Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Duren v. Missourigreen2 sentences1998“In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). ¶ 22 Wooten’s claims are nearly identical to 1998“In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). ¶ 22 Wooten’s claims are nearly identical to | 4 | 8 |
Berghuis v. Smithgreen2 sentences2023Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 319 (2010). 5 STATE v. AGUILAR Decision of the Court (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Id. (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)). 2023Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 319 (2010). 5 STATE v. AGUILAR Decision of the Court (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Id. (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Manninggreen2 sentences2007Brewer v. Nix, 963 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir.1992) (Iowa law); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73 (1996); State v. Rogers, 355 N.C. 420 , 562 S.E.2d 859 (2002); Sellers v. State, 809 P.2d 676 (Okla.Crim.App.1991); State v. Blunt, 708 S.W.2d 415 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985); Weaver v. State, 823 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Ct.App.1992). ¶ 17 We agree with the superior court: Stewart failed to raise a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement. 2007Brewer v. Nix, 963 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir.1992) (Iowa law); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73 (1996); State v. Rogers, 355 N.C. 420 , 562 S.E.2d 859 (2002); Sellers v. State, 809 P.2d 676 (Okla.Crim.App.1991); State v. Blunt, 708 S.W.2d 415 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985); Weaver v. State, 823 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Ct.App.1992). ¶ 17 We agree with the superior court: Stewart failed to raise a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pelicangreen2 sentences2007Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir.1985)(en banc); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984); Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 783-84 (2nd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 948 , 102 S.Ct. 2017 , 72 L.Ed.2d 472 (1982); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73, 75 (1996); State v. Pelican, 154 Vt. 496 , 580 A.2d 942, 947 (1990). ¶ 16 Although age is a clearly identifiable factor, these courts have recognized that age by itself does not generate similarity in attitudes and ideas, or demonstrate a commonality in interests th 2007Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir.1985)(en banc); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984); Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 783-84 (2nd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 948 , 102 S.Ct. 2017 , 72 L.Ed.2d 472 (1982); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73, 75 (1996); State v. Pelican, 154 Vt. 496 , 580 A.2d 942, 947 (1990). ¶ 16 Although age is a clearly identifiable factor, these courts have recognized that age by itself does not generate similarity in attitudes and ideas, or demonstrate a commonality in interests th | 1 | 1 |
James W. Brown v. David R. Harris, Superintendent, Greenhaven Correctional Facility, and Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2007Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir.1985)(en banc); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984); Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 783-84 (2nd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 948 , 102 S.Ct. 2017 , 72 L.Ed.2d 472 (1982); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73, 75 (1996); State v. Pelican, 154 Vt. 496 , 580 A.2d 942, 947 (1990). ¶ 16 Although age is a clearly identifiable factor, these courts have recognized that age by itself does not generate similarity in attitudes and ideas, or demonstrate a commonality in interests th | 1 | 1 |
Henry Willis, III v. Walter B. Zant, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Centergreen1 sentence2007Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir.1985)(en banc); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984); Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 783-84 (2nd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 948 , 102 S.Ct. 2017 , 72 L.Ed.2d 472 (1982); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73, 75 (1996); State v. Pelican, 154 Vt. 496 , 580 A.2d 942, 947 (1990). ¶ 16 Although age is a clearly identifiable factor, these courts have recognized that age by itself does not generate similarity in attitudes and ideas, or demonstrate a commonality in interests th | 1 | 1 |
James Barber v. James Pontegreen1 sentence2007Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir.1985)(en banc); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984); Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 783-84 (2nd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 948 , 102 S.Ct. 2017 , 72 L.Ed.2d 472 (1982); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73, 75 (1996); State v. Pelican, 154 Vt. 496 , 580 A.2d 942, 947 (1990). ¶ 16 Although age is a clearly identifiable factor, these courts have recognized that age by itself does not generate similarity in attitudes and ideas, or demonstrate a commonality in interests th | 1 | 1 |
Charles Silagy, Cross-Appellant v. Howard Peters, Iii, Warden, Pontiac Correctional Center, Cross-Appelleegreen2 sentences2007Id. at 1011 (internal citation omitted). ¶ 15 Other state and federal courts that have considered the fair-cross-section requirement vis-á-vis age have recognized that for a group to be distinctive under the Sixth Amendment, it must be defined and limited by some clearly identifiable factor; by a common thread or basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experiences running through the group; or by a community of interests among the members of the group, such that the group’s interests cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process. 2007Id. at 1011 (internal citation omitted). ¶ 15 Other state and federal courts that have considered the fair-cross-section requirement vis-á-vis age have recognized that for a group to be distinctive under the Sixth Amendment, it must be defined and limited by some clearly identifiable factor; by a common thread or basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experiences running through the group; or by a community of interests among the members of the group, such that the group’s interests cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Atwoodgreen2 sentences1998“In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). ¶ 22 Wooten’s claims are nearly identical to 1998“In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). ¶ 22 Wooten’s claims are nearly identical to | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Weaver v. State
green
1 sentence2007Brewer v. Nix, 963 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir.1992) (Iowa law); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73 (1996); State v. Rogers, 355 N.C. 420 , 562 S.E.2d 859 (2002); Sellers v. State, 809 P.2d 676 (Okla.Crim.App.1991); State v. Blunt, 708 S.W.2d 415 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985); Weaver v. State, 823 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Ct.App.1992). ¶ 17 We agree with the superior court: Stewart failed to raise a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Ronald Wayne Brewer v. Crispus Nix
green
