materiality inquiry in Pennsylvania

2026Whether the PCRA court was in error in finding that [Harper] did not meet the materiality requirement according to the rules of Brady, Giglio, Kyles v. Whitley, [ 514 U.S. 419 (1995)], and all the case[s] of the United States Supreme Court [regarding] Brady violations[?] 3.

2013See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 436 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (equating the prejudice inquiry under Strickland with the materiality inquiry under Brady)-, U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (same). .

2026We hereby grant Johnson’s Motion to Allow Post-Submission Communication. [J-31-2025] - 41 this materiality standard requires “‘“the beneficiary of [the] constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”’” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680, n. 9 (1985) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).106 In so many words, if the defendant establishes that the prosecutor knowingly allowed false testimony to stand uncorrected, the burden rests with the Commonwealth to establish lack of prejudice.

2013The post-conviction court, however, determined that such failure did not meet the materiality requirement requisite to relief on a Brady claim, see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), in that an exploration by the defense of the memory impairment concern at trial would not have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

2019See Willis , 46 A.3d at 670 (holding that evidence may be material for Brady purposes "where the Commonwealth's failure to disclose such evidence adversely affected the presentation of the defense at trial, or the defense's preparation for trial, such that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different").

2019See Willis, 46 A.3d at 670 (holding that evidence may be material for Brady purposes “where the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose such evidence adversely affected the presentation of the defense at trial, or the defense’s preparation for trial, such [J-54-2018] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 16 the Robinson documents based upon the witness’ motive or bias; that inquiry belongs to the jury.

2024“Rather, the question is whether ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 [] (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 []).

2020“Rather, the question is whether ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 , 119 S.Ct. at 1952 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 , 115 S.Ct. at 1566 ).

2002Where the requet a specific one, the materiality test is whether the evidence “might have affected the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 .

2002Where the requet a specific one, the materiality test is whether the evidence “might have affected the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 .

2025“The materiality inquiry is not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 854 (Pa. 2005).

2022The relevant question for the materiality analysis is “whether the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. (citations omitted).

2024The Commonwealth calls the PCRA court’s short prejudice analysis “legally insufficient,” “inadequate,” and “erroneous.”48 Contrary to the PCRA court’s conclusion, the Commonwealth suggests that “[e]vidence from the cash register rolls would have merely confirmed what Attorney Lord established at trial—Eller could not have seen Dowling between 11:20 AM and 11:30 AM.”49 The Commonwealth raises similar issues with the PCRA court’s materiality analysis under Brady and Napue, arguing that “Dowling cannot meet the materiality prong of the Brady analysis because he did not meet the substantively iden

2012Justice White’s very brief concurrence, representing the view of three Justices, noted that he agreed only that, for purposes of the materiality inquiry, “ ‘evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Id. at 685 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Justice Blackmun’s opinion, id. at 682 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ).

2012On August 15, 2008, the Commonwealth filed a petition for allowance of appeal, and, on March 18, 2009, this Court granted the Commonwealth’s petition with respect to the following issues: (1) Whether the Superior Court erred in finding that the materiality requirement of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 [ 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 ] (1963), was satisfied where the omitted statement of a codefendant would not have been admissible at trial, and the defendant did not demonstrate that its production to the defense before trial would have led to the discovery of admissible evidence? (2) Whether

2012On August 15, 2008, the Commonwealth filed a petition for allowance of appeal, and, on March 18, 2009, this Court granted the Commonwealth’s petition with respect to the following issues: (1) Whether the Superior Court erred in finding that the materiality requirement of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 [ 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 ] (1963), was satisfied where the omitted statement of a codefendant would not have been admissible at trial, and the defendant did not demonstrate that its production to the defense before trial would have led to the discovery of admissible evidence? (2) Whether

2026We note as well that a due process violation for failure to correct false testimony is subject to the materiality analysis that applies to other Brady violations.111 And here, given the overlap—the harm asserted ultimately being the want of more vigorous direct and/or cross-examination regarding the prospect of assistance with the New Jersey 110 Id. at 223. 111 See Commonwealth v. Wallace, 455 A.2d 1187, 1190-91 (Pa. 1983).

2026We hereby grant Johnson’s Motion to Allow Post-Submission Communication. [J-31-2025] - 41 this materiality standard requires “‘“the beneficiary of [the] constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”’” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680, n. 9 (1985) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).106 In so many words, if the defendant establishes that the prosecutor knowingly allowed false testimony to stand uncorrected, the burden rests with the Commonwealth to establish lack of prejudice.

