fair cross-section requirement in Ohio

2024Id. at 538 . {¶ 16} In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, Wright was required to demonstrate "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." State v. Fulton, 57 Ohio Guernsey County, Case No. 23CA000009 5 St.3d 120, 566 N.E.2d 1195

2018Under the Sixth Amendment, ‘[d]efendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition, * * * but the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.’ ” Id. {¶74} The Jones court looked to the decision in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 (1979), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that in order to establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must demon

2018“For purposes of the fair cross-section analysis, African- Americans are a distinctive group.” Jones (citing United States v. Buchanan (C.A.6, 2000), 213 F.3d 302, 310 ; United States v. Rioux (C.A.2, 1996), 97 F.3d 648, 654 ).

2003"For purposes of the fair cross-section analysis, African-Americans are a distinctive group." Jones (citing United States v. Buchanan (C.A. 6, 2000), 213 F.3d 302 , 310 ; United States v. Rioux (C.A. 2, 1996), 97 F.3d 648 , 654 ). {¶ 28} Appellant has not, however, established the second or third prongs of the Duren analysis.

2024In State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335 , 340, 744 N.E.2d 1163 (2001), the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 579 (1979), [T]hat in order to establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must demonstrate “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such p

2024In State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335 , 340, 744 N.E.2d 1163 (2001), the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 579 (1979), [T]hat in order to establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must demonstrate “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such p

2004United States v. Maxwell (6th Cir. 1998), 160 F.3d 1071 , 1075-76 ; United States v. Fletcher (9th Cir., 1992), 965 F.2d 781 ,782; Ford v. Seabold(6th Cir. 1988), 841 F.2d 677 , 681-82 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 , 109 S.Ct. 315 , 102 L.Ed.2d 334 (1988).

1991Id. at 531 .

2003Lockhart v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S. 162 , 175 , 106 S.Ct. 1758 .

1989This argument is without merit, as the fair cross-section requirement of Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522 , has never been applicable to the petit jury’s composition, as to do so “would be unworkable and unsound.” Lockhart v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S. 162, 174 .

2025Adams App. No. 23CA1171 15 {¶42} “Appellant's failure to point to any evidence supporting a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement defeats this claim.” State v. Elmore, 2005-Ohio-5940, ¶ 57 , citing United States v. Allen, 160 F.3d 1096, 1103-1104 (6th Cir.1998). {¶43} However, “[t]he demonstration of a prima facie fair-cross-section violation by the defendant is not the end of the inquiry into whether a constitutional violation has occurred.” Id. at 367.

2006THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶ 36} "WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO THE MAXIMUM CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES." {¶ 37} Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing maximum and consecutive prison terms because the court failed to make some of the findings required by R.C. 2929.14 (E)(4) in order to impose consecutive sentences, and the finding that the court did make pursuant to R.C. 2929.14 (C) in order to justify maximum sentences, which is that Defendant committed the worst form of the offenses, is not supported by the record. {¶ 38} In State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.

2006THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶ 36} "WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO THE MAXIMUM CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES." {¶ 37} Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing maximum and consecutive prison terms because the court failed to make some of the findings required by R.C. 2929.14 (E)(4) in order to impose consecutive sentences, and the finding that the court did make pursuant to R.C. 2929.14 (C) in order to justify maximum sentences, which is that Defendant committed the worst form of the offenses, is not supported by the record. {¶ 38} In State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.

2006Id. {¶ 33} In order to establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.

2006THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶ 36} "WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO THE MAXIMUM CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES." {¶ 37} Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing maximum and consecutive prison terms because the court failed to make some of the findings required by R.C. 2929.14 (E)(4) in order to impose consecutive sentences, and the finding that the court did make pursuant to R.C. 2929.14 (C) in order to justify maximum sentences, which is that Defendant committed the worst form of the offenses, is not supported by the record. {¶ 38} In State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.

2004United States v. Maxwell (6th Cir. 1998), 160 F.3d 1071 , 1075-76 ; United States v. Fletcher (9th Cir., 1992), 965 F.2d 781 ,782; Ford v. Seabold(6th Cir. 1988), 841 F.2d 677 , 681-82 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 , 109 S.Ct. 315 , 102 L.Ed.2d 334 (1988).

