fair cross-section requirement in California

2025Rather, he is entitled to a panel drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.” (De Rosans, at p. 621.) Defendant’s burden under the second prong is to show that the representation of African Americans “ ‘in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of persons in the community[.]’ ” (People v. Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 526 , quoting Duren, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364 .) “The second Duren prong requires a showing that the cognizable group is underrepresented in venires from which juries are selected, not on the panel from which t

2025To establish a prima-facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, “the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” (Duren, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364 ; Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 566 .) If the defendant establishes a prima facie case of s

1996It is uncontroverted that “[i]n California, the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community is guaranteed equally and independently by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution (Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522, 530 [ 42 L.Ed.2d 690, 698 , 95 S.Ct. 692 ]) and by article I, section 16 of the California Constitution (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 272 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ]).” (Williams v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 736, 740 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 503 , 781 P.2d 537 ].) “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the

1996It is uncontroverted that “[i]n California, the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community is guaranteed equally and independently by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution (Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522, 530 [ 42 L.Ed.2d 690, 698 , 95 S.Ct. 692 ]) and by article I, section 16 of the California Constitution (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 272 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ]).” (Williams v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 736, 740 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 503 , 781 P.2d 537 ].) “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the

2001Upon the court rests the responsibility of declaring the law; upon the jury, the responsibility of applying the law so declared to the facts as they, upon their conscience, believe them to be." ( Id. at p. 102, 15 S.Ct. 273 .) In Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522, 530 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 , the United States Supreme Court, in holding that the fair-cross-section requirement is fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, observed: "The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power—to make available the commonsense judgment of the comm

2001Upon the court rests the responsibility of declaring the law; upon the jury, the responsibility of applying the law so declared to the facts as they, upon their conscience, believe them to be." ( Id. at p. 102, 15 S.Ct. 273 .) In Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522, 530 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 , the United States Supreme Court, in holding that the fair-cross-section requirement is fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, observed: "The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power—to make available the commonsense judgment of the comm

2001(Bell); e.g., [People v.] Harris [(1984)] 36 Cal.3d [36,] 48-49 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 782 , 679 P.2d 433 ].)” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1159 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ].) “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be *233 excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation i

2001(Bell); e.g., [People v.] Harris [(1984)] 36 Cal.3d [36,] 48-49 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 782 , 679 P.2d 433 ].)” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1159 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ].) “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be *233 excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation i

2017Discussion A criminal defendant has a "right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a petit jury selected from a fair cross section of the *19 community." ( Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357 , 359, 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 ( Duren ); see People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132 , 1159, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 .) "In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which ju

2017Discussion A criminal defendant has a "right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a petit jury selected from a fair cross section of the *19 community." ( Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357 , 359, 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 ( Duren ); see People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132 , 1159, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 .) "In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which ju

2025Rather, he is entitled to a panel drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.” (De Rosans, at p. 621.) Defendant’s burden under the second prong is to show that the representation of African Americans “ ‘in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of persons in the community[.]’ ” (People v. Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 526 , quoting Duren, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364 .) “The second Duren prong requires a showing that the cognizable group is underrepresented in venires from which juries are selected, not on the panel from which t

2001(People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 491 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].)” (People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1088 .) As to appellant’s claim that he established a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, it is not disputed that the first prong is met in that African-Americans “are a cognizable group within the meaning of Duren . [Citation.]” (Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 526.) We address the adequacy of appellant’s showing as to the second and third prongs under Duren’s three-prong test.

2001(See Mattson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 844 ; Williams v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 736, 744-745 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 503 , 781 P.2d 537 ].) If a defendant makes a prima facie case showing that the fair-cross-section requirement is violated, “the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide either a more precise statistical showing that no constitutionally significant disparity exists or a compelling justification for the procedure that has resulted in the disparity in the jury venire.