1 sentence2007Brewer v. Nix, 963 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir.1992) (Iowa law); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73 (1996); State v. Rogers, 355 N.C. 420 , 562 S.E.2d 859 (2002); Sellers v. State, 809 P.2d 676 (Okla.Crim.App.1991); State v. Blunt, 708 S.W.2d 415 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985); Weaver v. State, 823 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Ct.App.1992). ¶ 17 We agree with the superior court: Stewart failed to raise a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Sellers v. State
green
1 sentence2007Brewer v. Nix, 963 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir.1992) (Iowa law); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73 (1996); State v. Rogers, 355 N.C. 420 , 562 S.E.2d 859 (2002); Sellers v. State, 809 P.2d 676 (Okla.Crim.App.1991); State v. Blunt, 708 S.W.2d 415 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985); Weaver v. State, 823 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Ct.App.1992). ¶ 17 We agree with the superior court: Stewart failed to raise a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Blunt
green
1 sentence2007Brewer v. Nix, 963 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir.1992) (Iowa law); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73 (1996); State v. Rogers, 355 N.C. 420 , 562 S.E.2d 859 (2002); Sellers v. State, 809 P.2d 676 (Okla.Crim.App.1991); State v. Blunt, 708 S.W.2d 415 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985); Weaver v. State, 823 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Ct.App.1992). ¶ 17 We agree with the superior court: Stewart failed to raise a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Artway v. Kramer
green
1 sentence2007Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir.1985)(en banc); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984); Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 783-84 (2nd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 948 , 102 S.Ct. 2017 , 72 L.Ed.2d 472 (1982); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73, 75 (1996); State v. Pelican, 154 Vt. 496 , 580 A.2d 942, 947 (1990). ¶ 16 Although age is a clearly identifiable factor, these courts have recognized that age by itself does not generate similarity in attitudes and ideas, or demonstrate a commonality in interests th | 1 | 2007–2007 |
White v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
green
1 sentence2007Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir.1985)(en banc); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984); Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 783-84 (2nd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 948 , 102 S.Ct. 2017 , 72 L.Ed.2d 472 (1982); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73, 75 (1996); State v. Pelican, 154 Vt. 496 , 580 A.2d 942, 947 (1990). ¶ 16 Although age is a clearly identifiable factor, these courts have recognized that age by itself does not generate similarity in attitudes and ideas, or demonstrate a commonality in interests th | 1 | 2007–2007 |
LaMantia v. New York
green
1 sentence2007Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir.1985)(en banc); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984); Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 783-84 (2nd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 948 , 102 S.Ct. 2017 , 72 L.Ed.2d 472 (1982); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73, 75 (1996); State v. Pelican, 154 Vt. 496 , 580 A.2d 942, 947 (1990). ¶ 16 Although age is a clearly identifiable factor, these courts have recognized that age by itself does not generate similarity in attitudes and ideas, or demonstrate a commonality in interests th | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Hoopa Valley Tribe of Indians v. Short
green
1 sentence2007Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir.1985)(en banc); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984); Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 783-84 (2nd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 948 , 102 S.Ct. 2017 , 72 L.Ed.2d 472 (1982); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73, 75 (1996); State v. Pelican, 154 Vt. 496 , 580 A.2d 942, 947 (1990). ¶ 16 Although age is a clearly identifiable factor, these courts have recognized that age by itself does not generate similarity in attitudes and ideas, or demonstrate a commonality in interests th | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Rogers
green
2 sentences2007Brewer v. Nix, 963 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir.1992) (Iowa law); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73 (1996); State v. Rogers, 355 N.C. 420 , 562 S.E.2d 859 (2002); Sellers v. State, 809 P.2d 676 (Okla.Crim.App.1991); State v. Blunt, 708 S.W.2d 415 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985); Weaver v. State, 823 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Ct.App.1992). ¶ 17 We agree with the superior court: Stewart failed to raise a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement. 2007Brewer v. Nix, 963 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir.1992) (Iowa law); Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 696 , 673 N.E.2d 73 (1996); State v. Rogers, 355 N.C. 420 , 562 S.E.2d 859 (2002); Sellers v. State, 809 P.2d 676 (Okla.Crim.App.1991); State v. Blunt, 708 S.W.2d 415 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985); Weaver v. State, 823 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Ct.App.1992). ¶ 17 We agree with the superior court: Stewart failed to raise a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Holland v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1992Indeed, that occurred in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 , 110 S.Ct. 803 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990) wherein the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement does not prevent either side from exercising its peremptory challenges in order to exclude cognizable racial or other groups from a jury which is finally empaneled as long as the venire itself is drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. 493 U.S. at 477 , 110 S.Ct. at 806 . 1992Indeed, that occurred in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 , 110 S.Ct. 803 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990) wherein the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement does not prevent either side from exercising its peremptory challenges in order to exclude cognizable racial or other groups from a jury which is finally empaneled as long as the venire itself is drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. 493 U.S. at 477 , 110 S.Ct. at 806 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Castaneda v. Partida
green
2 sentences1992That is, to succeed in a fair cross-section claim, a defendant must demonstrate that the persons he asserts were excluded from the venire were members of a group that is a “recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied.” Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494 , 97 S.Ct. at 1280 . 1992That is, to succeed in a fair cross-section claim, a defendant must demonstrate that the persons he asserts were excluded from the venire were members of a group that is a “recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied.” Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494 , 97 S.Ct. at 1280 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.