purposes rule in Pennsylvania

2024Co., . . . 902 A.2d 366, 376 ([Pa.] 2006) (citation omitted[; 7 italics added]); see also R/S Fin[.], . . . 716 A.2d at 1230 (“The purposes of the rule are the protection of the litigant from the dual burden of relitigating an issue with the same party or his privy and the promotion of judicial economy through prevention of needless litigation.” (quoting Foster v. Mut.

2023Co., . . . 902 A.2d 366, 376 ([Pa.] 2006) (citation omitted); see also R/S Fin[.], . . . 716 A.2d at 1230 (“The purposes of the rule are the protection of the litigant from the dual burden of relitigating an issue with the same party or his privy and the promotion of judicial economy through prevention of needless litigation.” (quoting Foster v. Mut.

2024Co., . . . 902 A.2d 366, 376 ([Pa.] 2006) (citation omitted[; 7 italics added]); see also R/S Fin[.], . . . 716 A.2d at 1230 (“The purposes of the rule are the protection of the litigant from the dual burden of relitigating an issue with the same party or his privy and the promotion of judicial economy through prevention of needless litigation.” (quoting Foster v. Mut.

2023Co., . . . 902 A.2d 366, 376 ([Pa.] 2006) (citation omitted); see also R/S Fin[.], . . . 716 A.2d at 1230 (“The purposes of the rule are the protection of the litigant from the dual burden of relitigating an issue with the same party or his privy and the promotion of judicial economy through prevention of needless litigation.” (quoting Foster v. Mut.

2019See Clark v. Troutman , 509 Pa. 336 , 502 A.2d 137 , 139 (1985) ("The purposes of the rule are the protection of litigants from the dual burden of relitigating an issue with the same party or his privy and the promotion of judicial economy through prevention of needless litigation."); Pollock v. National Football League , 171 A.3d 773 , 782 (Pa. Super. 2017) (noting that the policy behind res judicata is "the idea that a party should not get a second bite at the apple when he or she has had a full and fair opportunity the first time").

2019See Clark v. Troutman , 509 Pa. 336 , 502 A.2d 137 , 139 (1985) ("The purposes of the rule are the protection of litigants from the dual burden of relitigating an issue with the same party or his privy and the promotion of judicial economy through prevention of needless litigation."); Pollock v. National Football League , 171 A.3d 773 , 782 (Pa. Super. 2017) (noting that the policy behind res judicata is "the idea that a party should not get a second bite at the apple when he or she has had a full and fair opportunity the first time").

2008See Commonwealth v. Godfrey, 434 Pa. 532, 538 , 254 A.2d 923 (1969) (Roberts, J., concurring).

2008See Commonwealth v. Godfrey, 434 Pa. 532, 538 , 254 A.2d 923 (1969) (Roberts, J., concurring).

2000Daset Mining Corp. v. Industrial Fuels Corp., 326 Pa. Super. 14, 22 , 473 A.2d 584, 588 (1984).

2000Daset Mining Corp. v. Industrial Fuels Corp., 326 Pa. Super. 14, 22 , 473 A.2d 584, 588 (1984).

2025Indeed, our Court warned that “the so- called ‘expert’ looms ominously over our society ― too much so to permit the roles of the court and jury to be readily relinquished absent a true fostering of the purposes of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.” Id.

2009Id. ¶ 39 Finally, we note that “[p]rimary jurisdiction is a flexible doctrine, designed to coordinate the work of agencies and courts.” Com., Dept. of Environmental Resources v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 469 Pa. 578, 593-94 , 367 A.2d 222, 230 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 , 97 S.Ct. 1600 , 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977).

2016“One of the main purposes of the waiver doctrine is to ensure that the appellate court is provided with the benefit of the trial court’s reasoning.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 822 A.2d 716, 723 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 843 A.2d 1237 (Pa. 2004), cert. denied, Santiago v. Pennsylvania, 542 U.S. 942 (2004).

2005“One of the main purposes of the waiver doctrine is to ensure that the appellate court is provided with the benefit of the trial court’s reasoning.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 822 A.2d 716, 723 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, 577 Pa. 679 , 843 A.2d 1237 (2004), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2916 , 159 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004).

1999Id. at 372-73 , 312 A.2d at 600 . [5] In the matter sub judice, by reversing the sentence without first remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the majority ignores the Williams ' Court's admonishment against establishing a per se prophylactic rule.

