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5 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1986–1993 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bankheadgreen1 sentence1993Instead, he simply asserted that telephonic notification of prospective jurors “discriminates against Hispanics.” This failure to present evidence in support of the objection is fatal to Alvarado’s Sixth Amendment claim. 2 Tillman, 750 P.2d at 576 ; accord State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217-18 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tillmangreen2 sentences1993Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); accord Tillman, 750 P.2d at 575 . 1993Instead, he simply asserted that telephonic notification of prospective jurors “discriminates against Hispanics.” This failure to present evidence in support of the objection is fatal to Alvarado’s Sixth Amendment claim. 2 Tillman, 750 P.2d at 576 ; accord State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217-18 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Duren v. Missouri
green
2 sentences1989The third prong of the Duren test requires that a prima facie case of a violation of the fair cross-section requirement include a showing that the underrepresentation is due to "systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process." Id. 1989The third prong of the Duren test requires that a prima facie case of a violation of the fair cross-section requirement include a showing that the underrepresentation is due to “systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.” Id. | 2 | 1989–1993 |
Holland v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1991In Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 , 110 S.Ct. 803 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990), a majority of the Court held that while a white defendant has standing to raise a sixth amendment fair cross-section/impartial jury challenge to the prosecutor’s peremptory removal of Afro-Americans from his jury, the sixth amendment’s fair cross-section requirement cannot be interpreted to prohibit discriminatory peremptory challenges. 5 However, five members of the Court, Justices Kennedy, Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, stated that a defendant situated in the same position as Holland (i.e., a white defen 1991In Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 , 110 S.Ct. 803 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990), a majority of the Court held that while a white defendant has standing to raise a sixth amendment fair cross-section/impartial jury challenge to the prosecutor’s peremptory removal of Afro-Americans from his jury, the sixth amendment’s fair cross-section requirement cannot be interpreted to prohibit discriminatory peremptory challenges. 5 However, five members of the Court, Justices Kennedy, Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, stated that a defendant situated in the same position as Holland (i.e., a white defen | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Powers v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1991In Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 , 110 S.Ct. 803 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990), a majority of the Court held that while a white defendant has standing to raise a sixth amendment fair cross-section/impartial jury challenge to the prosecutor’s peremptory removal of Afro-Americans from his jury, the sixth amendment’s fair cross-section requirement cannot be interpreted to prohibit discriminatory peremptory challenges. 5 However, five members of the Court, Justices Kennedy, Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, stated that a defendant situated in the same position as Holland (i.e., a white defen | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Lockhart v. McCree
green
2 sentences1987Id. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 1764-65 , 90 L.Ed.2d at 148 . 1987Id. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 1764-65 , 90 L.Ed.2d at 148 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Taylor v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1986In [ Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975)], we identified those purposes as (1) "guard[ing] against the exercise of arbitrary power" and ensuring that the "common sense judgment of the community" will act as "a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor," (2) preserving "public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system," and (3) implementing our belief that "sharing in the administration of justice is a phase *1311 of civic responsibility." Id. at 530-31 [ 95 S.Ct. at 698 ]. 1986In [ Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975)], we identified those purposes as (1) "guard[ing] against the exercise of arbitrary power" and ensuring that the "common sense judgment of the community" will act as "a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor," (2) preserving "public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system," and (3) implementing our belief that "sharing in the administration of justice is a phase *1311 of civic responsibility." Id. at 530-31 [ 95 S.Ct. at 698 ]. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.