2004United States v. Maxwell (6th Cir. 1998), 160 F.3d 1071 , 1075-76 ; United States v. Fletcher (9th Cir., 1992), 965 F.2d 781 ,782; Ford v. Seabold(6th Cir. 1988), 841 F.2d 677 , 681-82 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 , 109 S.Ct. 315 , 102 L.Ed.2d 334 (1988).

2004United States v. Maxwell (6th Cir. 1998), 160 F.3d 1071 , 1075-76 ; United States v. Fletcher (9th Cir., 1992), 965 F.2d 781 ,782; Ford v. Seabold(6th Cir. 1988), 841 F.2d 677 , 681-82 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 , 109 S.Ct. 315 , 102 L.Ed.2d 334 (1988).

2004United States v. Maxwell (6th Cir. 1998), 160 F.3d 1071 , 1075-76 ; United States v. Fletcher (9th Cir., 1992), 965 F.2d 781 ,782; Ford v. Seabold(6th Cir. 1988), 841 F.2d 677 , 681-82 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 , 109 S.Ct. 315 , 102 L.Ed.2d 334 (1988).

2004United States v. Maxwell (6th Cir. 1998), 160 F.3d 1071 , 1075-76 ; United States v. Fletcher (9th Cir., 1992), 965 F.2d 781 ,782; Ford v. Seabold(6th Cir. 1988), 841 F.2d 677 , 681-82 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 , 109 S.Ct. 315 , 102 L.Ed.2d 334 (1988).

2003Thus, Hughbanks's trial took place after the decision of the United States Supreme Court, in April of that year, in Campbell v. Louisiana (1998), 523 U.S. 392 , 118 S.Ct. 1419 , in which the Court declared that a white criminal defendant had third-party standing to mount an equal-protection challenge, as well as standing to bring a due-process challenge, to racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury. 3 The Court left for another day the issue of the whether Campbell also had standing to raise a fair-cross-section claim.

2003Thus, Hughbanks's trial took place after the decision of the United States Supreme Court, in April of that year, in Campbell v. Louisiana (1998), 523 U.S. 392 , 118 S.Ct. 1419 , in which the Court declared that a white criminal defendant had third-party standing to mount an equal-protection challenge, as well as standing to bring a due-process challenge, to racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury. 3 The Court left for another day the issue of the whether Campbell also had standing to raise a fair-cross-section claim.

2003State v. Johnson [(1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 106 , 285 N.E.2d 751 , 60 O.O.2d 85 ]. * * * Unless prejudice to the defendant or the systematic and intentional exclusion of a group is shown, we will not reverse a judgment because of minor and technical defects in jury-selection procedures." {¶ 51} Under Duren , supra, to prove that a violation of the fair cross-section requirement has occurred, a defendant must show "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and r

2003State v. Johnson [(1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 106 , 285 N.E.2d 751 , 60 O.O.2d 85 ]. * * * Unless prejudice to the defendant or the systematic and intentional exclusion of a group is shown, we will not reverse a judgment because of minor and technical defects in jury-selection procedures." {¶ 51} Under Duren , supra, to prove that a violation of the fair cross-section requirement has occurred, a defendant must show "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and r

1991(Duren v. Missouri [1979], 439 U.S. 357, 364 [ 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579, 587 ], applied and followed.)” In Holland v. Illinois (1990), 493 U.S. 474 , 110 S.Ct. 803 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 , the Supreme Court discussed the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement: “The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does).

1991(Duren v. Missouri [1979], 439 U.S. 357, 364 [ 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579, 587 ], applied and followed.)” In Holland v. Illinois (1990), 493 U.S. 474 , 110 S.Ct. 803 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 , the Supreme Court discussed the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement: “The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does).

1990The Strickland analysis is similar to the analysis previously adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Lyte (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 391 .

1985However, “[ujnless prejudice to the defendant or the systematic and intentional exclusion of a group is shown, we will not reverse a judgment because of minor and technical defects in jury-selection procedures.” State v. Strodes (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 113, at 115-116 [ 2 O.O.3d 271 ], vacated on other grounds (1978), 438 U.S. 911 ; Puente, supra. A defendant must demonstrate three factors in order to sustain a challenge to a jury-selection procedure on the basis that the procedure involves a violation of the fair cross-section requirement.