fair cross-section requirement in Connecticut

1998Accordingly, in its analysis, the trial court was guided by Duren v. Missouri, supra, which enunciated a test for analyzing a fair cross section challenge." (Citations omitted.) State v. Castonquay, 194 Conn. 416 , 420 , 481 A.2d 56 (1984).

1998Accordingly, in its analysis, the trial court was guided by Duren v. Missouri, supra, which enunciated a test for analyzing a fair cross section challenge." (Citations omitted.) State v. Castonquay, 194 Conn. 416 , 420 , 481 A.2d 56 (1984).

2000We turn, therefore, to the second prong of the test, namely, whether there was an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons in the jury array. 1 Courts traditionally have employed one of four statistical models in order to analyze the question of whether a particular group is underrepresented in a jury pool: (1) absolute disparity; 12 (2) comparative disparity; 13 (3) statistical decision theory; 14 or (4) sub stantial impact. 15 In State v. Castonguay, supra, 194 Conn. 426 , this court stated that “the choice of a statistical method depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.” This cou

2000We turn, therefore, to the second prong of the test, namely, whether there was an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons in the jury array. 1 Courts traditionally have employed one of four statistical models in order to analyze the question of whether a particular group is underrepresented in a jury pool: (1) absolute disparity; 12 (2) comparative disparity; 13 (3) statistical decision theory; 14 or (4) sub stantial impact. 15 In State v. Castonguay, supra, 194 Conn. 426 , this court stated that “the choice of a statistical method depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.” This cou

1995Our Supreme Court addressed a fair cross section claim in State v. Tillman, 220 Conn. 487 , 600 A.2d 738 (1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1207 , 112 S. Ct. 3000 , 120 L.

1995Our Supreme Court addressed a fair cross section claim in State v. Tillman, 220 Conn. 487 , 600 A.2d 738 (1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1207 , 112 S. Ct. 3000 , 120 L.

1995Our Supreme Court addressed a fair cross section claim in State v. Tillman, 220 Conn. 487 , 600 A.2d 738 (1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1207 , 112 S. Ct. 3000 , 120 L.

1992Because the defendant failed to present evidence to support his claim that the jury array did not provide a fair and representative cross section of the community, the trial court acted properly in denying the defendant’s objection to the first jury panel. “ Tn order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such pe

1995Our Supreme Court addressed a fair cross section claim in State v. Tillman, 220 Conn. 487 , 600 A.2d 738 (1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1207 , 112 S. Ct. 3000 , 120 L.

1992Because the defendant failed to present evidence to support his claim that the jury array did not provide a fair and representative cross section of the community, the trial court acted properly in denying the defendant’s objection to the first jury panel. “ Tn order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such pe

1999See, e.g., State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 450-52 , 680 A.2d 147 (1996); State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 717-18 , 631 A.2d 288 (1993); State v. Tillman, 220 Conn. 487, 492 , 600 A.2d 738 (1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1207 , 112 S. Ct. 3000 , 120 L.

1995Our Supreme Court addressed a fair cross section claim in State v. Tillman, 220 Conn. 487 , 600 A.2d 738 (1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1207 , 112 S. Ct. 3000 , 120 L.

1998See also State v. Tillman, 220 Conn. 487 , 495 n. 3, 600 A.2d 738 (1991), cert. denied,' 505 U.S. 1207 , 112 S.Ct. 3000 , 120 L.Ed.2d 876 (1992) ("the United States Supreme Court has since construed Theil's fair cross-section requirement CT Page 6818 to be demanded by the sixth amendment and by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment"); State v. McCarthy, 197 Conn. 247 , 248 , 496 A.2d 513 (1985) (applying Duren test to fair cross section challenge of jury array based on due process); State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530 , 549-551 , 482 A.2d 300 (1984) (applying Duren test to due process

1998See also State v. Tillman, 220 Conn. 487 , 495 n. 3, 600 A.2d 738 (1991), cert. denied,' 505 U.S. 1207 , 112 S.Ct. 3000 , 120 L.Ed.2d 876 (1992) ("the United States Supreme Court has since construed Theil's fair cross-section requirement CT Page 6818 to be demanded by the sixth amendment and by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment"); State v. McCarthy, 197 Conn. 247 , 248 , 496 A.2d 513 (1985) (applying Duren test to fair cross section challenge of jury array based on due process); State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530 , 549-551 , 482 A.2d 300 (1984) (applying Duren test to due process

2000Duren v. Missouri, [supra, 439 U.S. 364 ] . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 450 , 680 A.2d 147 (1996). “[I]n a fair cross section claim, the defendant need not prove intent. [Systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an infringement of the defendant’s interest in a jury chosen from a fair community cross section.

