79 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sistrunk v. Stategreen2 sentences2026In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant seeking to establish a prima facie case of a violation of the fair cross-section requirement must demonstrate the following three elements: " '(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of 2005Additionally, "with regard to the second and third Duren elements, a defendant asserting a fair cross-section violation `must demonstrate ... not only that [blacks] *991 were not adequately represented on his jury venire, but also that this was the general practice in other venires.' Timmel v. Phillips, 799 F.2d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir.1986)." Sistrunk v. State, 630 So.2d at 150 . | 8 | 17 |
Pierce v. Stategreen2 sentences2009“Tn order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.’ “Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979).” Pierce v. State, 576 So.2d 236, 241 (Ala. 2005Byrd said that after the method of selecting grand-jury foreperson had changed blacks had been selected as grand-jury forepersons. "`"In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selecti | 6 | 9 |
Gavin v. Stategreen2 sentences2023It does not ensure any particular venire." Gavin v. State, 891 So. 2d 907, 945 (Ala. Crim. 2014So long as the master jury wheel is adequate and the prescribed procedure is thereafter followed, there can be no complaint that the panel ultimately produced by random selection is somehow underrepresentative in result.”) (citations omitted).’ “[Sistrunk v. State,] 630 So.2d [147] at 149-50 [(Ala.Crim.App.1993)]. ‘When raising a claim under [the fair-cross-section] requirement, a defendant “has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of a ‘fair cross section’ violation.” ’ Id. at 149, quoting Pierce v. State, 576 So,2d 236, 241 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). “ ‘In order to establish a prima facie | 6 | 6 |
Duren v. Missourigreen2 sentences2026In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant seeking to establish a prima facie case of a violation of the fair cross-section requirement must demonstrate the following three elements: " '(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of 2026In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant seeking to establish a prima facie case of a violation of the fair cross-section requirement must demonstrate the following three elements: " '(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of | 5 | 59 |
Robert F. Timmel v. Lyman Phillips, M.D.green2 sentences2005Additionally, "with regard to the second and third Duren elements, a defendant asserting a fair cross-section violation `must demonstrate ... not only that [blacks] *991 were not adequately represented on his jury venire, but also that this was the general practice in other venires.' Timmel v. Phillips, 799 F.2d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir.1986)." Sistrunk v. State, 630 So.2d at 150 . 2003Additionally, "with regard to the second and third Duren elements, a defendant asserting a fair cross-section violation `must demonstrate ... not only that [blacks] were not adequately represented on his jury venire, but also that this was the general practice in other venires.' Timmel v. Phillips, 799 F.2d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir.1986)." Sistrunk v. State, 630 So.2d at 150 .'" Travis, 776 So.2d at 838, quoting Stanton v. State, 648 So.2d 638, 640-41 (Ala.Crim.App.1994). | 5 | 9 |
Gibson v. Zantgreen2 sentences2023(Johnson's brief, pp. 42-49.) " 'In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the Supreme Court of the United States explained: " ' "In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be 10 CR-21-0291 excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to syste 2015In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the Supreme Court of the United States explained: “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepre-sentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection | 5 | 5 |
Carroll v. Stategreen2 sentences2023See id. at 946–47; Carroll v. State, 852 So. 2d 801 , 807–08 (Ala. Crim. 2015See id. at 946-47 ; Carroll v. State, 852 So.2d 801, 807-08 (Ala.Crim.App.1999); Clemons v. State, 720 So.2d 961, 972 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Sistrunk v. State, 630 So.2d 147, 149-50 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). | 4 | 6 |
Clemons v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See id. at 946-47 ; Carroll v. State, 852 So.2d 801, 807-08 (Ala.Crim.App.1999); Clemons v. State, 720 So.2d 961, 972 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Sistrunk v. State, 630 So.2d 147, 149-50 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). 2014See id. at 946-47 ; Carroll v. State, 852 So.2d 801, 807-08 (Ala.Crim.App.1999); Clemons v. State, 720 So.2d 961, 972 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Sistrunk v. State, 630 So.2d 147, 149-50 (Ala.Crim.App.1993).” Gholston v. State, 57 So.3d 178, 180-81 (Ala.Crim.App.2010). | 4 | 4 |
Stewart v. Stategreen2 sentences2003"In the absence of a showing of systematic exclusion, the showing of a disparity between the percentage of blacks in the population of the county in which venue is situated and the percentage of blacks on the venire does not establish a violation of the fair cross-section requirement." Stewart v. State, 623 So.2d 413, 415 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). 2000In the absence of a showing of systematic exclusion, the showing of a disparity between the percentage of blacks in the population of the county in which venue is situated and the percentage of blacks on the venire does not establish a violation of the fair cross section requirement.' Stewart v. State , 623 So.2d 413 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993)." "` Sistrunk , 630 So.2d at 150 .'" McNair v. State , 706 So.2d 828 , 841-42 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 706 So.2d 828 (Ala. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1064 (1998), quoting, Dobyne v. State , 672 So.2d 1319 , 1328-29 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994). | 3 | 9 |
