel's inability to hear compromised his ability to advocate for his client.

2024Compare Newsome v. State, 183 Ga. App. 339 (1) ( 359 SE2d 11 ) (1987) (decided prior to the enactment of OCGA § 16-9-40, and explaining that venue for financial transaction card fraud exists where the card “was presented and goods were received”).

2024Compare Newsome v. State, 183 Ga. App. 339 (1) ( 359 SE2d 11 ) (1987) (decided prior to the enactment of OCGA § 16-9-40, and explaining that venue for financial transaction card fraud exists where the card “was presented and goods were received”).

2019The record, however, does not support the assertion that any hearing difficulties 10 See Strickland, 466 U. S. at 692 (III) (B) (identifying an “[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether” as one of the rare instances in which prejudice is legally presumed for a Sixth Amendment claim); United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 659 (III) ( 104 SCt 2039 , 80 LE2d 657) (1984) (“[I]f [defense] counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process

2019The record, however, does not support the assertion that any hearing difficulties 10 See Strickland, 466 U. S. at 692 (III) (B) (identifying an “[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether” as one of the rare instances in which prejudice is legally presumed for a Sixth Amendment claim); United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 659 (III) ( 104 SCt 2039 , 80 LE2d 657) (1984) (“[I]f [defense] counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process

2019The record, however, does not support the assertion that any hearing difficulties 10 See Strickland, 466 U. S. at 692 (III) (B) (identifying an “[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether” as one of the rare instances in which prejudice is legally presumed for a Sixth Amendment claim); United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 659 (III) ( 104 SCt 2039 , 80 LE2d 657) (1984) (“[I]f [defense] counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process

2017As the Supreme Court of Georgia discussed in Bodne v. Bodne, 277 Ga. 445, 447 ( 588 SE2d 728 ) (2003), it is appropriate for the trial court to consider “the myriad factors that had an impact on the [child] as established by the evidence adduced before it.” 5 Importantly, for the purposes of our analysis, this confusion was the direct result of the mother acting in direct contravention of the divorce decree. 6 See Bodne, 277 Ga. at 446 (discussing testimony received by the trial court regarding irreparable harm that would be suffered by the child were the current custody arrangement to continu

2017As the Supreme Court of Georgia discussed in Bodne v. Bodne, 277 Ga. 445, 447 ( 588 SE2d 728 ) (2003), it is appropriate for the trial court to consider “the myriad factors that had an impact on the [child] as established by the evidence adduced before it.” 5 Importantly, for the purposes of our analysis, this confusion was the direct result of the mother acting in direct contravention of the divorce decree. 6 See Bodne, 277 Ga. at 446 (discussing testimony received by the trial court regarding irreparable harm that would be suffered by the child were the current custody arrangement to continu

2017As the Supreme Court of Georgia discussed in Bodne v. Bodne, 277 Ga. 445, 447 ( 588 SE2d 728 ) (2003), it is appropriate for the trial court to consider “the myriad factors that had an impact on the [child] as established by the evidence adduced before it.” 5 Importantly, for the purposes of our analysis, this confusion was the direct result of the mother acting in direct contravention of the divorce decree. 6 See Bodne, 277 Ga. at 446 (discussing testimony received by the trial court regarding irreparable harm that would be suffered by the child were the current custody arrangement to continu

2017As the Supreme Court of Georgia discussed in Bodne v. Bodne, 277 Ga. 445, 447 ( 588 SE2d 728 ) (2003), it is appropriate for the trial court to consider “the myriad factors that had an impact on the [child] as established by the evidence adduced before it.” 5 Importantly, for the purposes of our analysis, this confusion was the direct result of the mother acting in direct contravention of the divorce decree. 6 See Bodne, 277 Ga. at 446 (discussing testimony received by the trial court regarding irreparable harm that would be suffered by the child were the current custody arrangement to continu

2017As the Supreme Court of Georgia discussed in Bodne v. Bodne, 277 Ga. 445, 447 ( 588 SE2d 728 ) (2003), it is appropriate for the trial court to consider “the myriad factors that had an impact on the [child] as established by the evidence adduced before it.” 5 Importantly, for the purposes of our analysis, this confusion was the direct result of the mother acting in direct contravention of the divorce decree. 6 See Bodne, 277 Ga. at 446 (discussing testimony received by the trial court regarding irreparable harm that would be suffered by the child were the current custody arrangement to continu

2006See id. at 51-52 ; Porter v. State, 278 Ga. 694, 696 (3) ( 606 SE2d 240 ) (2004); Brawner v. State, 278 Ga. 316, 318 (2) ( 602 SE2d 612 ) (2004).

2006See id. at 51-52 ; Porter v. State, 278 Ga. 694, 696 (3) ( 606 SE2d 240 ) (2004); Brawner v. State, 278 Ga. 316, 318 (2) ( 602 SE2d 612 ) (2004).

2006See id. at 51-52 ; Porter v. State, 278 Ga. 694, 696 (3) ( 606 SE2d 240 ) (2004); Brawner v. State, 278 Ga. 316, 318 (2) ( 602 SE2d 612 ) (2004).

2006While the holds may have indicated that the State would refuse to release Herndon, when he became otherwise free to go, the holds were not the legal basis for Herndon’s detention until the State actually did refuse to release Herndon after he became otherwise free to go, that is, when he completed his sentence on the Troup County offense on January 3, 2004. 3 See Scandrett v. State, 279 Ga. at 634-635 (1) (b) (while defendant was in federal custody, the restrictions on his liberty were not attributable to pending state charges). 4 Only on that date did the holds ripen into an arrest on the Eas

2006See id. at 51-52 ; Porter v. State, 278 Ga. 694, 696 (3) ( 606 SE2d 240 ) (2004); Brawner v. State, 278 Ga. 316, 318 (2) ( 602 SE2d 612 ) (2004).

