66 Massachusetts opinions name it 5 courts 1819–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Maciasgreen2 sentences2006“Among the purposes of this rule are the protection of individual privacy interests and the desire to minimize the potential for violence or property damage.” Commonwealth v. Macias, 429 Mass. 698, 701 (1999). 2006The purposes of this rule include “the protection of individual privacy interests and the desire to minimize the potential for violence or property damage.” Commonwealth v. Macias, 429 Mass. 698, 700 (1999). | 3 | 4 |
Jarosz v. Palmergreen2 sentences2025"A dismissal with prejudice constitutes a valid and final judgment for the purposes of claim preclusion." Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 536 (2002). 2008Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 536 (2002) (“Because claim preclusion involves the same claims and the same parties, it is necessary that a stipulation of dismissal be accorded the same effects as a final judgment; it would have no force if the parties were permitted to change their minds and relitigate the exact same claims against the same parties”). | 2 | 2 |
Cormier v. Cartygreen2 sentences2001We do not condone such practice as it runs afoul of the purposes of rule 52(a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 365 Mass. 816 (1974). 8 “[Rule 52(a)] serves to (1) insure the quality of a judge’s decision making process by requiring simultaneous articulation of the judge’s underlying reasoning; (2) assure the parties that their claims have been fully and fairly considered; and (3) inform an appellate court of the basis on which a decision has been reached.” Cormier v. Carty, 381 Mass. 234, 236 (1980). 1989The rule is designed to “(1) insure the quality of a judge’s decision making process by requiring simultaneous articulation of the judge’s underlying reasoning; (2) assure the parties that their claims have been fully and fairly considered; and (3) inform an appellate court of the basis on which a decision has been reached.” Cormier v. Carty, 381 Mass. 234, 236 (1980). | 2 | 2 |
Champa v. Weston Public Schoolsgreen2 sentences2026Schs., 473 Mass. 86, 90 (2015). 2019Sch ., 473 Mass. 86 , 90, 39 N.E.3d 435 (2015). | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Nolingreen1 sentence2026See Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 477 (2014); Commonwealth v. Nolin, 373 Mass. 45, 51 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fortegreen1 sentence2026See Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 477 (2014); Commonwealth v. Nolin, 373 Mass. 45, 51 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Silver v. Horneckgreen1 sentence2025The trust's designation of Illinois as its place of administration remains valid "even where there is an out-of-state trustee, so long as at least some part of the trust's administration occurs in Illinois." Silver v. Horneck, 2021 IL App (1st) 201044 ¶ 45 (2021). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Howard Dale Bernard, Gordon Rae Childress, Sammy Brice Brock, Roger Lee Bard, Russell Richard Cochrangreen1 sentence2024Privette, 491 Mass. at 515, quoting United States v. Bernard, 623 F.2d 551, 561 (9th Cir. 1979). | 1 | 1 |
Almeida v. Arrudagreen1 sentence2023Partnership, 461 Mass. at 475 , and assume for the purposes of our analysis that only acoustic, and not electronically amplified, musical instruments were played at the Inn in 1967. 10 Almeida, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 246-247 (third prong satisfied where judge found that beer and wine sales would not affect neighborhood traffic, litter, or safety in way different in kind from current store). | 1 | 1 |
Cape Resort Hotels, Inc. v. Alcoholic Licensing Boardgreen1 sentence2023Contrast Cape Resort Hotels, Inc., 385 Mass. at 216 (entertainment complex generated "traffic and noise problems wholly different" from prior use). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. Williams , 455 Mass. 706 , 714 n.6, 919 N.E.2d 685 (2010) ("[E]xculpatory is not a technical term meaning alibi or other complete proof of innocence, but simply imports evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the accused ... or, stated affirmatively, supporting the innocence of the defendant" [quotations omitted] ); Commonwealth v. Pisa , 372 Mass. 590 , 595, 363 N.E.2d 245 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 869 , 98 S.Ct. 210 , 54 L.Ed.2d 147 (1977). 16 The defendant argued that the change in her testimony was the result of intimidation on the part of the Federal governmen 2018See Commonwealth v. Williams , 455 Mass. 706 , 714 n.6, 919 N.E.2d 685 (2010) ("[E]xculpatory is not a technical term meaning alibi or other complete proof of innocence, but simply imports evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the accused ... or, stated affirmatively, supporting the innocence of the defendant" [quotations omitted] ); Commonwealth v. Pisa , 372 Mass. 590 , 595, 363 N.E.2d 245 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 869 , 98 S.Ct. 210 , 54 L.Ed.2d 147 (1977). 16 The defendant argued that the change in her testimony was the result of intimidation on the part of the Federal governmen | 1 | 1 |
Keller v. O'Briengreen1 sentence2014Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass. 261, 268 (2013), quoting Keller v. O’Brien, 425 Mass. 774, 782 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Shapiro v. City of Worcestergreen1 sentence2014Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass. 261, 268 (2013), quoting Keller v. O’Brien, 425 Mass. 774, 782 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Bank of New York v. Baileygreen1 sentence2013When Harmon, on behalf of FNMA, made this claim, the SJC had already issued Bank of New York v. Bailey, 460 Mass. 327, 332 (2011), which explicitly authorized the Housing Court to “consider the former homeowner’s defense that the plaintiffs title is invalid because the foreclosure was not conducted strictly according to the statute.” However, although the underlying purposes of claim and issue preclusion are different, because the required elements for each mirror one another, an analysis based on the theory of claim preclusion would lead to the same result, that res judicata does not bar Farm | 1 | 1 |
