fair cross-section requirement in New Jersey

2026Berghuis requires defendants seeking “[t]o establish a . . . violation of the fair-cross-section requirement” to show that “(1) a group qualifying as ‘distinctive’ (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) ‘systematic exclusion’ in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation.” 559 U.S. 314, 327 (2010) (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 ); see also State v. Hightower, 120 N.J. 378, 400-01 (1990) (distinguishing between the showings required for equal protection and fair-cross-section claims); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 215-16 (1987) (same).

2021See Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 327 (2010) (“To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, . . . a defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as ‘distinctive’ (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) ‘systematic exclusion’ in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation.” (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979))). 28 Our rules and statutes pertaining to jury selection “are designed to pursue the goal of producing a jury in each case that is ‘as nearly impartial as the lot of humanity will adm

2026Berghuis requires defendants seeking “[t]o establish a . . . violation of the fair-cross-section requirement” to show that “(1) a group qualifying as ‘distinctive’ (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) ‘systematic exclusion’ in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation.” 559 U.S. 314, 327 (2010) (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 ); see also State v. Hightower, 120 N.J. 378, 400-01 (1990) (distinguishing between the showings required for equal protection and fair-cross-section claims); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 215-16 (1987) (same).

2021See Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 327 (2010) (“To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, . . . a defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as ‘distinctive’ (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) ‘systematic exclusion’ in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation.” (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979))). 28 Our rules and statutes pertaining to jury selection “are designed to pursue the goal of producing a jury in each case that is ‘as nearly impartial as the lot of humanity will adm

2026A. To establish a violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, defendants must (1) “identify a constitutionally cognizable group”; (2) “prove substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of time”; and (3) “show discriminatory purpose.” Dangcil, 248 N.J. at 141 (quoting State v. Dixon, 8 125 N.J. 223, 232 (1991)). 1 If a defendant establishes all three prongs, the State must demonstrate “that a significant state interest is manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury selection process that result in disproportionate exclusion of the distinctive group.” Ibid.

2026Berghuis requires defendants seeking “[t]o establish a . . . violation of the fair-cross-section requirement” to show that “(1) a group qualifying as ‘distinctive’ (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) ‘systematic exclusion’ in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation.” 559 U.S. 314, 327 (2010) (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 ); see also State v. Hightower, 120 N.J. 378, 400-01 (1990) (distinguishing between the showings required for equal protection and fair-cross-section claims); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 215-16 (1987) (same).

2026A. To establish a violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, defendants must (1) “identify a constitutionally cognizable group”; (2) “prove substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of time”; and (3) “show discriminatory purpose.” Dangcil, 248 N.J. at 141 (quoting State v. Dixon, 8 125 N.J. 223, 232 (1991)). 1 If a defendant establishes all three prongs, the State must demonstrate “that a significant state interest is manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury selection process that result in disproportionate exclusion of the distinctive group.” Ibid.

2026A. To establish a violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, defendants must (1) “identify a constitutionally cognizable group”; (2) “prove substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of time”; and (3) “show discriminatory purpose.” Dangcil, 248 N.J. at 141 (quoting State v. Dixon, 8 125 N.J. 223, 232 (1991)). 1 If a defendant establishes all three prongs, the State must demonstrate “that a significant state interest is manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury selection process that result in disproportionate exclusion of the distinctive group.” Ibid.

2026Berghuis requires defendants seeking “[t]o establish a . . . violation of the fair-cross-section requirement” to show that “(1) a group qualifying as ‘distinctive’ (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) ‘systematic exclusion’ in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation.” 559 U.S. 314, 327 (2010) (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 ); see also State v. Hightower, 120 N.J. 378, 400-01 (1990) (distinguishing between the showings required for equal protection and fair-cross-section claims); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 215-16 (1987) (same).

