9 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Heitman v. Cronstroms Manufacturing, Inc.green2 sentences2016See Heitman v. Cronstroms Mfg., Inc., 401 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn. App. 1987); see also Hansen, 412 N.W.2d at 323 . 2016See Heitman v. Cronstroms Mfg., Inc., 401 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn. App. 1987); see also Hansen, 412 N.W.2d at 323 . | 2 | 2 |
In Re Claim of Tilsethgreen2 sentences2016The materiality standard has its origins in Tilseth v. Midwest Lumber Co., 295 Minn. 372, 374-75 , 204 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn. 1973), a case we decided before the Legislature adopted a statutory definition of “employment misconduct.” Act of Apr. 23, 1997, ch. 66, § 49, 1997 Minn. Laws 357 , 387.7 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address issues not raised below); see also Travelers Indem. 2016The materiality standard has its origins in Tilseth v. Midwest Lumber Co., 295 Minn. 372, 374-75 , 204 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn. 1973), a case we decided before the Legislature adopted a statutory definition of “employment misconduct.” Act of Apr. 23, 1997, ch. 66, § 49, 1997 Minn. Laws 357 , 387.7 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address issues not raised below); see also Travelers Indem. | 2 | 2 |
Independent School District No. 709 v. Hansengreen2 sentences2016See Heitman v. Cronstroms Mfg., Inc., 401 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn. App. 1987); see also Hansen, 412 N.W.2d at 323 . 2016See Heitman v. Cronstroms Mfg., Inc., 401 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn. App. 1987); see also Hansen, 412 N.W.2d at 323 . | 2 | 2 |
Race v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Race v. State, 504 N.W.2d 214, 217-18 (Minn.1993). 2013We have held that for evidence to meet the materiality requirement it “must be credible.” Race v. State, 504 N.W.2d 214, 217-18 (Minn.1993). | 2 | 2 |
Rainer v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court determined that, because the witnesses who testified on Bobo’s behalf were not credible, the evidence that Bobo presented as newly discovered failed to satisfy the materiality requirement of the test announced in Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn.1997). 2015After considering the witnesses’ demeanor and the substance of their testimony, the post-conviction court found that, because D.T. and J.L. were not credible, Bobo failed to satisfy the materiality requirement of the newly discovered evidence test set forth in Rainer, 566 N.W.2d at 695 . 2 Having determined that Bobo failed to satisfy the Rainer test, the postconviction court explained that Bobo had necessarily failed to satisfy the more stringent statutory standard for newly discovered evidence set forth in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2) (2014). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hurdgreen1 sentence2010Gorman v. State, 619 N.W.2d 802, 805-06 (Minn.App.2000), rev. denied (Feb. 21, 2001); compare Hunt, 615 N.W.2d at 299 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 ) (requiring that a defendant show a reasonable probability that *218 the outcome at trial would have been different had the undisclosed evidence been produced), with Hurd, 763 N.W.2d at 34 (requiring that the defendant demonstrate that the evidence would probably have produced a more favorable outcome at trial). | 1 | 1 |
Gorman v. Stategreen1 sentence2010Gorman v. State, 619 N.W.2d 802, 805-06 (Minn.App.2000), rev. denied (Feb. 21, 2001); compare Hunt, 615 N.W.2d at 299 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 ) (requiring that a defendant show a reasonable probability that *218 the outcome at trial would have been different had the undisclosed evidence been produced), with Hurd, 763 N.W.2d at 34 (requiring that the defendant demonstrate that the evidence would probably have produced a more favorable outcome at trial). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Huntgreen1 sentence2010Gorman v. State, 619 N.W.2d 802, 805-06 (Minn.App.2000), rev. denied (Feb. 21, 2001); compare Hunt, 615 N.W.2d at 299 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 ) (requiring that a defendant show a reasonable probability that *218 the outcome at trial would have been different had the undisclosed evidence been produced), with Hurd, 763 N.W.2d at 34 (requiring that the defendant demonstrate that the evidence would probably have produced a more favorable outcome at trial). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bagleygreen2 sentences2010Gorman v. State, 619 N.W.2d 802, 805-06 (Minn.App.2000), rev. denied (Feb. 21, 2001); compare Hunt, 615 N.W.2d at 299 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 ) (requiring that a defendant show a reasonable probability that *218 the outcome at trial would have been different had the undisclosed evidence been produced), with Hurd, 763 N.W.2d at 34 (requiring that the defendant demonstrate that the evidence would probably have produced a more favorable outcome at trial). 2010Gorman v. State, 619 N.W.2d 802, 805-06 (Minn.App.2000), rev. denied (Feb. 21, 2001); compare Hunt, 615 N.W.2d at 299 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 ) (requiring that a defendant show a reasonable probability that *218 the outcome at trial would have been different had the undisclosed evidence been produced), with Hurd, 763 N.W.2d at 34 (requiring that the defendant demonstrate that the evidence would probably have produced a more favorable outcome at trial). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Powderly v. Ericksongreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., Archabal, 495 N.W.2d at 421-22; Urban Council on Mobility v. Minnesota Dep’t of Natural Resources, 289 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Minn.1980); State by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 87-88 (Minn.1979); PEER, 266 N.W.2d at 867-68 . 1997See, e.g., Archabal, 495 N.W.2d at 421-22; Urban Council on Mobility v. Minnesota Dep't of Natural Resources, 289 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Minn.1980); State by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 87-88 (Minn.1979); PEER, 266 N.W.2d at 867-68 . | 1 | 1 |