2025Coates v. Sec[.] [&] Exch[.] Comm[’n], 394 U.S. 976 . . . (1969)[; s]ee also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 , 153-54 . . . (1972) (“All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of this decision.”)[.] Stockard, 499 A.2d at 606 (Spaeth, J., concurring); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s materiality standard set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), in the context of the 1934 Act); T

2025Coates v. Sec[.] [&] Exch[.] Comm[’n], 394 U.S. 976 . . . (1969)[; s]ee also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 , 153-54 . . . (1972) (“All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of this decision.”)[.] Stockard, 499 A.2d at 606 (Spaeth, J., concurring); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s materiality standard set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), in the context of the 1934 Act); T

2025Coates v. Sec[.] [&] Exch[.] Comm[’n], 394 U.S. 976 . . . (1969)[; s]ee also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 , 153-54 . . . (1972) (“All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of this decision.”)[.] Stockard, 499 A.2d at 606 (Spaeth, J., concurring); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s materiality standard set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), in the context of the 1934 Act); T

2025Coates v. Sec[.] [&] Exch[.] Comm[’n], 394 U.S. 976 . . . (1969)[; s]ee also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 , 153-54 . . . (1972) (“All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of this decision.”)[.] Stockard, 499 A.2d at 606 (Spaeth, J., concurring); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s materiality standard set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), in the context of the 1934 Act); T

2025Coates v. Sec[.] [&] Exch[.] Comm[’n], 394 U.S. 976 . . . (1969)[; s]ee also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 , 153-54 . . . (1972) (“All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of this decision.”)[.] Stockard, 499 A.2d at 606 (Spaeth, J., concurring); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s materiality standard set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), in the context of the 1934 Act); T

2023In support of her argument, she relies on the five-factor materiality test set forth in Widmer Eng'g, Inc. v. Dufalla, 837 A.2d 459, 468 (Pa. Super. 2003).1 Buyer argues that “[n]one of these factors support a finding that a delay in payment of an ____________________________________________ 1The five factors for determining materiality in a breach of contract issue, as set forth in Widmer, are as follows: a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected; b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for that part of

2023Widmer Eng'g, Inc., 837 A.2d at 468 (citations omitted) -6- J-A01001-23 ‘extras’ invoice was material.” Buyer’s Brief at 31.

2021On the question of materiality, the court has noted that "[s]uch evidence is material 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' The materiality inquiry is not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury's conclusions. 'Rather, the question is whether 'the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such adifferent light as 10 to unde

2021Applying this reasoning to the case at -7- J-S55031-20 bar, Attorney Crawford’s testimony and the parties’ applications clearly raised a material issue of fact, i.e., whether Appellant was misinformed regarding plea offers from the Commonwealth.3 The trial court erred by denying the parties’ requests for a follow-up evidentiary hearing.4 Accord Copeland, supra at 60-61 ; see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hart, 199 A.3d 475, 482 (Pa.Super. 2018) (holding that where there are “disputed factual issues,” the PCRA court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing “as a matter of law”) (citing Pa.R.Cr

2015It was Brown’s burden to establish all three of the prongs necessary for a finding of a Brady violation, Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 451 (Pa. 2011), and he has failed to do so.

2014Compare Commonwealth v. Ly, 980 A.2d 61, 76 (Pa. 2009) (stating, “[a]s to Brady claims advanced under the PCRA, a defendant must demonstrate that the alleged Brady violation ‘so undermined the truth- determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place[]’”), and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i) (same), with Commonwealth ex. rel.

2013See Barbosa, supra. Based upon the foregoing, we hold Appellant’s challenge to the validity of his guilty plea is not properly before us for review at this time.

2012Commonwealth’s Brief at 9 (citing Commonwealth v. Brinkley, 505 Pa. 442, 453 , 480 A.2d 980, 986 (1984) (any portions of an out-of-court declarant’s statement about others’ involvement or lack of involvement in a particular crime are neither inculpatory, nor declarations against penal interest)).

2012Commonwealth’s Brief at 9 (citing Commonwealth v. Brinkley, 505 Pa. 442, 453 , 480 A.2d 980, 986 (1984) (any portions of an out-of-court declarant’s statement about others’ involvement or lack of involvement in a particular crime are neither inculpatory, nor declarations against penal interest)).