purposes rule in Michigan

2025Conversely, “[w]hen the ascertainment of guilt or innocence is not at stake, prospective application is possible” because “the purposes of the rule can be effectuated by prospective application.” People v Markham, 397 Mich 530, 535 ; 245 NW2d 41 (1976).

2025Conversely, “[w]hen the ascertainment of guilt or innocence is not at stake, prospective application is possible” because “the purposes of the rule can be effectuated by prospective application.” People v Markham, 397 Mich 530, 535 ; 245 NW2d 41 (1976).

2025Consistent with this standard for when a rule should be applied only prospectively, “a new rule of procedure . . . which does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process should be given [only] prospective effect.” Young, 410 Mich at 367 . [Carp, 496 Mich at 497-498 .] Although the defendant argued that sentencing concerns the “integrity of the fact-finding process,” this Court rejected the argument, noting that “[i]n every case to date in which this Court has applied the state retroactivity test, the ‘integrity of the fact-finding process’ has always been referred to in the context of

2025Consistent with this standard for when a rule should be applied only prospectively, “a new rule of procedure . . . which does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process should be given [only] prospective effect.” Young, 410 Mich at 367 . [Carp, 496 Mich at 497-498 .] Although the defendant argued that sentencing concerns the “integrity of the fact-finding process,” this Court rejected the argument, noting that “[i]n every case to date in which this Court has applied the state retroactivity test, the ‘integrity of the fact-finding process’ has always been referred to in the context of

2025Consistent with this standard for when a rule should be applied only prospectively, “a new rule of procedure . . . which does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process should be given [only] prospective effect.” Young, 410 Mich at 367 . [Carp, 496 Mich at 497-498 .] Although the defendant argued that sentencing concerns the “integrity of the fact-finding process,” this Court rejected the argument, noting that “[i]n every case to date in which this Court has applied the state retroactivity test, the ‘integrity of the fact-finding process’ has always been referred to in the context of

2025Consistent with this standard for when a rule should be applied only prospectively, “a new rule of procedure . . . which does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process should be given [only] prospective effect.” Young, 410 Mich at 367 . [Carp, 496 Mich at 497-498 .] Although the defendant argued that sentencing concerns the “integrity of the fact-finding process,” this Court rejected the argument, noting that “[i]n every case to date in which this Court has applied the state retroactivity test, the ‘integrity of the fact-finding process’ has always been referred to in the context of

2025Consistent with this standard for when a rule should be applied only prospectively, “a new rule of procedure . . . which does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process should be given [only] prospective effect.” Young, 410 Mich at 367 . [Carp, 496 Mich at 497-498 .] Although the defendant argued that sentencing concerns the “integrity of the fact-finding process,” this Court rejected the argument, noting that “[i]n every case to date in which this Court has applied the state retroactivity test, the ‘integrity of the fact-finding process’ has always been referred to in the context of

2025Consistent with this standard for when a rule should be applied only prospectively, “a new rule of procedure . . . which does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process should be given [only] prospective effect.” Young, 410 Mich at 367 . [Carp, 496 Mich at 497-498 .] Although the defendant argued that sentencing concerns the “integrity of the fact-finding process,” this Court rejected the argument, noting that “[i]n every case to date in which this Court has applied the state retroactivity test, the ‘integrity of the fact-finding process’ has always been referred to in the context of

2025Consistent with this standard for when a rule should be applied only prospectively, “a new rule of procedure . . . which does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process should be given [only] prospective effect.” Young, 410 Mich at 367 . [Carp, 496 Mich at 497-498 .] Although the defendant argued that sentencing concerns the “integrity of the fact-finding process,” this Court rejected the argument, noting that “[i]n every case to date in which this Court has applied the state retroactivity test, the ‘integrity of the fact-finding process’ has always been referred to in the context of

2025Consistent with this standard for when a rule should be applied only prospectively, “a new rule of procedure . . . which does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process should be given [only] prospective effect.” Young, 410 Mich at 367 . [Carp, 496 Mich at 497-498 .] Although the defendant argued that sentencing concerns the “integrity of the fact-finding process,” this Court rejected the argument, noting that “[i]n every case to date in which this Court has applied the state retroactivity test, the ‘integrity of the fact-finding process’ has always been referred to in the context of

2022The orders that may be made in regard to such a refusal include, but are not limited to: (a) An order that the mental or physical condition of the disobedient person shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the claim in accordance with the contention of the party obtaining the order. (b) An order refusing to allow the disobedient person to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing evidence of mental or physical condition. (c) An order rendering judgment by default against the disobedient person as to his entire claim or a designated part o

2022The orders that may be made in regard to such a refusal include, but are not limited to: (a) An order that the mental or physical condition of the disobedient person shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the claim in accordance with the contention of the party obtaining the order. (b) An order refusing to allow the disobedient person to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing evidence of mental or physical condition. (c) An order rendering judgment by default against the disobedient person as to his entire claim or a designated part o

2006Pohutski, supra at 696 . *622 First, the purpose of the new rule is simply to bring case law in line with the explicit language of the statute and preclude liability under the highway exception to governmental immunity if the defendant’s alleged failure to repair and maintain involves anything other than the “improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.” MCL 691.1402(1).

