purposes immunity in Alabama

1985Opinion of the Justices , 247 Ala. 195 , 23 So.2d 505 .

1985Opinion of the Justices , 247 Ala. 195 , 23 So.2d 505 .

1975“A lucid discussion of this constitutional provision is found in Opinion of the Justices, 275 Ala. 254 , 154 So.2d 12 , wherein the following language appears: “ ‘(2) One of the purposes of the requirement of Section 45, supra, that the subject of a law shall be clearly expressed in the title, is to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by incorporating in bills provisions not reasonably disclosed by its title, and which might be overlooked, and unintentionally approved in enacting the bill.

1975“A lucid discussion of this constitutional provision is found in Opinion of the Justices, 275 Ala. 254 , 154 So.2d 12 , wherein the following language appears: “ ‘(2) One of the purposes of the requirement of Section 45, supra, that the subject of a law shall be clearly expressed in the title, is to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by incorporating in bills provisions not reasonably disclosed by its title, and which might be overlooked, and unintentionally approved in enacting the bill.

2018Servs., Inc. , 81 So.3d 326 , 338-39 (Ala. 2011).

2018Servs., Inc. , 81 So.3d 326 , 338-39 (Ala. 2011).

2010Wood has admitted that he made the remark that Tullis could "kiss [his] ass." For the purposes of our analysis in this case, we will assume that such language is "inappropriate to the workplace" as that phrase is used in Black Creek's employee handbook and, thus, can provide "evidence that [Wood] was terminated for a legitimate reason." Culbreth , 599 So.2d at 1122 .

2010Wood has admitted that he made the remark that Tullís could “kiss [his] ass.” For the purposes of our analysis in this case, we will assume that such language is “inappropriate to the workplace” as that phrase is used in Black Creek’s employee handbook and, thus, can provide “evidence that [Wood] was terminated for a legitimate reason.” Culbreth, 599 So.2d at 1122 .

2003BROWN, J., concurs. 5 See Siegert v. Gilley , 500 U.S. 226 , 232 (1991) ("One of the purposes of immunity, absolute and qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit."); Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511 , 526 (stating that qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial").

2003See also Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173 (Ala.2000), in which a majority of this Court adopted the Cranman restatement of the rule governing State-agent immunity. [2] "Sprawling" is a wrestling technique in which a player throws his legs back, typically landing on his knees, in order to avoid having his legs grabbed by his opponent. [3] Furlow testified that Auburn High School is a member of the AHSAA. [4] See Ex parte Coleman, 861 So.2d 1080 (Ala. 2003) (when considering a summary-judgment motion, "[t]he court must accept the tendencies of the evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party and

2000Sarradett v. University of South Alabama Medical Center, 484 So.2d 426 (Ala.1986).

2000Sarradett v. University of South Alabama Medical Center, 484 So.2d 426 (Ala.1986).

1996"As the Court of Civil Appeals suggests in S & L, the holding in S & L was based in part on Presiding Judge Bradley's special concurrence in State Department of Revenue v. B & B Beverage, Inc., 534 So.2d 1114 (Ala.Civ.App.1987).

1992As the Court of Civil Appeals suggests in S & L, the holding in S & L was based in part on Presiding Judge Bradley’s special concurrence in State Department of Revenue v. B & B Beverage, Inc., 534 So.2d 1114 (Ala.Civ.App.1987).

1987McElroy, § 212.02.” Howton v. State, 391 So.2d 147 (Ala.Crim.App.1980).

1983The purposes of the rule are to prevent fraud and to insure the reliability of the oral testimony concerning the writing. . . ." (Citations omitted.) Howton v. State , 391 So.2d 147 , 150 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980). *Page 848 The state's evidence fully and thoroughly established the above requisites.

1912Co., 83 Ala. 604 , 2 South. 727 ; Memphis & Little Rock R.

1888Co., 83 Ala. 604 ; Memphis & Little Rock R.

