purposes doctrine in New York

2024One of the purposes of the doctrine is to conserve the resources of the courts and litigants (see Mayers v. D'Agostino, 58 N.Y.2d 696, 698 , 458 N.Y.S.2d 904 , 444 N.E.2d 1323 ; Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291 , 441 N.Y.S.2d 49 , 423 N.E.2d 807 ).

2024One of the purposes of the doctrine is to conserve the resources of the courts and litigants (see Mayers v. D'Agostino, 58 N.Y.2d 696, 698 , 458 N.Y.S.2d 904 , 444 N.E.2d 1323 ; Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291 , 441 N.Y.S.2d 49 , 423 N.E.2d 807 ).

2024One of the purposes of the doctrine is to conserve the resources of the courts and litigants (see Mayers v. D'Agostino, 58 N.Y.2d 696, 698 , 458 N.Y.S.2d 904 , 444 N.E.2d 1323 ; Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291 , 441 N.Y.S.2d 49 , 423 N.E.2d 807 ).

2024One of the purposes of the doctrine is to conserve the resources of the courts and litigants (see Mayers v. D'Agostino, 58 N.Y.2d 696, 698 , 458 N.Y.S.2d 904 , 444 N.E.2d 1323 ; Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291 , 441 N.Y.S.2d 49 , 423 N.E.2d 807 ).

1917Courts of Commbn Pleas of counties, under the former Constitution, in this State were held in Foot v. Stevens ( 17 Wend. 483 ) to be courts of general jurisdiction for the purpose of the presumption which always prevails as to jurisdiction of courts of that character, and the County Courts or Courts of Common Pleas of other States have been treated as courts of general jurisdiction for the purposes of such presumption.” Pringle v. Woolworth, 90 N. Y. 506 , 507.

1882Courts of Common Pleas of counties, under the former Constitution, in this State were held in Foot v. Stevens ( 17 Wend. 483 ), to be courts of general jurisdiction for the purpose of the presumption which always prevails as to jurisdiction of courts of that character, and the Coimty Courts or Courts of Common Pleas of other States have been treated as courts of general jurisdiction for the purposes of such presumption.

2026Rather, the court must determine in each case whether the reasons for the doctrine are present and whether the purposes of the doctrine will be served by its application" ( Heller v Coca-Cola Co. , 230 AD2d 768, 769 [2d Dept 1996] [citation omitted], lv dismissed & denied 89 NY2d 856 [1996]; see Lauer v New York Tel.

2024While recognizing that "this Court is bound to follow precedent from the Third Department" ( New York State Thruway Auth. v Fenech , 29 Misc 3d 644, 649 [Sup Ct, Albany County 2010], revd 94 AD3d 17 [3d Dept 2012]; see Matter of Patrick BB. , 284 AD2d 636, 639 [3d Dept 2001]; Mountain View Coach Lines v Storms , 102 AD2d 663, 664 [2d Dept 1984]), the Court is not persuaded that CPLR 4519 is inapplicable to this proceeding under Matter of Myers ( 45 AD3d 955 [3d Dept 2007]).

2024While recognizing that "this Court is bound to follow precedent from the Third Department" ( New York State Thruway Auth. v Fenech , 29 Misc 3d 644, 649 [Sup Ct, Albany County 2010], revd 94 AD3d 17 [3d Dept 2012]; see Matter of Patrick BB. , 284 AD2d 636, 639 [3d Dept 2001]; Mountain View Coach Lines v Storms , 102 AD2d 663, 664 [2d Dept 1984]), the Court is not persuaded that CPLR 4519 is inapplicable to this proceeding under Matter of Myers ( 45 AD3d 955 [3d Dept 2007]).

2024Relying on People v Rudolph ( 21 NY3d 497 ), the defendant argues that a DVSJA hearing is too valuable a right to be sacrificed in the plea negotiating stage and can never be waived.

2018Moreover, as discussed above, the court must narrowly construe a request for protection of privileged information, and apply the protection consistent with the underlying purposes of the immunity from disclosure ( Spectrum Sys. , 78 NY2d at 377 ).

2018In Spectrum Sys. , a case dealing with production of a report prepared by outside counsel, the Court of Appeals noted that the invocation of privilege should "not be used as a device to shield discoverable information" ( id. at 379 ). [FN4] Therefore, defendants' counsel has made a prima facie showing that the material sought is irrelevant and/or that the process is not calculated to lead to legitimate discovery, whether because the information sought is privileged or because the true purpose of the subpoena is solely to disqualify him.

2018Contrary to defendant's contention, however, this Court has never held that only young children can warrant the "particularly vulnerable victim" classification for the purposes of this exception. [FN3] It would be exceedingly strange to find that a defendant possesses the requisite mental state when he or she abandons a helpless adult victim ( see Kibbe , 35 NY2d at 409-410 ), but not when a defendant subjects an equally helpless adult victim to a prolonged period of torture.

2017The purposes of this privilege are to further the truth-seeking process at trial and encourage cooperation of witnesses, particularly with regard to expert witnesses, so that they can discharge their public duty freely “with knowledge that they will be insulated from the harassment and financial hazard of subsequent litigation” (Tolisano v Texon, 144 AD2d 267 , 271 [1988, Smith, J., dissenting], revd for reasons stated in dissent 75 NY2d 732 [1989]; see Rehberg v Paulk, 566 US 356, 367 [2012]).

2017The purposes of this privilege are to further the truth-seeking process at trial and encourage cooperation of witnesses, particularly with regard to expert witnesses, so that they can discharge their public duty freely “with knowledge that they will be insulated from the harassment and financial hazard of subsequent litigation” (Tolisano v Texon, 144 AD2d 267 , 271 [1988, Smith, J., dissenting], revd for reasons stated in dissent 75 NY2d 732 [1989]; see Rehberg v Paulk, 566 US 356, 367 [2012]).

2017We therefore reformulate this question to reflect what the Second Circuit described in its ruling as an open question of New York law for this Court: "[i]f Section 296 (15) is limited [to an employer,] how should courts determine whether an entity is the aggrieved party's 'employer' for the purposes of a claim under Section 296 (15)?" ( 835 F3d at 285 ).

2017We therefore reformulate this question to reflect what the Second Circuit described in its ruling as an open question of New York law for this Court: “if Section 296(15) is limited [to an employer], how should courts determine whether an entity is the aggrieved party’s ‘employer’ for the purposes of a claim under Section 296(15)?” ( 835 F3d at 285 ).

2012In a pair of cases that it also decided the same day, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act — which does not contain an express supersedure clause, but contains a purposes clause similar to the OGSML— does not preclude local municipalities from regulating the districts within which gas drilling may occur (see Board of County Commissioners, La Plata County v Bowen/Edwards Assoc., Inc., 830 P2d 1045 [1992]; Voss, 830 P2d 1061 [1992]).

2012In a pair of cases that it also decided the same day, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act — which does not contain an express supersedure clause, but contains a purposes clause similar to the OGSML— does not preclude local municipalities from regulating the districts within which gas drilling may occur (see Board of County Commissioners, La Plata County v Bowen/Edwards Assoc., Inc., 830 P2d 1045 [1992]; Voss, 830 P2d 1061 [1992]).

2009Auth., 38 AD3d 308 [1st Dept 2007].) Factual Background For the purposes of the hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts addressing the circumstances which led to plaintiffs injuries.

2004(Little v Banks, 85 NY 258 [1881].) Municipalities are treated the same as the State for the purposes of this rule of law.