2006Pohutski, supra at 696 .

1996Prelesnik v Esquina, 132 Mich App 341, 347 ; 347 NW2d 226 (1984). “[O]ne of the purposes of the clause is to protect [legislators] from the distractions and the loss of time, energy, and attention from their legislative task which would result if they were required to defend litigation.” Id., citing Eastland v United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 US 491, 503 ; 95 S Ct 1813 ; 44 L Ed 2d 324 (1975).

1996Prelesnik v Esquina, 132 Mich App 341, 347 ; 347 NW2d 226 (1984). “[O]ne of the purposes of the clause is to protect [legislators] from the distractions and the loss of time, energy, and attention from their legislative task which would result if they were required to defend litigation.” Id., citing Eastland v United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 US 491, 503 ; 95 S Ct 1813 ; 44 L Ed 2d 324 (1975).

2026We cite the rules of evidence in effect at the time of trial, although the amendments are irrelevant for the purposes of our analysis. -4- “Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably necessary to such diagnosis and treatment” are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. [People v Garland, 286 Mich App 1, 8 ; 777 NW2d 732 (2009), quoting MRE 803(4).] Th

2026We cite the rules of evidence in effect at the time of trial, although the amendments are irrelevant for the purposes of our analysis. -4- “Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably necessary to such diagnosis and treatment” are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. [People v Garland, 286 Mich App 1, 8 ; 777 NW2d 732 (2009), quoting MRE 803(4).] Th

2025The purposes of the doctrine are “to relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and encourage reliance on adjudication.” Richards v Tibaldi, 272 Mich App 522, 530 ; 726 NW2d 770 (2006).

2025The purposes of the doctrine are “to relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and encourage reliance on adjudication.” Richards v Tibaldi, 272 Mich App 522, 530 ; 726 NW2d 770 (2006).

2023The term “operation” for the purposes of this exception refers to “activities that are directly associated with the driving of a motor vehicle.” Wood v Detroit, 323 Mich App 416, 420 ; 917 NW2d 709 (2018), quoting Chandler v Muskegon Co, 467 Mich 315, 321 ; 652 NW2d 224 (2002).

2023The term “operation” for the purposes of this exception refers to “activities that are directly associated with the driving of a motor vehicle.” Wood v Detroit, 323 Mich App 416, 420 ; 917 NW2d 709 (2018), quoting Chandler v Muskegon Co, 467 Mich 315, 321 ; 652 NW2d 224 (2002).

2023A demonstration of actionable common-law fraud must establish: (1) That [the insured] made a material representation; (2) that it was false; (3) that when [the insured] made it [they] knew it was false, or made it recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) that [the insured] made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by [the insurer]; (5) that [the insurer] acted in reliance upon it; and (6) that [the insurer] thereby suffered injury. [Titan Ins, 491 Mich at 555 .] Regarding the first element in statements made for the purposes of a claim, this

2023A demonstration of actionable common-law fraud must establish: (1) That [the insured] made a material representation; (2) that it was false; (3) that when [the insured] made it [they] knew it was false, or made it recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) that [the insured] made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by [the insurer]; (5) that [the insurer] acted in reliance upon it; and (6) that [the insurer] thereby suffered injury. [Titan Ins, 491 Mich at 555 .] Regarding the first element in statements made for the purposes of a claim, this

2023A demonstration of actionable common-law fraud must establish: (1) That [the insured] made a material representation; (2) that it was false; (3) that when [the insured] made it [they] knew it was false, or made it recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) that [the insured] made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by [the insurer]; (5) that [the insurer] acted in reliance upon it; and (6) that [the insurer] thereby suffered injury. [Titan Ins, 491 Mich at 555 .] Regarding the first element in statements made for the purposes of a claim, this

2023Additionally, “a fact or representation in an application is material where communication of it would have had the effect of substantially increasing the chances of loss insured against so as to bring about a rejection of the risk or the charging of an increased premium.” Oade v Jackson Nat’l Life Ins Co of Mich, 465 Mich 244, 253-254 ; 632 NW2d 126 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023Additionally, “a fact or representation in an application is material where communication of it would have had the effect of substantially increasing the chances of loss insured against so as to bring about a rejection of the risk or the charging of an increased premium.” Oade v Jackson Nat’l Life Ins Co of Mich, 465 Mich 244, 253-254 ; 632 NW2d 126 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023The term “operation” for the purposes of this exception refers to “activities that are directly associated with the driving of a motor vehicle.” Wood v Detroit, 323 Mich App 416, 420 ; 917 NW2d 709 (2018), quoting Chandler v Muskegon Co, 467 Mich 315, 321 ; 652 NW2d 224 (2002).

