materiality standard in New Jersey

2001The court also concluded that A & K did not “receive any competitive advantage by the waiver of this defect.” Applying the two-prong materiality test expressed by the Court in Meadowbrook Carting Co., Inc. v. Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307, 315 , 650 A.2d 748 (1994), and by Judge Pressler in Tp. of River Vale v. R.J.

2001The court also concluded that A & K did not “receive any competitive advantage by the waiver of this defect.” Applying the two-prong materiality test expressed by the Court in Meadowbrook Carting Co., Inc. v. Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307, 315 , 650 A.2d 748 (1994), and by Judge Pressler in Tp. of River Vale v. R.J.

2019After being advised by the court that Longobardi established that neither an insured's intent in making a misstatement nor whether that misstatement was under oath was relevant to the inquiry, Pokhan's counsel responded, "Yeah, but still, that's an issue about materiality." The court proceeded to discuss materiality, quoting the Longobardi Court's agreement with the Second Circuit's statement that "the materiality requirement is satisfied if the false statement concerns a subject relevant and germane to the insurer's investigation as it was then proceeding." Longobardi, 121 N.J. at 541 (quotin

1994Thus the materiality requirement is satisfied if the false statement concerns a subject relevant and germane to the insurer’s investigation as it was then proceeding. [ Longobardi supra, 121 N.J. at 541 , 582 A.2d 1257 , quoting Fine v. Bellefonte Underwriters Ins.

1994Co., 725 F.2d 179, 183 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 , 106 S.Ct. 86 , 88 L.Ed.2d 70 (1985) ].

1990Co., 725 F.2d 179, 183 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 , 106 S.Ct. 86 , 88 L.Ed.2d 70 (1985).] The Fine court went on to hold that [fjalse sworn answers are material if they might have affected the attitude and action of the insurer.

1994Co., 725 F.2d 179, 183 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 , 106 S.Ct. 86 , 88 L.Ed.2d 70 (1985) ].

1990Co., 725 F.2d 179, 183 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 , 106 S.Ct. 86 , 88 L.Ed.2d 70 (1985).] The Fine court went on to hold that [fjalse sworn answers are material if they might have affected the attitude and action of the insurer.

1994Co., 725 F.2d 179, 183 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 , 106 S.Ct. 86 , 88 L.Ed.2d 70 (1985) ].

1990Co., 725 F.2d 179, 183 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 , 106 S.Ct. 86 , 88 L.Ed.2d 70 (1985).] The Fine court went on to hold that [fjalse sworn answers are material if they might have affected the attitude and action of the insurer.

2025"The materiality standard is satisfied if [the] defendant demonstrates that there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different ." A-3822-22 32 Ibid.

2024Nine years later, the United States Supreme Court "abandoned the [Agurs] distinction between" information specifically requested by defendant and information generally requested, or not requested at all, in favor of a materiality test that mirrored the one set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2023"The materiality standard is satisfied if defendant demonstrates that there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Ibid. (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).

2019We do not find these arguments persuasive. "[T]he bidding statutes are [intended] to benefit the taxpayers and they 'are construed as nearly as possible with sole reference to the public good.'" In re Jasper, 406 N.J.

2016Id. at 476 .

2013The materiality test is: [F]irst, whether the effect of a waiver would be to deprive the municipality of its assurance that the contract will be entered into, performed and guaranteed according to its specified requirements, and second, whether it is of such a nature that its waiver would adversely affect competitive bidding by placing a bidder in a position of advantage over other bidders or by otherwise undermining the necessary common standard of competition. [River Vale, supra, 127 N.J.Super. at 216 , 316 A.2d 737 .] This test is flexible and permits the Treasurer to “evaluate the entire R

2013The materiality test is: [F]irst, whether the effect of a waiver would be to deprive the municipality of its assurance that the contract will be entered into, performed and guaranteed according to its specified requirements, and second, whether it is of such a nature that its waiver would adversely affect competitive bidding by placing a bidder in a position of advantage over other bidders or by otherwise undermining the necessary common standard of competition. [River Vale, supra, 127 N.J.Super. at 216 , 316 A.2d 737 .] This test is flexible and permits the Treasurer to “evaluate the entire R

2000United States v. Bagley, 473 *632 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383 , 87 L.Ed. 2d 481, 494 (1985); State v. Nelson, supra, 330 N.J.Super. at 214 , 749 A. 2d 380 .

2000United States v. Bagley, 473 *632 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383 , 87 L.Ed. 2d 481, 494 (1985); State v. Nelson, supra, 330 N.J.Super. at 214 , 749 A. 2d 380 .

1998State v. Casele, 198 N.J.Super. 462, 470 , 487 A. 2d 765 (App.Div. 1985), set out the Picariello standard as a three-pronged test: "(1) whether the evidence was material to the issues of guilt or punishment, (2) whether the defendant was prejudiced by its destruction, and (3) whether the government had acted in bad faith when it destroyed it." Finally, State v. Peterkin, 226 N.J.Super. 25 , 543 A. 2d 466 (App.Div.1988), was a case where the court was confronted with the destruction of critical photo identification arrays and a subsequent effort to conceal that loss by the officer involved.