Kent v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2013For the purposes of this analysis, we assume that our decision in Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 317 (2002), applying the doctrine of present execution to motions to dismiss, applies with equal force to motions for summary judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Whipple v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxationgreen1 sentence2011For the purposes of this inquiry, the court defined “business” as “an activity which occupies the time, attention and labor of men for the purpose of livelihood, profit or gain.” Id. at 303, quoting from Whipple v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn., 263 Mass. 476, 485-486 (1928). | 1 | 1 |
Apparel Art International, Inc. v. Amertex Enterprises Ltd.green1 sentence2011“Although a set of facts may give rise to multiple counts based on different legal theories, if the facts form a common nucleus that is identifiable as a transaction or series of related transactions, then those facts represent one cause of action.” Id., quoting Apparel Art Int’l, Inc. v. Amertex Enters., Ltd., 48 F.3d 576, 583-84 (1st Cir. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
| National Investors Corporation v. Hoeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Talbert Trading Co. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discriminationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Mailletgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mackintosh v. Chambersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garrett v. Director of the Division of Employment Securitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Charlette v. Charlette Bros. Foundry, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Broderick's Casegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kargman v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discriminationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Buteau v. NORFOLK COUNTY RETIREMENT BOARDgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tuite & Sons, Inc. v. Shawmut Bank, N.A.green | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Revenue v. LaFrattagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cabell v. Terry W.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Doegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Richards v. Wisconsingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Fortegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| J. & J. ENTERPRISES, INC. v. Martignettigreen | 1 | 1 |
| MATTER OF DeSAULNIER (NO. 2)green | 1 | 1 |
| Palaza v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Franklin Fruit Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Suitsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holahan v. City of Medfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Salyer
green
1 sentence2026For the purposes of our analysis, we assume that the testimony of Pierresin and Rivera-Toucet describing the contents of the parking lot videos 6 should have been "barred for the same reasons as those underlying the best evidence rule," Salyer, 84 Mass. App. Ct. at 356 n.10. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Bank v. Thermo Elemental Inc.
green
1 sentence2025We accept that representation for the purposes of our analysis. [13] This result is consistent with the court's explanation in Bank, 451 Mass. at 662–663, that "when expenses incurred as a result of a contract breach are not paid by a plaintiff until after the breach has occurred, the interest is calculated not from the date of the breach or even the date the action was commenced, as the plain language of the statute would require, but from the date or dates on which the plaintiff made such payments." We nevertheless note, however, that the trial judge enjoys some discretion in setting accrual | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Shirley Wayside Ltd. Partnership v. Board of Appeals of Shirley
green
1 sentence2023Partnership, 461 Mass. at 475 , and assume for the purposes of our analysis that only acoustic, and not electronically amplified, musical instruments were played at the Inn in 1967. 10 Almeida, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 246-247 (third prong satisfied where judge found that beer and wine sales would not affect neighborhood traffic, litter, or safety in way different in kind from current store). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Bendetson v. Building Inspector of Revere
green
1 sentence2021Where the arguments in both cases "arise out of and attempt to characterize the same set of operative facts -- the actual use of the property in question," Bendetson v. Building Insp. of Revere, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 615 , 620 (1994), the causes of action in both cases are the same for purposes of claim preclusion. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
American International Insurance v. Robert Seuffer GmbH & Co. KG
green
1 sentence2020Co. v. Robert Seuffer GMBH & Co., 468 Mass. 109, 120-121 , cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1061 (2014). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Commonwealth v. School Committee of Springfield
green
2 sentences2018These grants received full scrutiny and endorsement by the residents of the town at multiple levels of town government. **109 The judge found that the first and third prongs of the test had been satisfied by the town. 5 With regard to the second factor, the judge assumed for the purposes of the analysis that the taxpayers would be able to show that the grants in fact substantially aided the church and she then conducted the balancing test, concluding that the grants did not run afoul of the anti-aid amendment. 6 She did not ignore *722 the second factor; rather, the judge balanced the various 2018These grants received full scrutiny and endorsement by the residents of the town at multiple levels of town government. **109 The judge found that the first and third prongs of the test had been satisfied by the town. 5 With regard to the second factor, the judge assumed for the purposes of the analysis that the taxpayers would be able to show that the grants in fact substantially aided the church and she then conducted the balancing test, concluding that the grants did not run afoul of the anti-aid amendment. 6 She did not ignore *722 the second factor; rather, the judge balanced the various | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Ayala v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2018Ayala v. Commonwealth , 454 Mass. 1015 , 1015, 910 N.E.2d 365 (2009). 15 For the purposes of our analysis, we assume, without in any way deciding, that the information that would confirm N.F.'s status as an informant falls within the scope of what is considered exculpatory information. 2018Ayala v. Commonwealth , 454 Mass. 1015 , 1015, 910 N.E.2d 365 (2009). 15 For the purposes of our analysis, we assume, without in any way deciding, that the information that would confirm N.F.'s status as an informant falls within the scope of what is considered exculpatory information. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bloom v. School Committee of Springfield