2023The term “operation” for the purposes of this exception refers to “activities that are directly associated with the driving of a motor vehicle.” Wood v Detroit, 323 Mich App 416, 420 ; 917 NW2d 709 (2018), quoting Chandler v Muskegon Co, 467 Mich 315, 321 ; 652 NW2d 224 (2002).

2022Further, “[t]rial courts possess the inherent authority to sanction litigants and their counsel, including the right to dismiss an action.” Maldonado, 476 Mich at 388 .

2021White, 453 Mich at 321 .

2019The trial court relied on an unpublished opinion of this Court, wherein, under similar factual circumstances, this Court noted that the MMMA was enacted after Kazmierczak, and this Court chose to “assume” for the purposes of its analysis that the odor of marijuana alone was “not sufficient to support probable cause to conduct a search . . . .” People v Zaid, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 26, 2015 (Docket No. 320197), p 5, vacated in part on other grounds 499 Mich 933 (2016).

2019Therefore, we remand to the trial court for the purposes of a hearing establishing a factual basis for the $1,500 costs, “or to alter that figure, if appropriate.” Id. at 360 . -3- Affirmed in part and remanded in part for further proceedings.

2017For the purposes of this rule, offenses are related if they are based on (a) the same conduct or transaction, or (b) a series of connected acts, or 2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 3 This Court denied defendant’s motion seeking remand for a Ginther hearing.

2017For the purposes of this rule, offenses are related if they are based on (a) the same conduct or transaction, or (b) a series of connected acts, or 2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 3 This Court denied defendant’s motion seeking remand for a Ginther hearing.

2017The purposes of the rule are the same as that of its predecessor (GCR 1963, 529.2): namely, to ensure that the motion at hand is before the judge most qualified to rule and to prevent so-called “judge shopping,” which “ ‘would obviously detract from the dignity and stability of judicial action . . . .’ ” Clemons v Detroit Dep’t of Transp, 120 Mich App 363, 374 ; 327 NW2d 480 (1982), quoting 3 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 230.

2017The purposes of the rule are the same as that of its predecessor (GCR 1963, 529.2): namely, to ensure that the motion at hand is before the judge most qualified to rule and to prevent so-called “judge shopping,” which “ ‘would obviously detract from the dignity and stability of judicial action . . . .’ ” Clemons v Detroit Dep’t of Transp, 120 Mich App 363, 374 ; 327 NW2d 480 (1982), quoting 3 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 230.

2016We have previously noted that the purposes of this rule include, as relevant to the instant case, “prevent[ing] any problems that would arise from a lawyer’s having to argue the credibility and the effect of his or her own testimony” and “prevent[ing] prejudice to the opposing party that might arise therefrom . . . .” People v Tesen, 276 Mich App 134, 143 ; 739 NW2d 689 (2007).

2016We have previously noted that the purposes of this rule include, as relevant to the instant case, “prevent[ing] any problems that would arise from a lawyer’s having to argue the credibility and the effect of his or her own testimony” and “prevent[ing] prejudice to the opposing party that might arise therefrom . . . .” People v Tesen, 276 Mich App 134, 143 ; 739 NW2d 689 (2007).

2016The purposes of the doctrine are to: “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.” Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340 , 357 n 30; 454 NW2d 374 (1990), quoting Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 94 ; 101 S Ct 411 ; 66 L Ed 2d 308 (1980).

2016The purposes of the doctrine are to: “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.” Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340 , 357 n 30; 454 NW2d 374 (1990), quoting Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 94 ; 101 S Ct 411 ; 66 L Ed 2d 308 (1980).

2016The purposes of the doctrine are to: “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.” Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340 , 357 n 30; 454 NW2d 374 (1990), quoting Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 94 ; 101 S Ct 411 ; 66 L Ed 2d 308 (1980).

2016The purposes of the doctrine are to: “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.” Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340 , 357 n 30; 454 NW2d 374 (1990), quoting Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 94 ; 101 S Ct 411 ; 66 L Ed 2d 308 (1980).