materiality requirement (Oregon) · Go Syfert
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materiality requirement in Oregon

8 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2024 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
United States v. Bagleygreen
scotus · 1985 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010See Bagley, 473 US at 682 (plurality opinion); id. at 685 (White, J., concurring in part).

2010See Bagley, 473 US at 682 (plurality opinion); id. at 685 (White, J., concurring in part).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
State ex rel Rosenblum v. Living Essentials, LLC green
orctapp · 2024
2 sentences

2024Cite as 335 Or App 30 (2024) 57 As we have explained above, the Supreme Court later held that the UTPA does not contain a materiality requirement and remanded the case to us to consider the state’s additional arguments.

2024Cite as 335 Or App 30 (2024) 57 As we have explained above, the Supreme Court later held that the UTPA does not contain a materiality requirement and remanded the case to us to consider the state’s additional arguments.

22024–2024
State ex rel Rosenblum v. Living Essentials, LLC green
or · 2023
2 sentences

2024Living Essentials II, 371 Or at 44 .

2024Living Essentials II, 371 Or at 44 .

22024–2024
State ex rel Rosenblum v. Living Essentials, LLC green
orctapp · 2021
1 sentence

2023ORS 646.632(1) allows a prosecuting attorney to bring suit to restrain “unlawful trade practices,” and ORS 646.636 allows a court to order equitable relief to “restore” to a person money or property “of which the person was deprived” by means of an unlaw- ful practice or “as may be necessary to ensure cessation of unlawful trade practices.” The Court of Appeals reasoned that, in light of those provisions, “the UTPA ‘as a whole’ appears to envision that the acts to be remedied as unlaw- ful trade practices are ones that have affected consumers— in other words, ones that materially bear on consu

12023–2023
Santilli v. State Farm Life Insurance green
or · 1977
2 sentences

2021A false representation in the insurance applica- tion process “is material only if the insurer would not have accepted the application at the premium stated had a truth- ful answer been given.” Santilli v. State Farm, 278 Or 53, 57 , 562 P2d 965 (1977); see also Walker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.

2021A false representation in the insurance applica- tion process “is material only if the insurer would not have accepted the application at the premium stated had a truth- ful answer been given.” Santilli v. State Farm, 278 Or 53, 57 , 562 P2d 965 (1977); see also Walker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.

12021–2021
State v. Robertson green
or · 1982
2 sentences

2021Here, reading ORS 646.608(1)(b) and (e) as the state suggests—that is, without a materiality requirement— raises more than just a tenable possibility that the statute would run afoul of Article I, section 8.17 Under Article I, section 8, a statute “written in terms directed to the sub- stance of any ‘opinion’ or any ‘subject’ of communication” is invalid on its face, unless it fits “wholly * * * within some historical exception.” State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 412 , 649 P2d 569 (1982).

2021Here, reading ORS 646.608(1)(b) and (e) as the state suggests—that is, without a materiality requirement— raises more than just a tenable possibility that the statute would run afoul of Article I, section 8.17 Under Article I, section 8, a statute “written in terms directed to the sub- stance of any ‘opinion’ or any ‘subject’ of communication” is invalid on its face, unless it fits “wholly * * * within some historical exception.” State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 412 , 649 P2d 569 (1982).

12021–2021
Brecht v. Abrahamson green
scotus · 1993
2 sentences

2017However, as the Supreme Court explained in Kyles , there is no need for further harmless-error analysis once a Brady violation is established because the materiality test under Brady “necessarily entails” the harmless-error test set out in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 US 619 , 113 S Ct 1710 , 123 L Ed 2d 353 (1993).

2017However, as the Supreme Court explained in Kyles , there is no need for further harmless-error analysis once a Brady violation is established because the materiality test under Brady “necessarily entails” the harmless-error test set out in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 US 619 , 113 S Ct 1710 , 123 L Ed 2d 353 (1993).

12017–2017
Kyles v. Whitley green
scotus · 1995
1 sentence

2017Kyles, 514 US at 435 .

12017–2017
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal green
scotus · 1982
2 sentences

2010However, the Court stated that it had borrowed much of its reasoning with respect to the Compulsory Process Clause from cases involving the Due Process Clause and that it had “little difficulty holding that at least the same materiality requirement obtains with respect to a due process claim.” 458 US at 872 .

2010However, the Court stated that it had borrowed much of its reasoning with respect to the Compulsory Process Clause from cases involving the Due Process Clause and that it had “little difficulty holding that at least the same materiality requirement obtains with respect to a due process claim.” 458 US at 872 .

12010–2010
Lobato v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. green
orctapp · 1985
2 sentences

1985Lobato v. SAIF, 75 Or App 488 , 706 P2d 1025 (1985).

1985Lobato v. SAIF, 75 Or App 488 , 706 P2d 1025 (1985).

11985–1985

Statutes the citing opinions construe

OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.605 (4) OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.608 (4) OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.632 (4) OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.642 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 168 (1975–2026) CA 102 (1899–2026) DE 66 (1985–2026) IL 40 (1934–2026) PA 39 (1980–2026) MD 38 (1982–2025) VA 36 (1987–2026) NJ 28 (1963–2025) WA 25 (1983–2024) MI 22 (1971–2026) NY 22 (1851–2026) LA 20 (1982–2025) FL 19 (1985–2019) CO 18 (1983–2025) DC 17 (2001–2025) TN 17 (2000–2025) OH 17 (1987–2026) MO 17 (1986–2024) ID 14 (1985–2022) NC 14 (2006–2023) WI 13 (1978–2023) CT 11 (1960–2024) MN 9 (1982–2024) UT 8 (1991–2025) MS 8 (1987–2013) IN 8 (1988–2016) KS 8 (1961–2024) MA 8 (1985–2020) OR 8 (1985–2024) NV 6 (1994–2016) GA 6 (2021–2026) AL 5 (1989–2015) IA 5 (2011–2026) MT 5 (1998–2016) KY 5 (1982–2025) NE 4 (1998–2025) SC 4 (2004–2018) AZ 4 (1985–2018) SD 4 (2020–2025) HI 3 (2000–2023) ND 3 (1981–2016) WV 3 (1998–2018) WY 3 (1992–2025) RI 3 (1975–1998) VT 2 (1987–2001) NM 2 (1994–2025) ME 2 (2008–2013) OK 2 (2015–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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