Urban Council on Mobility v. Minnesota Department of Natural Resourcesgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., Archabal, 495 N.W.2d at 421-22; Urban Council on Mobility v. Minnesota Dep’t of Natural Resources, 289 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Minn.1980); State by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 87-88 (Minn.1979); PEER, 266 N.W.2d at 867-68 . 1997See, e.g., Archabal, 495 N.W.2d at 421-22; Urban Council on Mobility v. Minnesota Dep't of Natural Resources, 289 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Minn.1980); State by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 87-88 (Minn.1979); PEER, 266 N.W.2d at 867-68 . | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1982See State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397 , 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967). [10] We cited a version of the Larrison rule in Whelan v. State, 298 Minn. 545 , 214 N.W.2d 344 (1972), in which we stated that a new trial should be granted in cases of recanted testimony "if (a) the defendant has acted with due diligence in seeking a new trial, and (b) the court is reasonably convinced that the witness has indeed recanted and that without this witness' perjured testimony at trial the jury might well have reached a different verdict." Id. at 545 , 214 N.W.2d at 344 ; see State v. Hill, 312 Minn. 514, 522 , 2 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corporationgreen1 sentence1982Therefore, even though the Larrison rule contains a less stringent materiality standard, new trials nevertheless will not be granted unless the court can be reasonably certain that the recantation is genuine. [8] "Might" has been said to mean "something more than an outside chance although much less than the `would probably' of the Berry rule." Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 512 (2d Cir. 1961). [9] We do not feel the need to reach the constitutional issue of whether this may amount to a denial of due process; instead, our decision is based on our conclusion that the denial of a new trial | 1 | 1 |
Alastair Kyle v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1982“Might” has been said to mean “something more than an outside chance although much less than the ‘would probably’ of the Berry rule.” Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 512 (2d Cir. 1961). . 1982Therefore, even though the Larrison rule contains a less stringent materiality standard, new trials nevertheless will not be granted unless the court can be reasonably certain that the recantation is genuine. [8] "Might" has been said to mean "something more than an outside chance although much less than the `would probably' of the Berry rule." Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 512 (2d Cir. 1961). [9] We do not feel the need to reach the constitutional issue of whether this may amount to a denial of due process; instead, our decision is based on our conclusion that the denial of a new trial | 1 | 1 |
State v. Borstgreen2 sentences1982See State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397 , 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967). [10] We cited a version of the Larrison rule in Whelan v. State, 298 Minn. 545 , 214 N.W.2d 344 (1972), in which we stated that a new trial should be granted in cases of recanted testimony "if (a) the defendant has acted with due diligence in seeking a new trial, and (b) the court is reasonably convinced that the witness has indeed recanted and that without this witness' perjured testimony at trial the jury might well have reached a different verdict." Id. at 545 , 214 N.W.2d at 344 ; see State v. Hill, 312 Minn. 514, 522 , 2 1982See State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397 , 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967). [10] We cited a version of the Larrison rule in Whelan v. State, 298 Minn. 545 , 214 N.W.2d 344 (1972), in which we stated that a new trial should be granted in cases of recanted testimony "if (a) the defendant has acted with due diligence in seeking a new trial, and (b) the court is reasonably convinced that the witness has indeed recanted and that without this witness' perjured testimony at trial the jury might well have reached a different verdict." Id. at 545 , 214 N.W.2d at 344 ; see State v. Hill, 312 Minn. 514, 522 , 2 | 1 | 1 |
Whelan v. Stategreen2 sentences1982See State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397 , 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967). [10] We cited a version of the Larrison rule in Whelan v. State, 298 Minn. 545 , 214 N.W.2d 344 (1972), in which we stated that a new trial should be granted in cases of recanted testimony "if (a) the defendant has acted with due diligence in seeking a new trial, and (b) the court is reasonably convinced that the witness has indeed recanted and that without this witness' perjured testimony at trial the jury might well have reached a different verdict." Id. at 545 , 214 N.W.2d at 344 ; see State v. Hill, 312 Minn. 514, 522 , 2 1982See State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397 , 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967). [10] We cited a version of the Larrison rule in Whelan v. State, 298 Minn. 545 , 214 N.W.2d 344 (1972), in which we stated that a new trial should be granted in cases of recanted testimony "if (a) the defendant has acted with due diligence in seeking a new trial, and (b) the court is reasonably convinced that the witness has indeed recanted and that without