1998State v. Casele, 198 N.J.Super. 462, 470 , 487 A. 2d 765 (App.Div. 1985), set out the Picariello standard as a three-pronged test: "(1) whether the evidence was material to the issues of guilt or punishment, (2) whether the defendant was prejudiced by its destruction, and (3) whether the government had acted in bad faith when it destroyed it." Finally, State v. Peterkin, 226 N.J.Super. 25 , 543 A. 2d 466 (App.Div.1988), was a case where the court was confronted with the destruction of critical photo identification arrays and a subsequent effort to conceal that loss by the officer involved.

1998State v. Casele, 198 N.J.Super. 462, 470 , 487 A. 2d 765 (App.Div. 1985), set out the Picariello standard as a three-pronged test: "(1) whether the evidence was material to the issues of guilt or punishment, (2) whether the defendant was prejudiced by its destruction, and (3) whether the government had acted in bad faith when it destroyed it." Finally, State v. Peterkin, 226 N.J.Super. 25 , 543 A. 2d 466 (App.Div.1988), was a case where the court was confronted with the destruction of critical photo identification arrays and a subsequent effort to conceal that loss by the officer involved.

1998State v. Casele, 198 N.J.Super. 462, 470 , 487 A. 2d 765 (App.Div. 1985), set out the Picariello standard as a three-pronged test: "(1) whether the evidence was material to the issues of guilt or punishment, (2) whether the defendant was prejudiced by its destruction, and (3) whether the government had acted in bad faith when it destroyed it." Finally, State v. Peterkin, 226 N.J.Super. 25 , 543 A. 2d 466 (App.Div.1988), was a case where the court was confronted with the destruction of critical photo identification arrays and a subsequent effort to conceal that loss by the officer involved.

1998The court reiterated its adherence to the Picariello standard in State v. Serret, 198 N.J.Super. 21, 26-27 , 486 A. 2d 345 (App.Div. 1984) (quoting from California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 , 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2534 , 81 L.Ed. 2d 413, 422 (1984)), further explaining that "the constitutional duty to preserve evidence is limited to such evidence as `might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense.'" "This materiality standard is met only when the evidence possesses an apparent exculpatory value and is of such a nature that comparable evidence could not be obtained by oth

1998The court reiterated its adherence to the Picariello standard in State v. Serret, 198 N.J.Super. 21, 26-27 , 486 A. 2d 345 (App.Div. 1984) (quoting from California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 , 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2534 , 81 L.Ed. 2d 413, 422 (1984)), further explaining that "the constitutional duty to preserve evidence is limited to such evidence as `might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense.'" "This materiality standard is met only when the evidence possesses an apparent exculpatory value and is of such a nature that comparable evidence could not be obtained by oth

1997In Marshall I , because defendant specifically had requested the withheld information, the Court applied the lower standard enunciated in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 , 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2398 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 350 (1976), namely, that a discovery violation would be deemed reversible error if the violation “might have affected the outcome of the trial.” Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 199-200 , 586 A.2d 85 .

1997In Marshall I , because defendant specifically had requested the withheld information, the Court applied the lower standard enunciated in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 , 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2398 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 350 (1976), namely, that a discovery violation would be deemed reversible error if the violation “might have affected the outcome of the trial.” Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 199-200 , 586 A.2d 85 .

1994Accordingly, we adopted a broad materiality test under which the insurer may rescind if the false concealment “ ‘naturally and reasonably influence[d] the judgment of the underwriter in making the contract at all, or in estimating the degree or character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of premium.’ ” Id. at 115 , 584 A.2d 190 (quoting Kerpchak v. John Hancock Mut.

1994Accordingly, we adopted a broad materiality test under which the insurer may rescind if the false concealment “ ‘naturally and reasonably influence[d] the judgment of the underwriter in making the contract at all, or in estimating the degree or character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of premium.’ ” Id. at 115 , 584 A.2d 190 (quoting Kerpchak v. John Hancock Mut.

1992The common law rule, at one time, was that the defendant must be shown to have intended to deceive the court and the jury, (see Cermak v. Hertz Corp., 53 N.J.Super. 455, 463 , 147 A.2d 800 (App.Div. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 28 N.J. 568 , 147 A.2d 795 (1959); State v. Winters, supra, 140 N.J.Super. at 118 , 355 A.2d 221 ; 60A Am.Jur.2d Perjury § 1 (1988)) — suggesting a clearly factual scope for the materiality inquiry, but the statute changed that when it provided that defendant’s belief as to materiality is irrelevant.

1992Super. at 118 , 355 A. 2d 221 ; 60A Am.Jur.2d Perjury § 1 (1988)) — suggesting a clearly factual scope for the materiality inquiry, but the statute changed that when it provided that defendant's belief as to materiality is irrelevant.