2006See id. at 51-52 ; Porter v. State, 278 Ga. 694, 696 (3) ( 606 SE2d 240 ) (2004); Brawner v. State, 278 Ga. 316, 318 (2) ( 602 SE2d 612 ) (2004).

2003Despite knowing the name of Fannie Mae, in her amended complaint, Brown did not state Fannie Mae’s name or the reasons why she had not joined Fannie Mae as a party. 17 See OCGA § 9-11-55 (a) (After expiration of 15-day period for opening default, plaintiff is entitled to judgment “as if every item and paragraph of the complaint . . . were sup *852 ported by proper evidence.”); Gregory, supra, § 7-2 (A), at 557. 18 Times Journal, Inc. v. Jonquil Broadcasting Co., 226 Ga. 673, 676 ( 177 SE2d 64 ) (1970).

2003Despite knowing the name of Fannie Mae, in her amended complaint, Brown did not state Fannie Mae’s name or the reasons why she had not joined Fannie Mae as a party. 17 See OCGA § 9-11-55 (a) (After expiration of 15-day period for opening default, plaintiff is entitled to judgment “as if every item and paragraph of the complaint . . . were sup *852 ported by proper evidence.”); Gregory, supra, § 7-2 (A), at 557. 18 Times Journal, Inc. v. Jonquil Broadcasting Co., 226 Ga. 673, 676 ( 177 SE2d 64 ) (1970).

1996Brown v. Brown, 237 Ga. 201, 202 ( 227 SE2d 360 ) (1976).

1996Brown v. Brown, 237 Ga. 201, 202 ( 227 SE2d 360 ) (1976).

1993The clerk shall retain an exact duplicate copy of all records and the transcript sent up, with the same pagination, in his office as a permanent record.” “One of the purposes of this requirement is to afford local counsel in the county where the case was tried convenient access to the exact duplicate copy of the record [sent on appeal] so as to enable [counsel] to easily ascertain the proper references to be included in his brief and written argument to this court.” Law v. Smith, 226 Ga. 298, 300 ( 174 SE2d 893 ) (1970).

1993The clerk shall retain an exact duplicate copy of all records and the transcript sent up, with the same pagination, in his office as a permanent record.” “One of the purposes of this requirement is to afford local counsel in the county where the case was tried convenient access to the exact duplicate copy of the record [sent on appeal] so as to enable [counsel] to easily ascertain the proper references to be included in his brief and written argument to this court.” Law v. Smith, 226 Ga. 298, 300 ( 174 SE2d 893 ) (1970).

1980Under Golosh v. Cherokee Cab Co., 226 Ga. 636, 638 ( 176 SE2d 925 ) and Moon v. Ga. Power Co., 127 Ga. App. 524, 526 ( 194 SE2d 348 ), the test of whether an employer-employee or independent contractor relationship existed is not whether the employer did in fact control and direct the employee in the work, but it is whether the employer had that right under the employment contract.

1980Under Golosh v. Cherokee Cab Co., 226 Ga. 636, 638 ( 176 SE2d 925 ) and Moon v. Ga. Power Co., 127 Ga. App. 524, 526 ( 194 SE2d 348 ), the test of whether an employer-employee or independent contractor relationship existed is not whether the employer did in fact control and direct the employee in the work, but it is whether the employer had that right under the employment contract.

1980Under Golosh v. Cherokee Cab Co., 226 Ga. 636, 638 ( 176 SE2d 925 ) and Moon v. Ga. Power Co., 127 Ga. App. 524, 526 ( 194 SE2d 348 ), the test of whether an employer-employee or independent contractor relationship existed is not whether the employer did in fact control and direct the employee in the work, but it is whether the employer had that right under the employment contract.

1980Under Golosh v. Cherokee Cab Co., 226 Ga. 636, 638 ( 176 SE2d 925 ) and Moon v. Ga. Power Co., 127 Ga. App. 524, 526 ( 194 SE2d 348 ), the test of whether an employer-employee or independent contractor relationship existed is not whether the employer did in fact control and direct the employee in the work, but it is whether the employer had that right under the employment contract.

1968Resolving this issue requires consideration of a provision of our Code and a well established rule by this court. *231 In this connection, Code Ann. §.3-202 recites that “All petitions for equitable relief shall be filed in the county of the residence of one of the defendants against whom substantial relief is prayed, except in cases of injunctions to stay pending proceedings, when the petition may be filed in the county where the proceedings shall be pending, provided no relief is prayed as to matters not included in such litigation. . .” This section is embodied in the rule of such cases as

1968Resolving this issue requires consideration of a provision of our Code and a well established rule by this court. *231 In this connection, Code Ann. §.3-202 recites that “All petitions for equitable relief shall be filed in the county of the residence of one of the defendants against whom substantial relief is prayed, except in cases of injunctions to stay pending proceedings, when the petition may be filed in the county where the proceedings shall be pending, provided no relief is prayed as to matters not included in such litigation. . .” This section is embodied in the rule of such cases as

1952There is a difference between fraud that will entitle a person to rescind a, contract and fraud that tolls the running of the statute of limitations, as pointed out in the case of Middleton v. Pruden, 57 Ga. App. 555, 560 ( 196 S. E. 259 ).

1952There is a difference between fraud that will entitle a person to rescind a, contract and fraud that tolls the running of the statute of limitations, as pointed out in the case of Middleton v. Pruden, 57 Ga. App. 555, 560 ( 196 S. E. 259 ).

1926See Neill v. Hill, 32 Ga. App. 381 (2) ( 123 S. E. 30 ).