17 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Duren v. Missourigreen2 sentences1986In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the United States Supreme Court stated that: In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection p 1986In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the United States Supreme Court stated that: In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection p | 1 | 8 |
Taylor v. Louisianagreen2 sentences1988See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 , 95 S.Ct. 692, 701-02 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975) ("[W]e impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population"); cf. Batson v. Kentucky [476] U.S. [79], [84], n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1716, n. 4 , 90 L.Ed.2d [69] (1986) (expressly declining to address "fair cross-section" challenge to discriminatory use of peremptory challenges). 1988See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 , 95 S.Ct. 692, 701-02 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975) ("[W]e impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population"); cf. Batson v. Kentucky [476] U.S. [79], [84], n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1716, n. 4 , 90 L.Ed.2d [69] (1986) (expressly declining to address "fair cross-section" challenge to discriminatory use of peremptory challenges). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. C.L. Childressgreen2 sentences1988See United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (CA8 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 , 104 S.Ct. 744 , 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 725 (CA8 1967) (Blackmun, J.) (" The point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the names are put in the box from which the panels are drawn ") vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1968). 106 S.Ct. at 1764-1765. (emphasis added) Likewise, we reject defendant's suggestion that the fair-cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment should be 1988See United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (CA8 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 , 104 S.Ct. 744 , 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 725 (CA8 1967) (Blackmun, J.) (" The point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the names are put in the box from which the panels are drawn ") vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1968). 106 S.Ct. at 1764-1765. (emphasis added) Likewise, we reject defendant's suggestion that the fair-cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment should be | 1 | 1 |
Childress v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1988See United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (CA8 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 , 104 S.Ct. 744 , 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 725 (CA8 1967) (Blackmun, J.) (" The point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the names are put in the box from which the panels are drawn ") vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1968). 106 S.Ct. at 1764-1765. (emphasis added) Likewise, we reject defendant's suggestion that the fair-cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment should be 1988See United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (CA8 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 , 104 S.Ct. 744 , 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 725 (CA8 1967) (Blackmun, J.) (" The point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the names are put in the box from which the panels are drawn ") vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1968). 106 S.Ct. at 1764-1765. (emphasis added) Likewise, we reject defendant's suggestion that the fair-cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment should be | 1 | 1 |
Duane Earl Pope v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1988See United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (CA8 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 , 104 S.Ct. 744 , 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 725 (CA8 1967) (Blackmun, J.) (" The point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the names are put in the box from which the panels are drawn ") vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1968). 106 S.Ct. at 1764-1765. (emphasis added) Likewise, we reject defendant's suggestion that the fair-cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment should be 1988See United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (CA8 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 , 104 S.Ct. 744 , 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 725 (CA8 1967) (Blackmun, J.) (" The point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the names are put in the box from which the panels are drawn ") vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1968). 106 S.Ct. at 1764-1765. (emphasis added) Likewise, we reject defendant's suggestion that the fair-cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment should be | 1 | 1 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences1988See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 , 95 S.Ct. 692, 701-02 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975) ("[W]e impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population"); cf. Batson v. Kentucky [476] U.S. [79], [84], n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1716, n. 4 , 90 L.Ed.2d [69] (1986) (expressly declining to address "fair cross-section" challenge to discriminatory use of peremptory challenges). 1988The limited scope of the fair cross-section requirement is a direct and inevitable consequence of the practical impossibility of providing each criminal defendant with a truly "representative" petit jury, see id., at [85], n. 6, 106 S.Ct., at 1717, n. 6, ... | 1 | 1 |
State v. Batesgreen1 sentence1987See also State v. Clark, 492 So.2d 862 (La.1986) and State v. Bates, 495 So.2d 1262 (La.1986). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Clarkgreen1 sentence1987See also State v. Clark, 492 So.2d 862 (La.1986) and State v. Bates, 495 So.2d 1262 (La.1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lockhart v. McCree
green
2 sentences1988The United States Supreme Court in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 , 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1764-1765 , 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), refused to extend the fair cross-section requirement to petit jury selections: ... 1988The United States Supreme Court in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 , 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1764-1765 , 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), refused to extend the fair cross-section requirement to petit jury selections: ... | 4 | 1986–2015 |