2017Martin has not shown that his request was made as soon as practicable, and, in fact, it appears that holding such a hearing at the time Martin requested it would clearly have interfered with the circuit court’s ability to manage its docket and would have done little, if anything, to advance the purposes of immunity discussed in Watters, supra. Whether there could ever be circumstances that would justify such a late request for a pretrial immunity hearing is not before us.

2015As noted above, “[o]ne of the purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit.” Ex parte Auburn University, 6 So.3d 478 (Ala.2008)(internal citations omitted).

2014In Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn.2013), the Minnesota Supreme Court discussed “the difference between substantive and procedural rules” for the purposes of an analysis under Teague: “On the one hand, a new rule is ‘substantive’ if the rule ‘narrow[s] the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms,’ or ‘placets] particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s power to punish.’ Schriro [v. Summerlin], 542 U.S. [348] at 351-52, 124 S.Ct. 2519 [(2004)] (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

2014In Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn.2013), the Minnesota Supreme Court discussed “the difference between substantive and procedural rules” for the purposes of an analysis under Teague: “On the one hand, a new rule is ‘substantive’ if the rule ‘narrow[s] the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms,’ or ‘placets] particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s power to punish.’ Schriro [v. Summerlin], 542 U.S. [348] at 351-52, 124 S.Ct. 2519 [(2004)] (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

2014In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court explained that the definition of a ‘substantive’ rule for purposes of the first Teague exception was not limited to new rules that placed certain conduct completely beyond the State’s power to punish. 492 U.S. 302, 330 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), abrogated on other grounds, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002).

2014In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court explained that the definition of a ‘substantive’ rule for purposes of the first Teague exception was not limited to new rules that placed certain conduct completely beyond the State’s power to punish. 492 U.S. 302, 330 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), abrogated on other grounds, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002).

2014In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court explained that the definition of a ‘substantive’ rule for purposes of the first Teague exception was not limited to new rules that placed certain conduct completely beyond the State’s power to punish. 492 U.S. 302, 330 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), abrogated on other grounds, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002).

2014In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court explained that the definition of a ‘substantive’ rule for purposes of the first Teague exception was not limited to new rules that placed certain conduct completely beyond the State’s power to punish. 492 U.S. 302, 330 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), abrogated on other grounds, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002).

2010“For the purposes of this claim, Gamble is challenging the constitutionality of his sentence in the present day, post [Roper v.] Simmons [, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004) ].

2010Co., 1 So.3d 576 , 582 n. 6 (La.Ct.App.2008) (quoting Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1997)). [2] Although Phillips disputes Seward's allegation that she began to move forward after she stopped initially and then stopped again, our standard of review requires us to accept Seward's allegation as true for the purposes of this analysis.

2005In holding that a taxpayer has standing to challenge a tax abatement conferred upon another taxpayer, the Court noted that "`[f]or the purposes of an analysis of standing, . . . granting of tax abatement does not differ significantly from an expenditure of public funds, since in either case the conduct complained of could result in the treasury's containing less money than it ought to. '" Henson , 891 So.2d at 868 (quoting Sommer v. City of St.

2005In holding that a taxpayer has standing to challenge a tax abatement conferred upon another taxpayer, the Court noted that "`[f]or the purposes of an analysis of standing, . . . granting of tax abatement does not differ significantly from an expenditure of public funds, since in either case the conduct complained of could result in the treasury's containing less money than it ought to. '" Henson, 891 So.2d at 868 (quoting Sommer v. City of St.

2004Therefore, applying the rule enunciated in Collins [v. Vernon , 512 S.W.2d 470 , 473 (Mo.Ct.App. 1974)], when a plaintiff alleges in his petition that a city's tax abatement power has been exercised unconstitutionally, we look to see whether a loss of revenue to the city `arises as a necessary conclusion from facts stated in the petition' in order to determine whether this plaintiff has alleged an injury giving him standing to sue." 631 S.W.2d at 680 (emphasis added).

2003For the purposes of the rule of repose, a "claim," Boshell, 418 So.2d at 92 , is synonymous with "`a right to sue,'" Duncan, 338 So.2d at 1253 (quoting Bass v. Bass, 88 Ala. 408, 412 , 7 So. 243 , 244 (1890)).