green
2 sentences2018Indeed, as this court's **110 anti-aid amendment cases repeatedly state, the amendment "marks no difference between 'aids,' whether religious or secular." Springfield , 382 Mass. at 674 , n.14 , 417 N.E.2d 408 , quoting Bloom v. School Comm. of Springfield , 376 Mass. 35 , 45, 379 N.E.2d 578 (1978). 2018Indeed, as this court's **110 anti-aid amendment cases repeatedly state, the amendment "marks no difference between 'aids,' whether religious or secular." Springfield , 382 Mass. at 674 , n.14 , 417 N.E.2d 408 , quoting Bloom v. School Comm. of Springfield , 376 Mass. 35 , 45, 379 N.E.2d 578 (1978). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Pisa
green
2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. Williams , 455 Mass. 706 , 714 n.6, 919 N.E.2d 685 (2010) ("[E]xculpatory is not a technical term meaning alibi or other complete proof of innocence, but simply imports evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the accused ... or, stated affirmatively, supporting the innocence of the defendant" [quotations omitted] ); Commonwealth v. Pisa , 372 Mass. 590 , 595, 363 N.E.2d 245 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 869 , 98 S.Ct. 210 , 54 L.Ed.2d 147 (1977). 16 The defendant argued that the change in her testimony was the result of intimidation on the part of the Federal governmen 2018See Commonwealth v. Williams , 455 Mass. 706 , 714 n.6, 919 N.E.2d 685 (2010) ("[E]xculpatory is not a technical term meaning alibi or other complete proof of innocence, but simply imports evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the accused ... or, stated affirmatively, supporting the innocence of the defendant" [quotations omitted] ); Commonwealth v. Pisa , 372 Mass. 590 , 595, 363 N.E.2d 245 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 869 , 98 S.Ct. 210 , 54 L.Ed.2d 147 (1977). 16 The defendant argued that the change in her testimony was the result of intimidation on the part of the Federal governmen | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Whitehead v. Flamegas Companies
green
1 sentence2018See Commonwealth v. Williams , 455 Mass. 706 , 714 n.6, 919 N.E.2d 685 (2010) ("[E]xculpatory is not a technical term meaning alibi or other complete proof of innocence, but simply imports evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the accused ... or, stated affirmatively, supporting the innocence of the defendant" [quotations omitted] ); Commonwealth v. Pisa , 372 Mass. 590 , 595, 363 N.E.2d 245 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 869 , 98 S.Ct. 210 , 54 L.Ed.2d 147 (1977). 16 The defendant argued that the change in her testimony was the result of intimidation on the part of the Federal governmen | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sims v. United States
green
1 sentence2018See Commonwealth v. Williams , 455 Mass. 706 , 714 n.6, 919 N.E.2d 685 (2010) ("[E]xculpatory is not a technical term meaning alibi or other complete proof of innocence, but simply imports evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the accused ... or, stated affirmatively, supporting the innocence of the defendant" [quotations omitted] ); Commonwealth v. Pisa , 372 Mass. 590 , 595, 363 N.E.2d 245 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 869 , 98 S.Ct. 210 , 54 L.Ed.2d 147 (1977). 16 The defendant argued that the change in her testimony was the result of intimidation on the part of the Federal governmen | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Runyan
green
1 sentence2013We decline to do so here. 17 Yet, even assuming for the purposes of this analysis only that Heller applied to firearm possession outside the home, our analysis in Runyan, supra at 235-237 , leads us to conclude that the storage statute would pass constitutional muster. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Riley v. Presnell
green
1 sentence2011Rather, it is a reasonable person who has been subjected to the conduct which forms the basis for the plaintiff’s complaint.” Ibid. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Isaac Manego v. The Orleans Board of Trade, Isaac Manego v. The Orleans Board of Trade, Cape Cod Five Cents Savings Bank and David B. Willard green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Commonwealth v. King green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Commonwealth v. Snyder green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Commonwealth v. Licata green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| City of Lynn v. Thompson green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Commonwealth v. Martin green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Adoption of Ramon green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Commonwealth v. Meech green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Carlson Corp. v. University of Vermont green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Carter v. Commissioner of Correction green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Commonwealth v. Cundriff green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Luna v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Commonwealth v. Borans green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Laborers Pension Trust Fund for Northern California v. Imel green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Carifio v. Town of Watertown green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Lewis v. Emerson green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Commonwealth v. Ciminera green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Commonwealth v. Ciminera green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Payton v. Abbott Labs green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.