Holland v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2016Further, in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 , 110 S.Ct. 803, 823 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting), Justice Stevens stated that it was the fair cross section principle underlying the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial that permitted non-unanimous juries. 2016Further, in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 , 110 S.Ct. 803, 823 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting), Justice Stevens stated that it was the fair cross section principle underlying the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial that permitted non-unanimous juries. | 3 | 2009–2016 |
McKoy v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences2016Justice Scalia, a noted originalist on the Court, explicitly rejected a unanimity requirement in his dissent McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 , 110 S.Ct. 1227 , 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990), saying: Of course the Court’s holding today — and its' underlying thesis that each individual juror must be empowered to “give effect” to his own view— invalidates not just a requirement of unanimity for the defendant to benefit from a mitigating factor, but a requirement for any number of jurors more than one. 2016Justice Scalia, a noted originalist on the Court, explicitly rejected a unanimity requirement in his dissent McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 , 110 S.Ct. 1227 , 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990), saying: Of course the Court’s holding today — and its' underlying thesis that each individual juror must be empowered to “give effect” to his own view— invalidates not just a requirement of unanimity for the defendant to benefit from a mitigating factor, but a requirement for any number of jurors more than one. | 3 | 2009–2016 |
Pope v. United States
green
2 sentences1988See United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (CA8 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 , 104 S.Ct. 744 , 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 725 (CA8 1967) (Blackmun, J.) (" The point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the names are put in the box from which the panels are drawn ") vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1968). 106 S.Ct. at 1764-1765. (emphasis added) Likewise, we reject defendant's suggestion that the fair-cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment should be 1988See United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (CA8 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 , 104 S.Ct. 744 , 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 725 (CA8 1967) (Blackmun, J.) (" The point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the names are put in the box from which the panels are drawn ") vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1968). 106 S.Ct. at 1764-1765. (emphasis added) Likewise, we reject defendant's suggestion that the fair-cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment should be | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Powell v. Texas
green
2 sentences1988See United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (CA8 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 , 104 S.Ct. 744 , 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 725 (CA8 1967) (Blackmun, J.) (" The point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the names are put in the box from which the panels are drawn ") vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1968). 106 S.Ct. at 1764-1765. (emphasis added) Likewise, we reject defendant's suggestion that the fair-cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment should be 1988See United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (CA8 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 , 104 S.Ct. 744 , 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 725 (CA8 1967) (Blackmun, J.) (" The point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the names are put in the box from which the panels are drawn ") vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1968). 106 S.Ct. at 1764-1765. (emphasis added) Likewise, we reject defendant's suggestion that the fair-cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment should be | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Witherspoon v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1986It is for this reason that we conclude the Witherspoon-excludables do not constitute a `distinctive group' for fair cross-section purposes, and hold that `death qualification' does not violate the fair cross-section requirement." Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 1766 . 1986It is for this reason that we conclude the Witherspoon-excludables do not constitute a `distinctive group' for fair cross-section purposes, and hold that `death qualification' does not violate the fair cross-section requirement." Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 1766 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Lockhart v. McCree
green
1 sentence1986Furthermore, in a recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Lockhart v. McCree, — U.S. - 106 S.Ct. 59 , 88 L.Ed.2d 48 (1985), the Court held that “Witherspoon-excludables” in capital cases may be excluded without contravening any of the basic objectives of a fair cross section requirement for juries. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Rose v. Clark
green
1 sentence1986Furthermore, in a recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Lockhart v. McCree, — U.S. - 106 S.Ct. 59 , 88 L.Ed.2d 48 (1985), the Court held that “Witherspoon-excludables” in capital cases may be excluded without contravening any of the basic objectives of a fair cross section requirement for juries. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
John Eldon Smith, or Anthony Isalldo MacHetti v. Charles Balkcom, Warden, Georgia State Prison
green
1 sentence1985The States remain free to prescribe relevant qualifications for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions so long as it may be fairly said that the jury list or panels are representative of the community.’ [Taylor v. Louisiana ], 419 U.S. at 537-38 , 95 S.Ct. at 701 .” Smith v. Balkcom, supra. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that even where a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section is proven, a state may justify the violation upon showing a significant state interest which is “manifestly and primarily” advanced by the jury selection criteria which result in the exclusion of a | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.