1999Id. at 372-73 , 312 A.2d at 600 . [5] In the matter sub judice, by reversing the sentence without first remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the majority ignores the Williams ' Court's admonishment against establishing a per se prophylactic rule.

2026This Court has held that for the purposes of this exception, the “indicia of reliability” includes, among other things, “the spontaneity of the statements, consistency in repetition, the mental state of the declarant, use of terms unexpected in children of that age, and the lack of a motive to fabricate.” Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168, 173 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation and brackets omitted).5 Appellant waived this claim.

2026This Court has held that, for the purposes of this exception to the general rule barring the admission of hearsay, the “indicia of reliability” includes, among other things, “the spontaneity of the statements, consistency in repetition, the mental state of the declarant, use of terms unexcepted in the children of that age, and the lack of a motive to fabricate.” Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168, 173 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quotation marks, citation, and bracket marks omitted).

2025Each court may, by local rule, designate the time of publication of the trial list for the purposes of this rule. 15 The Superior Court invoked its ruling in Baysmore v. Brownstein.16 There, the intermediate court held that, “[w]hile certain exceptions exist to [Rule 216(c)], whereby the court may in its sound discretion grant a request for a continuance due to the absence of a party or witness, the court may still demand a showing of diligence on the part of the movant before so granting.”17 Citing Baysmore, the panel concluded that Dr. Gross had failed to act with diligence given that he “wa

2025Each court may, by local rule, designate the time of publication of the trial list for the purposes of this rule. 15 The Superior Court invoked its ruling in Baysmore v. Brownstein.16 There, the intermediate court held that, “[w]hile certain exceptions exist to [Rule 216(c)], whereby the court may in its sound discretion grant a request for a continuance due to the absence of a party or witness, the court may still demand a showing of diligence on the part of the movant before so granting.”17 Citing Baysmore, the panel concluded that Dr. Gross had failed to act with diligence given that he “wa

2020The psychiatric file is imbued with the privilege because it might contain such confidential information.” Commonwealth. v. Simmons, 719 A.2d 336, 341 (Pa. Super. 1998) (emphasis added).

2020The psychiatric file is imbued with the privilege because it might contain such confidential information.” Commonwealth. v. Simmons, 719 A.2d 336, 341 (Pa. Super. 1998) (emphasis added).

2019See Knox v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 588 A.2d 79, 82 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (stating that the purposes of the doctrine of res judicata is, in part, to protect judicial resources and protect parties from vexatious litigation); see also 42 Pa. C.S. §2503 (permitting the award of “counsel fees as a sanction against another participant for violation of any general rule which expressly prescribes the award of counsel fees as a sanction for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct during the pendency of any matter”); Pa. R.P.C. 3.1 (a lawyer has a duty to bring meritorious claims and c

2016See Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995) (providing that the objective of the law of the case doctrine is, in part, “to promote the goal of judicial economy”); Knox v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 588 A.2d 79, 82 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (stating that the purposes of the doctrine of res judicata is, in part, to protect judicial resources and protect parties from vexatious litigation); Bechtel Power, 452 A.2d at 288 (holding that the “evil avoided” by dismissing a petition that attempted to relitigate an identical issue that is still under appeal in an earlier case is

2025Broadly stated, the Holmes decision recognized that state evidentiary rules precluding evidence may violate the constitutional right “to present a complete defense,” id. at 324 , if the specific rule infringes upon a weighty interest of the accused and is arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes the rule is designed to serve.

2025Id. at 319-20 .

2016See Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995) (providing that the objective of the law of the case doctrine is, in part, “to promote the goal of judicial economy”); Knox v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 588 A.2d 79, 82 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (stating that the purposes of the doctrine of res judicata is, in part, to protect judicial resources and protect parties from vexatious litigation); Bechtel Power, 452 A.2d at 288 (holding that the “evil avoided” by dismissing a petition that attempted to relitigate an identical issue that is still under appeal in an earlier case is

2002The salient case on the coordinate jurisdiction rule is Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564 , 664 A.2d 1326 (1995).