Stanton v. Stategreen2 sentences2005In this case, there was absolutely no showing either that random computerized selection of licensed drivers inherently results in under representation of blacks on jury venires in Conecuh County or that blacks had been underrepresented on other venires in Conecuh County.' " Stanton, 648 So.2d at 640-41 . 2003Additionally, "with regard to the second and third Duren elements, a defendant asserting a fair cross-section violation `must demonstrate ... not only that [blacks] were not adequately represented on his jury venire, but also that this was the general practice in other venires.' Timmel v. Phillips, 799 F.2d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir.1986)." Sistrunk v. State, 630 So.2d at 150 .'" Travis, 776 So.2d at 838, quoting Stanton v. State, 648 So.2d 638, 640-41 (Ala.Crim.App.1994). | 3 | 6 |
Ex Parte Landgreen2 sentences2000The trial court properly denied Gamble's challenge to the venire and to the jury on these grounds. "`In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.'" Ex parte Land, 678 1999"The Court: Overruled." This Court in Benefield v. State, 726 So.2d 286 (Ala.Cr.App.1997), quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), stated: "`[I]n Duren [v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668-69 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979) ], the Court stated: "`"In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable | 3 | 5 |
Ex Parte Dobynegreen2 sentences2005See Ex parte Dobyne, 672 So.2d 1354 (Ala.1995). 1997See Ex parte Dobyne, 672 So.2d 1354 (Ala.1995). | 3 | 3 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences1994See Johnson v. State, 502 So.2d 877, 880 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (venire need not be `"a perfect mirror of the community or accurately reflect the proportionate strength of every identifiable group."')." ". . . . "`In the absence of a showing of systematic exclusion, the showing of a disparity between the percentage of blacks in the population of the county in which venue is situated and the percentage of blacks on the venire does not establish a violation of the fair cross-section requirement.' Stewart v. State, 623 So.2d 413 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993)." Sistrunk, 630 So.2d at 150 . 1993As in Johnson v. State , 502 So.2d 877 , 880 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), the appellant "makes no claim as to proportionality on the master list, but only as to the venire in his case." The appellant misapprehends the nature of the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment. | 2 | 3 |
Gholston v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See id. at 946-47 ; Carroll v. State, 852 So.2d 801, 807-08 (Ala.Crim.App.1999); Clemons v. State, 720 So.2d 961, 972 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Sistrunk v. State, 630 So.2d 147, 149-50 (Ala.Crim.App.1993).” Gholston v. State, 57 So.3d 178, 180-81 (Ala.Crim.App.2010). 2014“The Duren Court defined systematic exclusion as exclusion that is ‘inherent in the particular jury-s'electión process utilized.’” Gholston v. State, 57 So.3d 178, 181 (Ala.Crim.App.2010) (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979)). | 2 | 2 |
Joyce v. Stategreen2 sentences1996He argues that the method of drawing the panel from a list of citizens having a driver's license is unconstitutional because it "excludes many persons who may he registered voters and good, decent, law-abiding folks, who do not have a driver's license." "The fair cross-section test set out in Duren v. Missouri , 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), is whether a 'distinctive group' in the community has been underrepresented in venires as a result of systematic exclusion of that group in the jury selection process." Joyce v. State , 605 So.2d 1243 , 1245 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992). 1996He argues that the method of drawing the panel from a list of citizens having a driver's license is unconstitutional because it "excludes many persons who may be registered voters and good, decent, law-abiding folks, who do not have a driver's license." "The fair cross-section test set out in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), is whether a `distinctive group' in the community has been underrepresented in venires as a result of systematic exclusion of that group in the jury selection process." Joyce v. State, 605 So.2d 1243, 1245 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). | 1 | 3 |
McMillian v. Stategreen2 sentences1992McMillian v. State, 594 So.2d 1253 (Ala.Cr.App.1991). 1992See McMillian v. State , 594 So.2d 1253 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991), remanded, 594 So.2d 1288 (Ala. 1992), on remand, 594 So.2d 1289 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992). | 1 | 3 |
Holland v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences1990Of course, in this case petitioner seeks an extension of the fair cross-section requirement from the venire to the petit jurybut that variation calls into question the scope of the Sixth Amendment guarantee, not his standing to assert it." 493 U.S. at 476-77 , 110 S.Ct. at 805 . 1990Of course, in this case petitioner seeks an extension of the fair cross-section requirement from the venire to the petit jurybut that variation calls into question the scope of the Sixth Amendment guarantee, not his standing to assert it." 493 U.S. at 476-77 , 110 S.Ct. at 805 . | 1 | 3 |