2001(See Mattson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 844 ; Williams v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 736, 744-745 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 503 , 781 P.2d 537 ].) If a defendant makes a prima facie case showing that the fair-cross-section requirement is violated, “the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide either a more precise statistical showing that no constitutionally significant disparity exists or a compelling justification for the procedure that has resulted in the disparity in the jury venire.

2001(People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 491 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].)” (People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1088 .) As to appellant’s claim that he established a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, it is not disputed that the first prong is met in that African-Americans “are a cognizable group within the meaning of Duren . [Citation.]” (Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 526.) We address the adequacy of appellant’s showing as to the second and third prongs under Duren’s three-prong test.

2001(People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 491 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].)” (People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1088 .) As to appellant’s claim that he established a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, it is not disputed that the first prong is met in that African-Americans “are a cognizable group within the meaning of Duren . [Citation.]” (Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 526.) We address the adequacy of appellant’s showing as to the second and third prongs under Duren’s three-prong test.

2012(People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 842 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 802 , 789 P.2d 983 ].) ‘In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.’ ([Duren,\ supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364

2012(People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 842 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 802 , 789 P.2d 983 ].) ‘In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.’ ([Duren,\ supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364

2008As the United States Supreme Court explained, death penalty opponents, ‘or for that matter any other group defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that render members of the group unable to serve as jurors in a particular case, may be excluded from jury service without contravening any of the basic objectives of the fair-cross-section requirement.’ [Citations.] It is also well settled that this exclusion does not violate defendant’s right to an impartial jury.” (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1198 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ], quoting Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S.

2008As the United States Supreme Court explained, death penalty opponents, ‘or for that matter any other group defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that render members of the group unable to serve as jurors in a particular case, may be excluded from jury service without contravening any of the basic objectives of the fair-cross-section requirement.’ [Citations.] It is also well settled that this exclusion does not violate defendant’s right to an impartial jury.” (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1198 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ], quoting Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S.

1991Proc., §§ 197, subd. (a), 204.) Under Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 579 , 99 S.Ct. 664 ] ( Duren ), in order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, "the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not *Page 298 fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection

1991Proc., §§ 197, subd. (a), 204.) Under Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 579 , 99 S.Ct. 664 ] ( Duren ), in order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, "the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not *Page 298 fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection

2010As the United States Supreme Court explained, death penalty opponents, ‘or for that matter any other group defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that render members of the group unable to serve as jurors in a particular case, may be excluded from jury service without contravening any of the basic objectives of the fair-cross-section requirement.’ ( Lockhart, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 176-177 . . . ; see also People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 353 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 803 , 673 P.2d 680 ].) It is also well settled that this exclusion does not violate defendant’s right to an impartial jury. (

2010As the United States Supreme Court explained, death penalty opponents, ‘or for that matter any other group defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that render members of the group unable to serve as jurors in a particular case, may be excluded from jury service without contravening any of the basic objectives of the fair-cross-section requirement.’ ( Lockhart, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 176-177 . . . ; see also People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 353 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 803 , 673 P.2d 680 ].) It is also well settled that this exclusion does not violate defendant’s right to an impartial jury. (

2020(Jackson, at pp. 1194–1195; see Roddy v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1135 (Roddy) [“Regardless of a defendant’s constitutional right to pretrial discovery, ‘some 14We are mindful that “even dicta of the Supreme Court should not be disregarded by an intermediate court without a compelling reason.” (California Coastal Com. v. Office of Admin.

2014I, § 16; [citations].) This guarantee mandates that courts select juries from pools that do not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community. [Citation.]” (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 255 .) “The relevant ‘community’ 13 for cross-section purposes is the community of qualified jurors in the judicial district in which the case is to be tried. [Citations.]” (People v. Currie (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 225, 233 .) “[T]o establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ gr

2014I, § 16; [citations].) This guarantee mandates that courts select juries from pools that do not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community. [Citation.]” (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 255 .) “The relevant ‘community’ 13 for cross-section purposes is the community of qualified jurors in the judicial district in which the case is to be tried. [Citations.]” (People v. Currie (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 225, 233 .) “[T]o establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ gr

