fair cross-section requirement in Illinois

1988This court held: “This is not a case involving the systematic exclusion of ‘a “distinctive” group in the community’ [citation], which would trigger a fair-cross-section inquiry under the standard recently announced by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 , 90 L.

1988This court held: “This is not a case involving the systematic exclusion of ‘a “distinctive” group in the community’ [citation], which would trigger a fair-cross-section inquiry under the standard recently announced by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 , 90 L.

1989(Buchanan v. Kentucky (1987), 483 U.S. 402 , 97 L.

1989(Buchanan v. Kentucky (1987), 483 U.S. 402 , 97 L.

1987Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Lockhart v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S. 162 , 90 L.Ed.2d 137 , 106 S.Ct. 1758 ; People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252, 278 , cert. denied (1984), 466 U.S. 981 , 80 L.Ed.2d 836 , 104 S.Ct. 2364 . • 5, 6 We hold that defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 .

1987The opinions relied on by the majority — People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135 , People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 252 , and People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 79 — were based on precedent that has now been overturned.

1983Ed. 2d 690, 698 , 95 S. Ct. 692, 697-98 , the Supreme Court accepted “ ‘the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment’ ” and stated that “ ‘the requirement has solid foundation.’ ” We also pointed out that in the same case, the Supreme Court held that the State’s systematic exclusion from the jury of “ ‘identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial.’ ” ( 106 Ill.

1983In Payne, we referred to the fact that in Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522, 530 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690, 698 , 95 S.Ct. 692, 697-98 , the Supreme Court accepted "`the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment'" and stated that "`the requirement has solid foundation.'" We also pointed out that in the same case, the Supreme Court held that the State's systematic exclusion from the jury of "`identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial.'" ( 106 Ill.

2004To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant is required to establish the following: “(1) the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) the under[ ] representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.” Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d at 304-05 , 637 N.E.2d at 1006 , citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 58 L.

2004To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant is required to establish the following: “(1) the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) the under[ ] representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.” Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d at 304-05 , 637 N.E.2d at 1006 , citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 58 L.

1995(See Stanley, 246 Ill.

1990Ed. 2d 579, 584 , 99 S. Ct. 664, 666 ), the fair cross-section requirement does not apply to the petit jury (Holland v. Illinois (1990), 493 U.S. 474, 478 , 107 L.

1990Ed. 2d 579, 584 , 99 S. Ct. 664, 666 ), the fair cross-section requirement does not apply to the petit jury (Holland v. Illinois (1990), 493 U.S. 474, 478 , 107 L.

1990Ed. 2d at 695 , 95 S. Ct. at 696-97 ), and no evidence of intent to discriminate is required (People v. Harris (1984), 36 Cal. 3d 36, 56-57 , 679 P.2d 433, 445 , 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 794 ).

1990Ed. 2d at 695 , 95 S. Ct. at 696-97 ), and no evidence of intent to discriminate is required (People v. Harris (1984), 36 Cal. 3d 36, 56-57 , 679 P.2d 433, 445 , 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 794 ).

1990It is clear that issues not raised in the trial court are considered waived on appeal (People v. Holman (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 133 ), although we may, in our discretion, consider such issues where the evidence is closely balanced or where the error is of such magnitude that the accused was denied a fair trial (People v. Palmer (1989), 188 Ill.

1990It is clear that issues not raised in the trial court are considered waived on appeal (People v. Holman (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 133 ), although we may, in our discretion, consider such issues where the evidence is closely balanced or where the error is of such magnitude that the accused was denied a fair trial (People v. Palmer (1989), 188 Ill.

1988This court has recently reconsidered its position concerning this issue in People v. Thompkins (1988), 121 Ill.2d 401 , and stated, citing Lockhart v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S. 162 , 90 L.Ed.2d 137 , 106 S.Ct. 1758 : "`In sum, " Witherspoon -excludables," or for that matter any other group defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that render members of the group unable to *475 serve as jurors in a particular case, may be excluded from jury service without contravening any of the basic objectives of the fair cross-section requirement.' Lockhart v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S. 162, 176-77 , 90 L.Ed.

1988This court has recently reconsidered its position concerning this issue in People v. Thompkins (1988), 121 Ill.2d 401 , and stated, citing Lockhart v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S. 162 , 90 L.Ed.2d 137 , 106 S.Ct. 1758 : "`In sum, " Witherspoon -excludables," or for that matter any other group defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that render members of the group unable to *475 serve as jurors in a particular case, may be excluded from jury service without contravening any of the basic objectives of the fair cross-section requirement.' Lockhart v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S. 162, 176-77 , 90 L.Ed.

1988Ed. 2d at 150 , 106 S. Ct. at 1766 .) Further, citing Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209 , 71 L.

1988Ed. 2d at 150 , 106 S. Ct. at 1766 .) Further, citing Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209 , 71 L.

1988Nor are we familiar with any constitutional right allowing a defendant to select his own place of trial. [Citation.] To require that the venire of the transferee county proportionately mirror any distinctive groups found in the originating county would either saddle our judiciary with an onerous, if not impossible, task or effectively grant defendants a heretofore unrecognized right to choose their place of trial." 114 Ill.2d at 180-81 . *433 The facts in this case are similar to those in Johnson .

