fair cross-section requirement in Georgia

2021See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (99 SCt 664, 58 LE2d 579) (1979) (to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, a defendant must show, among other things, that the “representation of [a distinctive] group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community”) (emphasis supplied); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (106 SCt 1758, 90 LE2d 137) (1986) (“We have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle . . . to require petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to ref

2021See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (99 SCt 664, 58 LE2d 579) (1979) (to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, a defendant must show, among other things, that the “representation of [a distinctive] group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community”) (emphasis supplied); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (106 SCt 1758, 90 LE2d 137) (1986) (“We have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle . . . to require petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to ref

2010To make a prima facie claim of a fair cross-section violation, a defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group [on the jury source list] is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. [Cits.] Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 692 (1) ( 532 SE2d 78 ) (2000).

2010To make a prima facie claim of a fair cross-section violation, a defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group [on the jury source list] is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. [Cits.] Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 692 (1) ( 532 SE2d 78 ) (2000).

2010A fair cross-section claim is “almost identical” to a claim raised directly under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “with the one prominent exception being that the claimant need not demonstrate any intent to under-represent a cognizable group. [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) Ramirez v. State, supra, 276 Ga. at 161-162 (1) (c).

2010However, a prima facie showing of a fair cross-section violation can be rebutted if the State can demonstrate that “attainment of a fair cross section [is] incompatible with a significant state interest.” [Cit.] Id. at 162 (1) (c).

2021See also Willis, 304 Ga. at 694-695 (rejecting a fair cross-section claim based on the death-qualification process).

2021See also Willis, 304 Ga. at 694-695 (rejecting a fair cross-section claim based on the death-qualification process).

2023See Shubert v. State, 306 Ga. 490, 492 (2) (831 SE2d 826) (2019) (holding that the defendant failed to carry his burden to make even a prima facie case for a fair cross- section claim because he had presented insufficient evidence to determine the racial composition of the relevant master jury list).

2023See Shubert v. State, 306 Ga. 490, 492 (2) ( 831 SE2d 826 ) (2019) (holding that the defendant failed to carry his burden to make even a prima facie case for a fair-cross- section claim because he had presented insufficient evidence to determine the racial composition of the relevant master jury list).

2023See Shubert v. State, 306 Ga. 490, 492 (2) (831 SE2d 826) (2019) (holding that the defendant failed to carry his burden to make even a prima facie case for a fair cross- section claim because he had presented insufficient evidence to determine the racial composition of the relevant master jury list).

2023See Shubert v. State, 306 Ga. 490, 492 (2) ( 831 SE2d 826 ) (2019) (holding that the defendant failed to carry his burden to make even a prima facie case for a fair-cross- section claim because he had presented insufficient evidence to determine the racial composition of the relevant master jury list).

2021See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (99 SCt 664, 58 LE2d 579) (1979) (to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, a defendant must show, among other things, that the “representation of [a distinctive] group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community”) (emphasis supplied); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (106 SCt 1758, 90 LE2d 137) (1986) (“We have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle . . . to require petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to ref

2021See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (99 SCt 664, 58 LE2d 579) (1979) (to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, a defendant must show, among other things, that the “representation of [a distinctive] group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community”) (emphasis supplied); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (106 SCt 1758, 90 LE2d 137) (1986) (“We have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle . . . to require petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to ref

2023Foster, 288 Ga. at 101 (2) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted). (c) Moody also argues that the master jury list used to summon jurors in his case violated the fair cross-section requirement in that African-Americans were unconstitutionally under-represented.

2023Foster, 288 Ga. at 101 (2) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted). (c) Moody also argues that the master jury list used to summon jurors in his case violated the fair-cross-section requirement in that African-Americans were unconstitutionally under-represented.

2023See Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 103-104 (1) ( 657 SE2d 213 ) (2008) (distinguishing between a “defect . . . in complying with the statutory directives governing how the jury commission should select grand jurors” and a defect “[w]here th[e] role of the jury commission ha[d] been entirely circumvented by the service of a grand juror it never selected for service, [which was] an ‘essential and substantial’ 56 OCGA § 15-12-120.1 was violated in the manner that Moody alleges, Moody has not established a fair-cross-section violation, as discussed below, or that the alleged violation amounted to “

2023See Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 103-104 (1) ( 657 SE2d 213 ) (2008) (distinguishing between a “defect . . . in complying with the statutory directives governing how the jury commission should select grand jurors” and a defect “[w]here th[e] role of the jury commission ha[d] been entirely circumvented by the service of a grand juror it never selected for service, [which was] an ‘essential and substantial’ 56 OCGA § 15-12-120.1 was violated in the manner that Moody alleges, Moody has not established a fair-cross-section violation, as discussed below, or that the alleged violation amounted to “

2023“In order to show a Sixth Amendment violation, [Moody] must show the group’s cognizibility, under-representation, and systematic exclusion.” Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 68 (3) (b) ( 694 SE2d 316 ) (2010), disapproved on other grounds by Willis, 304 Ga. at 706 (11) (a) n.3.

2023“In order to show a Sixth Amendment violation, [Moody] must show the group’s cognizibility, under-representation, and systematic exclusion.” Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 68 (3) (b) ( 694 SE2d 316 ) (2010), disapproved on other grounds by Willis, 304 Ga. at 706 (11) (a) n.3.

2021See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (110 SCt 803, 107 LE2d 905) (1990) (the “traditional understanding” underpinning the fair cross-section requirement “has never included the notion that, in the process of drawing the jury, th[e] initial representativeness [of the venire] cannot be diminished by allowing both the accused and the State to eliminate persons thought to be inclined against their interests”).

2021See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (110 SCt 803, 107 LE2d 905) (1990) (the “traditional understanding” underpinning the fair cross-section requirement “has never included the notion that, in the process of drawing the jury, th[e] initial representativeness [of the venire] cannot be diminished by allowing both the accused and the State to eliminate persons thought to be inclined against their interests”).

2021See also Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 879 (2) ( 708 SE2d 362 ) (2011) (to prove a prima facie jury pool composition violation, defendant is required to show that the allegedly excluded group was actually underrepresented); Morrow, supra at 695 (1) (composition of jury pool did not violate constitution where defendant presented unreliable evidence that group was underrepresented on county jury lists).

2021See also Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 879 (2) ( 708 SE2d 362 ) (2011) (to prove a prima facie jury pool composition violation, defendant is required to show that the allegedly excluded group was actually underrepresented); Morrow, supra at 695 (1) (composition of jury pool did not violate constitution where defendant presented unreliable evidence that group was underrepresented on county jury lists).

2011However, a prima facie showing of a fair cross-section violation can be rebutted if the State can demonstrate that “attainment of a fair cross section (is) incompatible with a significant state interest.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 735, 737-738 (2) ( 699 SE2d 25 ) (2010).

2011However, a prima facie showing of a fair cross-section violation can be rebutted if the State can demonstrate that “attainment of a fair cross section (is) incompatible with a significant state interest.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 735, 737-738 (2) ( 699 SE2d 25 ) (2010).

2010Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (VII), 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975).

2010Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (VII), 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975).

1994We find this issue to be controlled adversely to Williams by the decision of the Supreme Court in Jewell v. State, 261 Ga. 861, 862-863 (3) ( 413 SE2d 201 ) (1992).

1994We find this issue to be controlled adversely to Williams by the decision of the Supreme Court in Jewell v. State, 261 Ga. 861, 862-863 (3) ( 413 SE2d 201 ) (1992).