Dobyne v. Stategreen2 sentences2000In the absence of a showing of systematic exclusion, the showing of a disparity between the percentage of blacks in the population of the county in which venue is situated and the percentage of blacks on the venire does not establish a violation of the fair cross section requirement.' Stewart v. State , 623 So.2d 413 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993)." "` Sistrunk , 630 So.2d at 150 .'" McNair v. State , 706 So.2d 828 , 841-42 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 706 So.2d 828 (Ala. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1064 (1998), quoting, Dobyne v. State , 672 So.2d 1319 , 1328-29 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994). 1997In the absence of a showing of systematic exclusion, the showing of a disparity between the percentage of blacks in the population of the county in which venue is situated and the percentage of blacks on the venire does not establish a violation of the fair cross-section requirement." Stewart v. State, 623 So.2d 413 (Ala.Cr.App.1993).' "Sistrunk, 630 So.2d at 150 ." Dobyne v. State, 672 So.2d 1319, 1328-29 (Ala.Cr.App.1994). | 1 | 2 |
| White v. Stategreen | 1 | 2 |
| Lopez v. Stategreen | 1 | 2 |
| Rogers v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Inabinett v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Abernathy v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thomas v. 3201 Caughey Roadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barry Darnell Wysinger v. Leoneal Davis, Warden the Attorney General for the State of Alabamagreen | 1 | 1 |
| McMillian v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fields v. Peoplegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Childs v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Branchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lockett v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Pierce
green
2 sentences1999The test to determine whether the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been violated is as follows: "`In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the gr 1992Here, as in Pierce v. State , 576 So.2d 236 , 241-42 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), cert. denied, 576 So.2d 258 (Ala. 1991), " 'In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.' Dure | 5 | 1992–1999 |
Travis v. State
green
2 sentences2005(The jury consisted of seven African-Americans, five whites, seven females, and five males.) In rejecting McGowan's argument, we need look no further than Travis v. State, 776 So.2d 819 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 776 So.2d 874 (Ala.2000), in which the appellant alleged that Conecuh County's jury-selection process violated the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2000In this case, there was absolutely no showing either that random . . . selection of licensed drivers inherently results in underrepresentation of blacks on [grand juries or] jury venires in [Madison] County or that blacks had been underrepresented on other venires in [Madison] County.'" *Page 986 Travis v. State , 776 So.2d 819 , 838 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997), aff'd, 776 So.2d 874 (Ala. 2000). | 4 | 1999–2005 |
Rayburn v. State
green
2 sentences1996The appellant contends that a systematic exclusion of people sharing certain religious beliefs denied his constitutional right to have a jury venire comprised of a fair cross-section of the community. "`In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresent 1990See also Johnson v. State , 502 So.2d 877 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987) (neither jury roll nor venire is required to be a perfect mirror of the community); Rayburn v. State , 495 So.2d 733 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986) (defendant must show that minority group is underrepresented on jury rolls and that the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of that group in the jury process)." Jackson v. State , 549 So.2d 616 , 619 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989). " 'In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "dist | 4 | 1990–1996 |
Lockhart v. McCree
green
2 sentences2013Scheuing also argues that “the refusal to allow a cognizable group, such as jurors opposed to the death penalty, to sit on the jury violated their [constitutional] rights.... ” (Scheuing’s brief, at 89-90.) In Lockhart , however, the United States Supreme Court instructed: “‘Witherspoon[ v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968),]-excludables,’ or for that matter any other group defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that render members of the group unable to serve as jurors in a particular case, may be excluded from jury service without contravening any of the basic objectives of the fair-cross-s 1992In Duren v. Missouri , 439 U.S. 357 , 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the United States Supreme Court stated: "In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the Defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive group' in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to the systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection pro | 3 | 1991–2013 |
Bostic v. United States
green
2 sentences2000The trial court properly denied Gamble's challenge to the venire and to the jury on these grounds. "`In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.'" Ex parte Land, 678 1999"The Court: Overruled." This Court in Benefield v. State, 726 So.2d 286 (Ala.Cr.App.1997), quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), stated: "`[I]n Duren [v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668-69 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979) ], the Court stated: "`"In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable | 3 | 1999–2000 |
Harrell v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2000The trial court properly denied Gamble's challenge to the venire and to the jury on these grounds. "`In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.'" Ex parte Land, 678 1999"The Court: Overruled." This Court in Benefield v. State, 726 So.2d 286 (Ala.Cr.App.1997), quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), stated: "`[I]n Duren [v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668-69 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979) ], the Court stated: "`"In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable | 3 | 1999–2000 |