2014I, § 16; [citations].) This guarantee mandates that courts select juries from pools that do not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community. [Citation.]” (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 255 .) “The relevant ‘community’ 13 for cross-section purposes is the community of qualified jurors in the judicial district in which the case is to be tried. [Citations.]” (People v. Currie (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 225, 233 .) “[T]o establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ gr

2007I, § 16; [citations].) That guarantee mandates that the pools from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community. [Citation.]” (People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1087-1088 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 906 P.2d 478 ] (Horton).) “The federal and state guarantees are coextensive, and the analyses are identical. [Citations.]” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1159 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ].) “[T]o establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded

2007I, § 16; [citations].) That guarantee mandates that the pools from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community. [Citation.]” (People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1087-1088 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 906 P.2d 478 ] (Horton).) “The federal and state guarantees are coextensive, and the analyses are identical. [Citations.]” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1159 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ].) “[T]o establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded

1989While the affidavit forms are sent to prospective jurors during the qualifying process, neither they nor the computer-stored data contain any indication of the prospective juror’s race or ethnic origin.” ( 132 Cal.App.3d at p. 291 .) On this evidence Buford held that the defendant had established a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement. ( 132 Cal.App.3d at p. 299 .) People v. Harris is similar.

1989While the affidavit forms are sent to prospective jurors during the qualifying process, neither they nor the computer-stored data contain any indication of the prospective juror’s race or ethnic origin.” ( 132 Cal.App.3d at p. 291 .) On this evidence Buford held that the defendant had established a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement. ( 132 Cal.App.3d at p. 299 .) People v. Harris is similar.

2025To establish a prima-facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, “the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” (Duren, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364 ; Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 566 .) If the defendant establishes a prima facie case of s

2025To establish a prima-facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, “the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” (Duren, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364 ; Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 566 .) If the defendant establishes a prima facie case of s

2015Racial Composition of Venire Pool and Jury Defendant contends he was prejudiced by the lack of racial and ethnic diversity on the jury and the venire pool. “[A] prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement requires proof (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this 19 underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection pro

2014I, § 16; [citations].) This guarantee mandates that courts select juries from pools that do not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community. [Citation.]” (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 255 .) “The relevant ‘community’ 13 for cross-section purposes is the community of qualified jurors in the judicial district in which the case is to be tried. [Citations.]” (People v. Currie (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 225, 233 .) “[T]o establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ gr

1989If a defendant establishes a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment at this stage of jury selection, the burden shifts to the People to rebut the showing made by the defendant. (4a) In Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. 357 , the United States Supreme Court defined the elements of that prima facie showing, creating a three-prong test: "In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the repres

1989If a defendant establishes a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment at this stage of jury selection, the burden shifts to the People to rebut the showing made by the defendant. (4a) In Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. 357 , the United States Supreme Court defined the elements of that prima facie showing, creating a three-prong test: "In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the repres

1991This conclusion necessarily entails the judgment that women are sufficiently numerous and distinct from men and that if they are systematically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement cannot be satisfied.” (Id., at p. 531 [ 42 L.Ed.2d at p. 698 ]; see Holland v. Illinois (1990) 493 U.S. 474 [ 107 L.Ed.2d 905, 919 , 110 S.Ct. 803 ].) In the context of a challenge to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, women were recognized as a “cognizable group” in People v. Macioce (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 262, 280 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 771 ], (See also, discussio

1991This conclusion necessarily entails the judgment that women are sufficiently numerous and distinct from men and that if they are systematically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement cannot be satisfied.” (Id., at p. 531 [ 42 L.Ed.2d at p. 698 ]; see Holland v. Illinois (1990) 493 U.S. 474 [ 107 L.Ed.2d 905, 919 , 110 S.Ct. 803 ].) In the context of a challenge to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, women were recognized as a “cognizable group” in People v. Macioce (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 262, 280 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 771 ], (See also, discussio