1988One of the purposes for this rule is to afford trial courts the first opportunity to correct error or grant new trials where necessary and, thus, obviate the need for appellate review. 510 Pa. at 146 , 507 A.2d at 78 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

1988One of the purposes for this rule is to afford trial courts the first opportunity to correct error or grant new trials where necessary and, thus, obviate the need for appellate review. 510 Pa. at 146 , 507 A.2d at 78 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

2026Furthermore, “[p]ursuant to the Tender Years Hearsay Act, a trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a child’s out-of-court statement is trustworthy.” Interest of D.C., 263 A.3d 326, 335 (Pa. Super. 2021).

2025Id. at 1175, 1181 .

2024Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), issues not raised at trial are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, to “ensure that the trial court that initially hears a dispute has had an opportunity to consider the issue, which in turn advances the orderly and efficient use of our judicial resources, and provides fairness to the parties.” See Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1274 (Pa. 2012) (some formatting altered and citation omitted); see also In re R.N., 951 A.2d 363 , 371 (Pa. 2008) (“in juvenile proceedings, appellants must preserve issues on appeal by raising them in the [

2024Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), issues not raised at trial are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, to “ensure that the trial court that initially hears a dispute has had an opportunity to consider the issue, which in turn advances the orderly and efficient use of our judicial resources, and provides fairness to the parties.” See Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1274 (Pa. 2012) (some formatting altered and citation omitted); see also In re R.N., 951 A.2d 363 , 371 (Pa. 2008) (“in juvenile proceedings, appellants must preserve issues on appeal by raising them in the [

2023Commonwealth v. Carlton, 701 A.2d 143 , 146 (Pa. 1997); Crompton, 682 A.2d at 288; Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d at 755 .

2023Commonwealth v. Carlton, 701 A.2d 143, 146 (Pa. 1997); Crompton, 682 A.2d at 288 ; Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d at 755 .

2023“Although this rule is frequently referred to as ‘knock and announce,’ the rule actually imposes no specific obligation to knock.” Commonwealth v. Bellamy, 252 A.3d 656, 664 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 874 A.2d 667, 671 (Pa.Super. 2005)).

2023“Although this rule is frequently referred to as ‘knock and announce,’ the rule actually imposes no specific obligation to knock.” Commonwealth v. Bellamy, 252 A.3d 656, 664 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 874 A.2d 667, 671 (Pa.Super. 2005)).

2023Commonwealth v. Carlton, 701 A.2d 143 , 146 (Pa. 1997); Crompton, 682 A.2d at 288; Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d at 755 .

2023Commonwealth v. Carlton, 701 A.2d 143, 146 (Pa. 1997); Crompton, 682 A.2d at 288 ; Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d at 755 .

2023However, for both types of spouses, since the purpose of the marital presumption is to preserve the inviolability of the intact marriage, “[w]hen there is no longer an intact family or a marriage to preserve, then the presumption . . . is not applicable.” Vargo v. Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459 , 463 (Pa.Super. 2007); K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798 , 806-07 (Pa. 2012) (“As to the [marital presumption], we note only that recent Pennsylvania decisions have relegated it to a substantially more limited role, by narrowing its application to situations in which the underlying policies will be advanced (centr

2023However, for both types of spouses, since the purpose of the marital presumption is to preserve the inviolability of the intact marriage, “[w]hen there is no longer an intact family or a marriage to preserve, then the presumption . . . is not applicable.” Vargo v. Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459, 463 (Pa.Super. 2007); K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798, 806-07 (Pa. 2012) (“As to the [marital presumption], we note only that recent Pennsylvania decisions have relegated it to a substantially more limited role, by narrowing its application to situations in which the underlying policies will be advanced (central

2023However, for both types of spouses, since the purpose of the marital presumption is to preserve the inviolability of the intact marriage, “[w]hen there is no longer an intact family or a marriage to preserve, then the presumption . . . is not applicable.” Vargo v. Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459 , 463 (Pa.Super. 2007); K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798 , 806-07 (Pa. 2012) (“As to the [marital presumption], we note only that recent Pennsylvania decisions have relegated it to a substantially more limited role, by narrowing its application to situations in which the underlying policies will be advanced (centr

2023However, for both types of spouses, since the purpose of the marital presumption is to preserve the inviolability of the intact marriage, “[w]hen there is no longer an intact family or a marriage to preserve, then the presumption . . . is not applicable.” Vargo v. Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459, 463 (Pa.Super. 2007); K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798, 806-07 (Pa. 2012) (“As to the [marital presumption], we note only that recent Pennsylvania decisions have relegated it to a substantially more limited role, by narrowing its application to situations in which the underlying policies will be advanced (central