fair cross-section requirement in Oklahoma

2011To establish a prima fucie case of a violation of the fair cross-section requirement, Appellant "must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinetive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepre-sentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process." Hooker v. State, 1994 OK CR 75 , ¶ 21, 887 P.2d 1351, 1358-59 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664

2011To establish a prima fucie case of a violation of the fair cross-section requirement, Appellant "must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinetive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepre-sentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process." Hooker v. State, 1994 OK CR 75 , ¶ 21, 887 P.2d 1351, 1358-59 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664

1994The Supreme Court has never defined the term "distinctive group." However, we see merit in the three-prong test enunciated in Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677 (6th Cir.1988).

1994Neither this Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court has defined the term "distinctive group." However, we do find guidance in the three-prong test enunciated in Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677 (6th Cir.1988): (1) that the group is defined and limited by some factor ( i.e., that the group has a definite composition such as by race or sex); (2) that a common thread or basic similarity in attitude, ideas or experience runs through the group; and (3) that there is a community of interest among members of the group such that the group's interests cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded fr

1989The Supreme Court held in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), that the fair cross section principle must offer much leeway and allow for relevant qualifications for jurors as well as reasonable exemptions. 1 Ill Appellant urged in a pretrial motion for change of venue that he could not receive a fair trial in Oklahoma County due to extensive pretrial publicity.

1989The Supreme Court held in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), that the fair cross section principle must offer much leeway and allow for relevant qualifications for jurors as well as reasonable exemptions. 1 Ill Appellant urged in a pretrial motion for change of venue that he could not receive a fair trial in Oklahoma County due to extensive pretrial publicity.

1999Hain, 1996 OK CR 26 at ¶ 60 , 919 P.2d at 1146. . 1987 OK CR 166 , 742 P.2d 562 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 , 108 S.Ct. 763 , 98 L.Ed.2d 779 . .

1999Hain, 1996 OK CR 26 at ¶ 60 , 919 P.2d at 1146. . 1987 OK CR 166 , 742 P.2d 562 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 , 108 S.Ct. 763 , 98 L.Ed.2d 779 . .

1999Hain, 1996 OK CR 26 at ¶ 60 , 919 P.2d at 1146. . 1987 OK CR 166 , 742 P.2d 562 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 , 108 S.Ct. 763 , 98 L.Ed.2d 779 . .

1999Hain, 1996 OK CR 26 at ¶ 60 , 919 P.2d at 1146. . 1987 OK CR 166 , 742 P.2d 562 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 , 108 S.Ct. 763 , 98 L.Ed.2d 779 . .

1991Assuming without admitting that appellant had satisfied his burden under the first prong of Duren, supra, see also Moore v. State, 736 P.2d 161, 165-66 (Okl.Cr.1987) cert. denied 484 U.S. 873 , 108 S.Ct. 212 , 98 L.Ed.2d 163 (1987), we note the language of the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537-38 , 95 S.Ct. 692, 701 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975): The fair-cross-section principal must have much leeway in application.

1991Assuming without admitting that appellant had satisfied his burden under the first prong of Duren, supra, see also Moore v. State, 736 P.2d 161, 165-66 (Okl.Cr. 1987) cert. denied 484 U.S. 873 , 108 S.Ct. 212 , 98 L.Ed.2d 163 (1987), we note the language of the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537-38 , 95 S.Ct. 692, 701 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975): The fair-cross-section principal must have much leeway in application.