fair cross-section requirement in Maryland

1997The opinion also quoted with approval Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S, 162, 173, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1764-65 , 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986): “We have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle to invalidate use of either for-cause or peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, or to require petit juries, as opposed *128 to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community at large.” 493 U.S. at 482-83 , 110 S.Ct. at 808 .

1997The opinion also quoted with approval Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S, 162, 173, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1764-65 , 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986): “We have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle to invalidate use of either for-cause or peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, or to require petit juries, as opposed *128 to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community at large.” 493 U.S. at 482-83 , 110 S.Ct. at 808 .

2021Many of those cases used the concept of “cognizable group” in applying the Supreme Court decision in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), which held that the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment was violated when a “distinctive group” is under-represented in the jury selection process due to a systematic exclusion of that group.

1997The Supreme Court held in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), that, in order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must show: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due *663 to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Id. at 364 ,

1997Indeed, even if peremptory challenges were deliberately used to exclude Blacks from a particular petit jury, something unquestionably unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as implemented by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), such a practice would still not violate the fair cross-section requirement of either the Federal Sixth Amendment or Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights as supplemented by §§ 8-102 and 8-103.

1997Indeed, even if peremptory challenges were deliberately used to exclude Blacks from a particular petit jury, something unquestionably unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as implemented by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), such a practice would still not violate the fair cross-section requirement of either the Federal Sixth Amendment or Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights as supplemented by §§ 8-102 and 8-103.

1997The opinion also quoted with approval Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S, 162, 173, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1764-65 , 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986): “We have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle to invalidate use of either for-cause or peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, or to require petit juries, as opposed *128 to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community at large.” 493 U.S. at 482-83 , 110 S.Ct. at 808 .

1997The opinion also quoted with approval Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S, 162, 173, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1764-65 , 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986): “We have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle to invalidate use of either for-cause or peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, or to require petit juries, as opposed *128 to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community at large.” 493 U.S. at 482-83 , 110 S.Ct. at 808 .

1986In Taylor [v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975)], we identified those purposes as (1) ‘guardpng] against the exercise of arbitrary power’ and ensuring that the ‘commonsense judgment of the community’ will act as ‘a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor,’ (2) preserving ‘public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system,’ and (3) implementing our belief that ‘sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.’ Id,., at 530-531 [ 95 S.Ct. at 698 ].” 476 U.S. at—, 106 S.Ct. at 1765, 90 L.Ed.2d at 148-49 .

1986In Taylor [v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975)], we identified those purposes as (1) ‘guardpng] against the exercise of arbitrary power’ and ensuring that the ‘commonsense judgment of the community’ will act as ‘a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor,’ (2) preserving ‘public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system,’ and (3) implementing our belief that ‘sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.’ Id,., at 530-531 [ 95 S.Ct. at 698 ].” 476 U.S. at—, 106 S.Ct. at 1765, 90 L.Ed.2d at 148-49 .