6 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1994–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mazzan v. Warden, Ely State Prisongreen1 sentence2016See Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48 , 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000) (reiterating that the three components to a successful Brady claim are "the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; the evidence was withheld by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently; and prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material"); Jimenez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 619 , 918 P.2d 687, 692 (1996) (stating the materiality standard where a defendant made no specific request for the evidence). | 1 | 1 |
Jimenez v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48 , 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000) (reiterating that the three components to a successful Brady claim are "the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; the evidence was withheld by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently; and prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material"); Jimenez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 619 , 918 P.2d 687, 692 (1996) (stating the materiality standard where a defendant made no specific request for the evidence). 2016See Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48 , 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000) (reiterating that the three components to a successful Brady claim are "the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; the evidence was withheld by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently; and prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material"); Jimenez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 619 , 918 P.2d 687, 692 (1996) (stating the materiality standard where a defendant made no specific request for the evidence). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hueblergreen2 sentences2014See id. at , 275 P.3d at 99 (discussing factors which may be considered when applying the materiality test). 2014See id. at , 275 P.3d at 99 (discussing factors which may be considered when applying the materiality test). | 1 | 1 |
Padilla v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2012The materiality test is a high bar, cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___ , ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 , 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) (describing ineffective-assistance test as "high bar"), that involves both a subjective and objective component. 2012The materiality test is a high bar, cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___ , ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 , 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) (describing ineffective-assistance test as "high bar"), that involves both a subjective and objective component. | 1 | 1 |
Javier Hincapie Sanchez v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2012We therefore adopt the materiality test set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez v. U.S., 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995), but we adhere to our decision in Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121 , 881 P.2d 1 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Foster v. State, 116 Nev. 1088 , 13 P.3d 61 (2000), to use separate materiality tests depending on whether there was a specific request by the defense. 2012We therefore adopt the materiality test set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez v. U.S., 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.1995), but we adhere to our decision in Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121 , 881 P.2d 1 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Foster v. State, 116 Nev. 1088 , 13 P.3d 61 (2000), to use separate materiality tests depending on whether there was a specific request by the defense. | 1 | 1 |
Molina v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 190 , 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004). 2012See Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 190 , 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sturgeongreen2 sentences2012State v. Sturgeon, 231 Wis.2d 487 , 605 N.W.2d 589, 596 (Wis.Ct.App.1999). [9] We *100 agree that these are relevant considerations, but we also emphasize that this is not an exhaustive list and that "[t]he particular case may present other relevant considerations." Id. 2012State v. Sturgeon, 231 Wis.2d 487 , 605 N.W.2d 589, 596 (Wis.Ct.App.1999). [9] We *100 agree that these are relevant considerations, but we also emphasize that this is not an exhaustive list and that "[t]he particular case may present other relevant considerations." Id. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Agursgreen1 sentence1994As the Supreme Court has stated, once an accused states a substantial basis for claiming materiality, “it is reasonable to require the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the problem to the trial judge.” Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Roberts v. State
green
2 sentences2012We therefore adopt the materiality test set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez v. U.S., 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.1995), but we adhere to our decision in Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121 , 881 P.2d 1 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Foster v. State, 116 Nev. 1088 , 13 P.3d 61 (2000), to use separate materiality tests depending on whether there was a specific request by the defense. 2012We therefore adopt the materiality test set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez v. U.S., 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.1995), but we adhere to our decision in Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121 , 881 P.2d 1 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Foster v. State, 116 Nev. 1088 , 13 P.3d 61 (2000), to use separate materiality tests depending on whether there was a specific request by the defense. | 2 | 1998–2012 |
Foster v. State
green
2 sentences2012We therefore adopt the materiality test set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez v. U.S., 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.1995), but we adhere to our decision in Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121 , 881 P.2d 1 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Foster v. State, 116 Nev. 1088 , 13 P.3d 61 (2000), to use separate materiality tests depending on whether there was a specific request by the defense. 2012We therefore adopt the materiality test set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez v. U.S., 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.1995), but we adhere to our decision in Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121 , 881 P.2d 1 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Foster v. State, 116 Nev. 1088 , 13 P.3d 61 (2000), to use separate materiality tests depending on whether there was a specific request by the defense. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Hill v. Lockhart
green
2 sentences2012Cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (holding that to establish prejudice prong of ineffective-assistance claim, defendant who pleaded guilty must demonstrate reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial). 2012Cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (holding that to establish prejudice prong of ineffective-assistance claim, defendant who pleaded guilty must demonstrate reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
1 sentence2009Wyman, on the other hand, argues that this court should adopt a materiality test that mirrors the materiality test under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.