this witness' perjured testimony at trial the jury might well have reached a different verdict." Id. at 545 , 214 N.W.2d at 344 ; see State v. Hill, 312 Minn. 514, 522 , 2 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hillgreen2 sentences1982See State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397 , 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967). [10] We cited a version of the Larrison rule in Whelan v. State, 298 Minn. 545 , 214 N.W.2d 344 (1972), in which we stated that a new trial should be granted in cases of recanted testimony "if (a) the defendant has acted with due diligence in seeking a new trial, and (b) the court is reasonably convinced that the witness has indeed recanted and that without this witness' perjured testimony at trial the jury might well have reached a different verdict." Id. at 545 , 214 N.W.2d at 344 ; see State v. Hill, 312 Minn. 514, 522 , 2 1982See State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397 , 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967). [10] We cited a version of the Larrison rule in Whelan v. State, 298 Minn. 545 , 214 N.W.2d 344 (1972), in which we stated that a new trial should be granted in cases of recanted testimony "if (a) the defendant has acted with due diligence in seeking a new trial, and (b) the court is reasonably convinced that the witness has indeed recanted and that without this witness' perjured testimony at trial the jury might well have reached a different verdict." Id. at 545 , 214 N.W.2d at 344 ; see State v. Hill, 312 Minn. 514, 522 , 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tilseth v. Midwest Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences2016The materiality standard has its origins in Tilseth v. Midwest Lumber Co., 295 Minn. 372, 374-75 , 204 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn. 1973), a case we decided before the Legislature adopted a statutory definition of “employment misconduct.” Act of Apr. 23, 1997, ch. 66, § 49, 1997 Minn. Laws 357 , 387.7 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address issues not raised below); see also Travelers Indem. 2016The materiality standard has its origins in Tilseth v. Midwest Lumber Co., 295 Minn. 372, 374-75 , 204 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn. 1973), a case we decided before the Legislature adopted a statutory definition of “employment misconduct.” Act of Apr. 23, 1997, ch. 66, § 49, 1997 Minn. Laws 357 , 387.7 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address issues not raised below); see also Travelers Indem. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bloomington Steel & Supply Co.
green
2 sentences2016Co. v. Bloomington Steel & Supply Co., 718 N.W.2d 888 , 898 n.7 (Minn. 2006) (declining to reach issues raised in the amicus curiae brief because they were not decided by the lower courts). 2016Co. v. Bloomington Steel & Supply Co., 718 N.W.2d 888 , 898 n.7 (Minn. 2006) (declining to reach issues raised in the amicus curiae brief because they were not decided by the lower courts). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Walen v. State
green
1 sentence2024Because the materiality analysis “involves a mixed issue of fact and law, we review a district court’s materiality determination de novo.” Walen, 777 N.W.2d at 216 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People for Environmental Enlightenment & Responsibility (PEER), Inc. v. Minnesota Environmental Quality Council
green
2 sentences1997See, e.g., Archabal, 495 N.W.2d at 421-22; Urban Council on Mobility v. Minnesota Dep’t of Natural Resources, 289 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Minn.1980); State by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 87-88 (Minn.1979); PEER, 266 N.W.2d at 867-68 . 1997See, e.g., Archabal, 495 N.W.2d at 421-22; Urban Council on Mobility v. Minnesota Dep't of Natural Resources, 289 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Minn.1980); State by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 87-88 (Minn.1979); PEER, 266 N.W.2d at 867-68 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie
green
2 sentences1990It then cited Brady and Agurs , conducted a materiality analysis, and remanded for an in-camera inspection of the questioned evidence to determine whether it contained information that “probably would have changed the outcome of his trial.” Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57-58 , 107 S.Ct. at 1001-02 . 1990It then cited Brady and Agurs , conducted a materiality analysis, and remanded for an in-camera inspection of the questioned evidence to determine whether it contained information that “probably would have changed the outcome of his trial.” Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57-58 , 107 S.Ct. at 1001-02 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal
green
2 sentences1990Since we cannot say either that access to the documents would produce a “reasonable doubt” about the conviction or that appellant’s discovery request does not constitute a “fishing expedition,” we cannot conclude that discovery of documents relating to days when no theft is alleged to have taken place would “probably have changed the outcome of the trial.” See United States v. ValenzuelaBernal, 458 U.S. 858, 868 , 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3447 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). 1990Since we cannot say either that access to the documents would produce a “reasonable doubt” about the conviction or that appellant’s discovery request does not constitute a “fishing expedition,” we cannot conclude that discovery of documents relating to days when no theft is alleged to have taken place would “probably have changed the outcome of the trial.” See United States v. ValenzuelaBernal, 458 U.S. 858, 868 , 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3447 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.