Becker v. Southwest Travis County Road District No. 1
green
2 sentences2000The trial court properly denied Gamble's challenge to the venire and to the jury on these grounds. "`In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.'" Ex parte Land, 678 1999"The Court: Overruled." This Court in Benefield v. State, 726 So.2d 286 (Ala.Cr.App.1997), quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), stated: "`[I]n Duren [v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668-69 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979) ], the Court stated: "`"In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable | 3 | 1999–2000 |
Vaughn v. State
neutral
2 sentences1995Hogan v. State , 663 So.2d 1017 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994); Sistrunk supra; Stewart , supra; Joyce v. State , 605 So.2d 1243 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992); Rayburn v. State , 495 So.2d 733 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986); Vaughn v. State , 485 So.2d 388 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986). 1993Joyce v. State , 605 So.2d 1243 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992); Rayburn v. State , 495 So.2d 733 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986); Vaughn v. State , 485 So.2d 388 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986). | 3 | 1986–1995 |
Witherspoon v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2013Scheuing also argues that “the refusal to allow a cognizable group, such as jurors opposed to the death penalty, to sit on the jury violated their [constitutional] rights.... ” (Scheuing’s brief, at 89-90.) In Lockhart , however, the United States Supreme Court instructed: “‘Witherspoon[ v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968),]-excludables,’ or for that matter any other group defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that render members of the group unable to serve as jurors in a particular case, may be excluded from jury service without contravening any of the basic objectives of the fair-cross-s 1993F The appellant also argues that the trial court erred in failing to ask the veniremembers, pursuant to Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), whether they would automatically impose the death penalty if the appellant was found guilty of the crime. | 2 | 1993–2013 |
Ex Parte Travis
green
2 sentences2005(The jury consisted of seven African-Americans, five whites, seven females, and five males.) In rejecting McGowan's argument, we need look no further than Travis v. State, 776 So.2d 819 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 776 So.2d 874 (Ala.2000), in which the appellant alleged that Conecuh County's jury-selection process violated the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2000In this case, there was absolutely no showing either that random . . . selection of licensed drivers inherently results in underrepresentation of blacks on [grand juries or] jury venires in [Madison] County or that blacks had been underrepresented on other venires in [Madison] County.'" *Page 986 Travis v. State , 776 So.2d 819 , 838 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997), aff'd, 776 So.2d 874 (Ala. 2000). | 2 | 2000–2005 |
Pierce v. State
green
2 sentences2005Byrd said that after the method of selecting grand-jury foreperson had changed blacks had been selected as grand-jury forepersons. "`"In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selecti 2003Once the list is generated, the court puts all of the names in a hat and randomly chooses 18 to be the grand jury. "`In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.' " Du | 2 | 2003–2005 |
Ex Parte Pierce
green
2 sentences2005Byrd said that after the method of selecting grand-jury foreperson had changed blacks had been selected as grand-jury forepersons. "`"In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selecti 2003Once the list is generated, the court puts all of the names in a hat and randomly chooses 18 to be the grand jury. "`In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.' " Du | 2 | 2003–2005 |
| Smith v. State green | 2 | 1983–1991 |
| Wesley v. State green | 2 | 1990–1991 |
| Acklin v. State green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Ex Parte Williams green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Pincheon v. State green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| McNair v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Hoskinson v. Indiana green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Benefield v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Rutherford v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Costle green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Brundage v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Hogan v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Madden v. State neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Lee v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| cluster 490522 green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Ex Parte Fowler green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| M. E. F. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Schreiber v. Salamack green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Bobby Cox v. Charles Montgomery, Warden, Georgia State Prison green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Commonwealth v. Soares green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Aragon green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Ex Parte Rutledge green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Rutledge v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Battle v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Jackson v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Castaneda v. Partida green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Hobby v. United States green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Williams v. State green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.