1987Our cases are in accord with Buchanan and McCree . ( People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill.2d 180, 197 , cert. denied (1986), 476 U.S. 1165 , 90 L.Ed.2d 733 , 106 S.Ct. 2292 ; People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill.2d 23, 45 , cert. denied (1984), 469 U.S. 963 , 83 L.Ed.2d 298 , 105 S.Ct. 362 .) It is clear that death penalty questioning of prospective jurors does not implicate the fair-cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment.

1987Our cases are in accord with Buchanan and McCree . ( People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill.2d 180, 197 , cert. denied (1986), 476 U.S. 1165 , 90 L.Ed.2d 733 , 106 S.Ct. 2292 ; People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill.2d 23, 45 , cert. denied (1984), 469 U.S. 963 , 83 L.Ed.2d 298 , 105 S.Ct. 362 .) It is clear that death penalty questioning of prospective jurors does not implicate the fair-cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment.

1987(Fields v. People (Colo. 1987), 732 P.2d 1145 .) However the United States Supreme Court has declined to extend the fair cross-section requirement to petit juries.

1987Ed. 2d 491 , 88 S. Ct. 1444 , (1968), that the Sixth Amendment’s provision for jury trial is made binding on the States ***,” and “[w]e accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” 419 U.S. 522, 526, 530 , 42 L.

1987Justice Rizzi pointed out further in Payne that 10 years after Swain, the Supreme Court stated in Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 , 95 S.Ct. 692 : "The background against which this case must be decided includes our holding in Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , (1968), that the Sixth Amendment's provision for jury trial is made binding on the States * * *," and "[w]e accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." 419 U.S. 522, 526, 530 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690, 696, 698 , 95 S.Ct.

1987Our cases are in accord with Buchanan and McCree . ( People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill.2d 180, 197 , cert. denied (1986), 476 U.S. 1165 , 90 L.Ed.2d 733 , 106 S.Ct. 2292 ; People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill.2d 23, 45 , cert. denied (1984), 469 U.S. 963 , 83 L.Ed.2d 298 , 105 S.Ct. 362 .) It is clear that death penalty questioning of prospective jurors does not implicate the fair-cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment.

1987Our cases are in accord with Buchanan and McCree . ( People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill.2d 180, 197 , cert. denied (1986), 476 U.S. 1165 , 90 L.Ed.2d 733 , 106 S.Ct. 2292 ; People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill.2d 23, 45 , cert. denied (1984), 469 U.S. 963 , 83 L.Ed.2d 298 , 105 S.Ct. 362 .) It is clear that death penalty questioning of prospective jurors does not implicate the fair-cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment.

1987Duren v. Missouri (1979), 439 U.S. 357 , 359 n. 1, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 , 583 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 664 , 666 n. 1; Peters v. Kiss (1972), 407 U.S. 493 , 33 L.Ed.2d 83 , 92 S.Ct. 2163 (white defendant could raise sixth amendment claim based on the exclusion of blacks).

1987Duren v. Missouri (1979), 439 U.S. 357 , 359 n. 1, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 , 583 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 664 , 666 n. 1; Peters v. Kiss (1972), 407 U.S. 493 , 33 L.Ed.2d 83 , 92 S.Ct. 2163 (white defendant could raise sixth amendment claim based on the exclusion of blacks).

1987The opinions relied on by the majority — People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill.2d 135 , People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252 , and People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79 — were based on precedent that has now been overturned.

1987The opinions relied on by the majority — People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135 , People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 252 , and People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 79 — were based on precedent that has now been overturned.

1987Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Lockhart v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S. 162 , 90 L.Ed.2d 137 , 106 S.Ct. 1758 ; People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252, 278 , cert. denied (1984), 466 U.S. 981 , 80 L.Ed.2d 836 , 104 S.Ct. 2364 . • 5, 6 We hold that defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 .

1987Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Lockhart v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S. 162 , 90 L.Ed.2d 137 , 106 S.Ct. 1758 ; People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252, 278 , cert. denied (1984), 466 U.S. 981 , 80 L.Ed.2d 836 , 104 S.Ct. 2364 . • 5, 6 We hold that defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 .

1987Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Lockhart v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S. 162 , 90 L.Ed.2d 137 , 106 S.Ct. 1758 ; People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252, 278 , cert. denied (1984), 466 U.S. 981 , 80 L.Ed.2d 836 , 104 S.Ct. 2364 . • 5, 6 We hold that defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 .

1987Our cases are in accord with Buchanan and McCree . ( People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill.2d 180, 197 , cert. denied (1986), 476 U.S. 1165 , 90 L.Ed.2d 733 , 106 S.Ct. 2292 ; People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill.2d 23, 45 , cert. denied (1984), 469 U.S. 963 , 83 L.Ed.2d 298 , 105 S.Ct. 362 .) It is clear that death penalty questioning of prospective jurors does not implicate the fair-cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment.

1987Our cases are in accord with Buchanan and McCree . ( People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill.2d 180, 197 , cert. denied (1986), 476 U.S. 1165 , 90 L.Ed.2d 733 , 106 S.Ct. 2292 ; People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill.2d 23, 45 , cert. denied (1984), 469 U.S. 963 , 83 L.Ed.2d 298 , 105 S.Ct. 362 .) It is clear that death penalty questioning of prospective jurors does not implicate the fair-cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment.

1987The opinions relied on by the majority — People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill.2d 135 , People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252 , and People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79 — were based on precedent that has now been overturned.

1987The opinions relied on by the majority — People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135 , People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 252 , and People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 79 — were based on precedent that has now been overturned.