2021See Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 327 (2010) (“To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, . . . a defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as ‘distinctive’ (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) ‘systematic exclusion’ in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation.” (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979))). 28 Our rules and statutes pertaining to jury selection “are designed to pursue the goal of producing a jury in each case that is ‘as nearly impartial as the lot of humanity will adm

2021To establish a prima facie claim that the grand jury selection process violated the fair-cross-section requirement or the right to equal protection, 13 a 13 Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons . . . have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.” We have construed the “expansive language” of Article I, Paragraph 1 as 40 defendant must show, through statistical evidence or through inf

2019The fair cross-section requirement is not explicit in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, "but is derived from the traditional understanding of how an 'impartial jury' is assembled." Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990).

1989In declining to decide the sixth-amendment issue because its disposition would not apply to defendant, the plurality opinion referred to Justice Harlan’s view that it is “sounder, in adjudicating habeas petitions, generally to apply the law prevailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of [habeas] cases on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation.” [Id. at —, 109 S.Ct. at 1073 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 353 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 689 , 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1178 , 28 L.Ed.2d 404, 418 (1971) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.)).] Th

1989In declining to decide the sixth-amendment issue because its disposition would not apply to defendant, the plurality opinion referred to Justice Harlan’s view that it is “sounder, in adjudicating habeas petitions, generally to apply the law prevailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of [habeas] cases on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation.” [Id. at —, 109 S.Ct. at 1073 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 353 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 689 , 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1178 , 28 L.Ed.2d 404, 418 (1971) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.)).] Th

1987See *237 United States v. Holman, 680 F. 2d 1340, 1356 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F. 2d 1380, 1385 (11th Cir.1982).

1987See United States v. Holman, 680 F. 2d 1340, 1356 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F.2d 1380, 1385 (11th Cir.1982).

1987See *237 United States v. Holman, 680 F. 2d 1340, 1356 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F. 2d 1380, 1385 (11th Cir.1982).

1987See United States v. Holman, 680 F. 2d 1340, 1356 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F.2d 1380, 1385 (11th Cir.1982).

1987The fair cross-section principle, however, is designed to achieve results, not just assure opportunities; thus “ ‘compilers of jury lists may drift into discrimination by not taking affirmative action to prevent it.’ ” People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d at 58 , 679 P.2d at 446 , 201 Cal.Rptr. at 795 (quoting People v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.App.3d 966, 972 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 732, 736 (1974)).

1987The fair cross-section principle, however, is designed to achieve results, not just assure opportunities; thus “ ‘compilers of jury lists may drift into discrimination by not taking affirmative action to prevent it.’ ” People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d at 58 , 679 P.2d at 446 , 201 Cal.Rptr. at 795 (quoting People v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.App.3d 966, 972 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 732, 736 (1974)).

1987In contrast, in Thompson v. Sheppard, supra, 490 F. 2d 830 , where the statistical showing—an 11% absolute disparity and a 36.4% comparative disparity—was comparable to those in Preston and Stephens and very similar to that here, but where the jury lists were chosen randomly from voter lists, the court held that defendant failed to carry his burden of demonstrating a violation of the fair cross-section standard.

1987In contrast, in Thompson v. Sheppard, supra, 490 F. 2d 830 , where the statistical showing—an 11% absolute disparity and a 36.4% comparative disparity—was comparable to those in Preston and Stephens and very similar to that here, but where the jury lists were chosen randomly from voter lists, the court held that defendant failed to carry his burden of demonstrating a violation of the fair cross-section standard.

1978In Peters v. Kiff, supra, 407 U.S. at 503, 92 S.Ct. 2163 , the court used the language "large and identifiable." Justice White further observed in Taylor that "the fair cross-section principle must have much leeway in application," and "it should also be emphasized that in holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population." 419 U.S. at 538 , 95 S.Ct. at 702 .

1978In Peters v. Kiff, supra, 407 U.S. at 503, 92 S.Ct. 2163 , the court used the language "large and identifiable." Justice White further observed in Taylor that "the fair cross-section principle must have much leeway in application," and "it should also be emphasized that in holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population." 419 U.S. at 538 , 95 S.Ct. at 702 .