2000Duren v. Missouri, [supra, 439 U.S. 364 ] . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 450 , 680 A.2d 147 (1996). “[I]n a fair cross section claim, the defendant need not prove intent. [Systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an infringement of the defendant’s interest in a jury chosen from a fair community cross section.

2021See, e.g., State v. Bennett, 324 Conn. 744 , 748 n.1, 155 A.3d 188 (2017). 11 The parties agree that the defendant satisfied this first prong because African-Americans and Hispanics ‘‘clearly comprise . . . distinctive group[s].’’ State v. Gibbs, supra, 254 Conn. 588 . 12 Although we need not address the second prong of the defendant’s fair cross section claim, we make the following observation.

2021See, e.g., State v. Bennett, 324 Conn. 744 , 748 n.1, 155 A.3d 188 (2017). 11 The parties agree that the defendant satisfied this first prong because African-Americans and Hispanics ‘‘clearly comprise . . . distinctive group[s].’’ State v. Gibbs, supra, 254 Conn. 588 . 12 Although we need not address the second prong of the defendant’s fair cross section claim, we make the following observation.

2002See Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 234 Conn. 221, 230 , 662 A.2d 1179 (1995), quoting State v. Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 382 , 645 A.2d 529 (1994) (“[ojrdinarily, [constitutional issues are not considered unless absolutely necessary to the decision of a case” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2002See Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 234 Conn. 221, 230 , 662 A.2d 1179 (1995), quoting State v. Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 382 , 645 A.2d 529 (1994) (“[ojrdinarily, [constitutional issues are not considered unless absolutely necessary to the decision of a case” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2002See Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 234 Conn. 221, 230 , 662 A.2d 1179 (1995), quoting State v. Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 382 , 645 A.2d 529 (1994) (“[ojrdinarily, [constitutional issues are not considered unless absolutely necessary to the decision of a case” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2002See Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 234 Conn. 221, 230 , 662 A.2d 1179 (1995), quoting State v. Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 382 , 645 A.2d 529 (1994) (“[ojrdinarily, [constitutional issues are not considered unless absolutely necessary to the decision of a case” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2000Both the absolute disparity and comparative disparity models, although more widely used than the substantial impact test, are considered inaccurate when the distinctive group at issue represents a very small portion of the community; see United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1998); and the statistical decision theory’s focus on randomness is, by its very nature, inapplicable to a concededly nonrandom process.

2000See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 476-77 , 110 S. Ct. 803 , 107 L.

2000See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 476-77 , 110 S. Ct. 803 , 107 L.

2000Whether Hispanic persons were underrepresented in the jury array represents a mixed question of law and fact, under which “[w]e review the [trial] court’s factual determinations relevant to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment . . . challenge for clear error . . . but we review de novo the court’s legal determination whether a prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement has occurred.” (Citation omitted.) United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998); see State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 548 , 798 P.2d 1 (1990).

2000Whether Hispanic persons were underrepresented in the jury array represents a mixed question of law and fact, under which “[w]e review the [trial] court’s factual determinations relevant to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment . . . challenge for clear error . . . but we review de novo the court’s legal determination whether a prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement has occurred.” (Citation omitted.) United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998); see State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 548 , 798 P.2d 1 (1990).

2000Whether Hispanic persons were underrepresented in the jury array represents a mixed question of law and fact, under which “[w]e review the [trial] court’s factual determinations relevant to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment . . . challenge for clear error . . . but we review de novo the court’s legal determination whether a prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement has occurred.” (Citation omitted.) United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998); see State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 548 , 798 P.2d 1 (1990).

2000Both the absolute disparity and comparative disparity models, although more widely used than the substantial impact test, are considered inaccurate when the distinctive group at issue represents a very small portion of the community; see United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1998); and the statistical decision theory’s focus on randomness is, by its very nature, inapplicable to a concededly nonrandom process.

1997See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S. Ct. 1712 , 90 L.

1997See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S. Ct. 1712 , 90 L.