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14 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Agursgreen2 sentences2022See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 280–82 (1999). 17 When defense counsel makes a specific request for discovery, “if the subject matter of such a request is material, or indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable to require the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the problem to the trial judge.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (italics added). 2022See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 280–82 (1999). 17 When defense counsel makes a specific request for discovery, “if the subject matter of such a request is material, or indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable to require the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the problem to the trial judge.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (italics added). | 3 | 4 |
Strickler v. Greenegreen2 sentences2022At the outset, we conclude that the district court applied the correct standard when reviewing the potential Brady evidence because, contrary to Campbell’s assertion, there is a materiality requirement: “The prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the defense and material to either guilt or punishment.” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744 , 830, 419 P.3d 1042, 1129 (2018) (italics added) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ). “ ‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or bec 2022At the outset, we conclude that the district court applied the correct standard when reviewing the potential Brady evidence because, contrary to Campbell’s assertion, there is a materiality requirement: “The prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the defense and material to either guilt or punishment.” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744 , 830, 419 P.3d 1042, 1129 (2018) (italics added) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ). “ ‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or bec | 2 | 3 |
State v. Erik Virgil Hallgreen2 sentences2022At the outset, we conclude that the district court applied the correct standard when reviewing the potential Brady evidence because, contrary to Campbell’s assertion, there is a materiality requirement: “The prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the defense and material to either guilt or punishment.” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744 , 830, 419 P.3d 1042, 1129 (2018) (italics added) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ). “ ‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or bec 2022At the outset, we conclude that the district court applied the correct standard when reviewing the potential Brady evidence because, contrary to Campbell’s assertion, there is a materiality requirement: “The prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the defense and material to either guilt or punishment.” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744 , 830, 419 P.3d 1042, 1129 (2018) (italics added) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ). “ ‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or bec | 2 | 2 |
State v. Leatherwoodgreen2 sentences2020Sarbacher argues that the district court correctly applied the materiality standard from Brady, as articulated by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Leatherwood, 104 Idaho 100, 103 , 656 P.2d 760, 763 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982). 4 A. The district erred in applying Brady, instead of Youngblood, to a case where the missing evidence was of unknown exculpatory value. 2020Sarbacher argues that the district court correctly applied the materiality standard from Brady, as articulated by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Leatherwood, 104 Idaho 100, 103 , 656 P.2d 760, 763 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982). 4 A. The district erred in applying Brady, instead of Youngblood, to a case where the missing evidence was of unknown exculpatory value. | 2 | 2 |
Siercke v. Sierckegreen2 sentences2022“A party may refine issues that they have raised below with additional legal arguments so long as the substantive issue and the party’s position on that issue remain the same.” Siercke v. Siercke, 167 Idaho 709, 715 , 476 P.3d 376, 382 (2020). 2022“A party may refine issues that they have raised below with additional legal arguments so long as the substantive issue and the party’s position on that issue remain the same.” Siercke v. Siercke, 167 Idaho 709, 715 , 476 P.3d 376, 382 (2020). | 1 | 1 |
Napue v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2013See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 , 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397-98 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 349-50 (1976); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 , 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1177 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, 1221 (1959). 2013See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 , 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397-98 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 349-50 (1976); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 , 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1177 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, 1221 (1959). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brunogreen2 sentences2000Dopp, 129 Idaho at 606 , 930 P.2d at 1048 ; State v. Bruno, 119 Idaho 199, 201-02 , 804 P.2d 928, 930-31 (Ct.App.1990). 2000Dopp, 129 Idaho at 606 , 930 P.2d at 1048 ; State v. Bruno, 119 Idaho 199, 201-02 , 804 P.2d 928, 930-31 (Ct.App.1990). | 1 | 1 |
California v. Trombettagreen1 sentence1985See Trombetta, 104 S.Ct. at 2534 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2022At the outset, we conclude that the district court applied the correct standard when reviewing the potential Brady evidence because, contrary to Campbell’s assertion, there is a materiality requirement: “The prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the defense and material to either guilt or punishment.” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744 , 830, 419 P.3d 1042, 1129 (2018) (italics added) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ). “ ‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or bec 2022At the outset, we conclude that the district court applied the correct standard when reviewing the potential Brady evidence because, contrary to Campbell’s assertion, there is a materiality requirement: “The prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the defense and material to either guilt or punishment.” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744 , 830, 419 P.3d 1042, 1129 (2018) (italics added) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ). “ ‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or bec | 3 | 1992–2022 |
Neder v. United States
green
2 sentences2012Id. at 8-15 , 119 S.Ct. at 1833-37 , 144 L.Ed.2d at 46-51 . 2012Id. at 8-15 , 119 S.Ct. at 1833-37 , 144 L.Ed.2d at 46-51 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Giglio v. United States
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Sheffield v. Curran
green
1 sentence2003This materiality standard was applied to circumstances very similar to those presented here in Sheffield v. Curran, 645 F.Supp. 859 (D.Mass.1986). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Dopp
green
2 sentences2000Dopp, 129 Idaho at 606 , 930 P.2d at 1048 ; State v. Bruno, 119 Idaho 199, 201-02 , 804 P.2d 928, 930-31 (Ct.App.1990). 2000Dopp, 129 Idaho at 606 , 930 P.2d at 1048 ; State v. Bruno, 119 Idaho 199, 201-02 , 804 P.2d 928, 930-31 (Ct.App.1990). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
United States v. Bagley
green
2 sentences1992A “reasonable probability” is *598 a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. at 3383 , 87 L.Ed.2d at 494 . 1992A “reasonable probability” is *598 a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. at 3383 , 87 L.Ed.2d at 494 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Aragon
green
2 sentences1992In making this analysis, the trial court relied on State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358 , 690 P.2d 293 (1984). 1992In making this analysis, the trial court relied on State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358 , 690 P.2d 293 (1984). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.