1993He contends that a systematic underrepresentation of Hispanic persons and young people aged 18 to 24 was caused by excuses from service for economic hardship. *1061 (24) "In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclu

1993He contends that a systematic underrepresentation of Hispanic persons and young people aged 18 to 24 was caused by excuses from service for economic hardship. *1061 (24) "In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclu

2018(People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 18-19 (Henriquez); People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1154 .) “ ‘In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, [a] defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in 5 the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.’ ” (Henri

2003The second prong "requires a constitutionally significant difference between the number of members of the cognizable group appearing for jury duty and the number in the relevant community." ( People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1155 , 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 .) Defendant cannot make such a showing.

2020Jan. 1, 2021].) 3 alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.’ ” (People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1 , 18–19.) Whether a defendant is entitled to “the discovery of information necessary to make such a case” requires a different analysis.

2018(People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 18-19 (Henriquez); People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1154 .) “ ‘In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, [a] defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in 5 the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.’ ” (Henri

2025Rather, he is entitled to a panel drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.” (De Rosans, at p. 621.) Defendant’s burden under the second prong is to show that the representation of African Americans “ ‘in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of persons in the community[.]’ ” (People v. Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 526 , quoting Duren, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364 .) “The second Duren prong requires a showing that the cognizable group is underrepresented in venires from which juries are selected, not on the panel from which t

2025The fair cross-section requirement as well as Duren “clearly contemplate[] a pre-trial challenge.” (De Rosans, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 621 .) Defendant’s argument “that the trial court should have granted a continuance rests on an erroneous assessment of the nature of a fair cross-section claim.

2015The trial court denied defendant’s motion to quash the jury venire, ruling there was no underrepresentation of Hispanics by significant numbers due to systematic exclusion in the jury selection process. (2) Analysis “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be *652 excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that

2015The trial court denied defendant’s motion to quash the jury venire, ruling there was no underrepresentation of Hispanics by significant numbers due to systematic exclusion in the jury selection process. (2) Analysis “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be *652 excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that

2014I, § 16; [citations].) This guarantee mandates that courts select juries from pools that do not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community. [Citation.]” (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 255 .) “The relevant ‘community’ 13 for cross-section purposes is the community of qualified jurors in the judicial district in which the case is to be tried. [Citations.]” (People v. Currie (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 225, 233 .) “[T]o establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ gr

2007I, § 16; [citations].) That guarantee mandates that the pools from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community. [Citation.]” (People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1087-1088 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 906 P.2d 478 ] (Horton).) “The federal and state guarantees are coextensive, and the analyses are identical. [Citations.]” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1159 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ].) “[T]o establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded

2010As the United States Supreme Court explained, death penalty opponents, ‘or for that matter any other group defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that render members of the group unable to serve as jurors in a particular case, may be excluded from jury service without contravening any of the basic objectives of the fair-cross-section requirement.’ ( Lockhart, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 176-177 . . . ; see also People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 353 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 803 , 673 P.2d 680 ].) It is also well settled that this exclusion does not violate defendant’s right to an impartial jury. (

1996As the United States Supreme Court explained, death penalty opponents, "or for that matter any other group defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that render members of the group unable to serve as jurors in a particular case, may be excluded from jury service without contravening any of the basic objectives of the fair-cross-section requirement." ( Lockhart, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 176-177 [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 149-150]; see also People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 353 [ 197 Cal. Rptr. 803 , 673 P.2d 680 ].) It is also well settled that this exclusion does not violate defendant's right to

2006(Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364 ; People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1061 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 , 846 P.2d 756 ], revd. on other grounds in Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318 [ 128 L.Ed.2d 293 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 ].) He also would have to show he preserved the claim for appeal by objecting to the excusáis on fair cross-section grounds below.

2006(Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364 ; People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1061 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 , 846 P.2d 756 ], revd. on other grounds in Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318 [ 128 L.Ed.2d 293 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 ].) He also would have to show he preserved the claim for appeal by objecting to the excusáis on fair cross-section grounds below.