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20 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kyles v. Whitleygreen2 sentences2017See In the Matter of Attorney C, 47 P. 3d 1167 (Co. 2002) (finding Colorado version of the rule aligned with Brady and adopting a materiality standard to avoid imposing “inconsistent obligations upon prosecutors”); Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg- 4 In a footnote, the Cousin court, in an opinion by Justice Lemmon, stated: The prosecutor did not disclose this obviously exculpatory statement to the defense prior to trial, as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). 2017See In the Matter of Attorney C, 47 P. 3d 1167 (Co. 2002) (finding Colorado version of the rule aligned with Brady and adopting a materiality standard to avoid imposing “inconsistent obligations upon prosecutors”); Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg- 4 In a footnote, the Cousin court, in an opinion by Justice Lemmon, stated: The prosecutor did not disclose this obviously exculpatory statement to the defense prior to trial, as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). | 1 | 6 |
United States v. Bagleyred2 sentences2025In effect, this materiality standard requires “ ‘ “the beneficiary of [the] constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ’ ” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680, n.9 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (quoting Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18 , 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). 2025In effect, this materiality standard requires “ ‘ “the beneficiary of [the] constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ’ ” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680, n.9 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (quoting Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18 , 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). | 1 | 4 |
Hondroulis v. Schuhmachergreen2 sentences2008While the trial court correctly recognized that expert testimony is not required for the second portion of the materiality inquiry which encompasses whether a person in the plaintiff's position would attach significance to a particular risk, see Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So.2d 398 (La.1988); Pinnick, supra ; Yuska, supra, expert testimony is required for the first prong of the inquiry, which entails a definition of *726 the existence and nature of the risk and the likelihood of its occurrence. 2001The first part of the materiality test is "the existence and nature of the risk and the likelihood of its occurrence." In Hondroulis , we held that "`[s]ome' expert testimony is necessary to establish this aspect of materiality because only a physician or other qualified expert is capable of judging what risk exists and the likelihood of occurrence." 553 So.2d at 412 . | 1 | 4 |
United States v. Agursred2 sentences2025See 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 , 112–113, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397 , 2401–02, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)); see also Johnson v. Scott, 68 F.3d 106 , 109–10 (5th Cir. 1995). 4 even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.”). 2025See 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 , 112–113, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397 , 2401–02, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)); see also Johnson v. Scott, 68 F.3d 106 , 109–10 (5th Cir. 1995). 4 even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.”). | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. Scottgreen1 sentence2025See 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 , 112–113, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397 , 2401–02, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)); see also Johnson v. Scott, 68 F.3d 106 , 109–10 (5th Cir. 1995). 4 even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.”). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2025Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (“The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, 1 The familiar materiality standard of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 1196– 97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), is identical to the Strickland prejudice test. 2025Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (“The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, 1 The familiar materiality standard of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 1196– 97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), is identical to the Strickland prejudice test. | 1 | 1 |
LaCaze v. Warden Louisiana Correctional Institute for Womengreen1 sentence2024See, LaCaze, 645 F.3d at 736 (“The materiality inquiry does not turn on which of two competing sources of bias a court, in hindsight, determines the jury would have considered more important.”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Attorney Cgreen2 sentences2017See In the Matter of Attorney C , 47 P.3d 1167 (Co. 2002) (finding Colorado version of the rule aligned with Brady and adopting a materiality standard to avoid imposing "inconsistent obligations upon prosecutors"); Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin , 124 Ohio St.3d 415 , 923 N.E.2d 125 (Ohio 2010) (declining to construe Ohio version of the rule as requiring a greater scope of disclosure than Brady out of concern it would "threaten prosecutors with professional discipline for failing to disclose evidence even when the applicable law does not require disclosure"); In re: Riek , 350 Wis.2d 6 2017See In the Matter of Attorney C, 47 P. 3d 1167 (Co. 2002) (finding Colorado version of the rule aligned with Brady and adopting a materiality standard to avoid imposing “inconsistent obligations upon prosecutors”); Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg- 4 In a footnote, the Cousin court, in an opinion by Justice Lemmon, stated: The prosecutor did not disclose this obviously exculpatory statement to the defense prior to trial, as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martingreen2 sentences2017See In the Matter of Attorney C , 47 P.3d 1167 (Co. 2002) (finding Colorado version of the rule aligned with Brady and adopting a materiality standard to avoid imposing "inconsistent obligations upon prosecutors"); Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin , 124 Ohio St.3d 415 , 923 N.E.2d 125 (Ohio 2010) (declining to construe Ohio version of the rule as requiring a greater scope of disclosure than Brady out of concern it would "threaten prosecutors with professional discipline for failing to disclose evidence even when the applicable law does not require disclosure"); In re: Riek , 350 Wis.2d 6 2017See In the Matter of Attorney C , 47 P.3d 1167 (Co. 2002) (finding Colorado version of the rule aligned with Brady and adopting a materiality standard to avoid imposing "inconsistent obligations upon prosecutors"); Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin , 124 Ohio St.3d 415 , 923 N.E.2d 125 (Ohio 2010) (declining to construe Ohio version of the rule as requiring a greater scope of disclosure than Brady out of concern it would "threaten prosecutors with professional discipline for failing to disclose evidence even when the applicable law does not require disclosure"); In re: Riek , 350 Wis.2d 6 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2025Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (“The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, 1 The familiar materiality standard of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 1196– 97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), is identical to the Strickland prejudice test. 2025Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (“The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, 1 The familiar materiality standard of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 1196– 97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), is identical to the Strickland prejudice test. | 2 | 2017–2025 |
State v. Marshall
green
2 sentences2009Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); State v. Marshall, 94-0461 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 819 . 2000Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); State v. Marshall, 94-0461 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 819 . | 2 | 2000–2009 |
Chapman v. California
yellow
2 sentences2025In effect, this materiality standard requires “ ‘ “the beneficiary of [the] constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ’ ” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680, n.9 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (quoting Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18 , 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). 2025In effect, this materiality standard requires “ ‘ “the beneficiary of [the] constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ’ ” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680, n.9 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (quoting Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18 , 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Sharon A. Riek
green
2 sentences2017See In the Matter of Attorney C , 47 P.3d 1167 (Co. 2002) (finding Colorado version of the rule aligned with Brady and adopting a materiality standard to avoid imposing "inconsistent obligations upon prosecutors"); Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin , 124 Ohio St.3d 415 , 923 N.E.2d 125 (Ohio 2010) (declining to construe Ohio version of the rule as requiring a greater scope of disclosure than Brady out of concern it would "threaten prosecutors with professional discipline for failing to disclose evidence even when the applicable law does not require disclosure"); In re: Riek , 350 Wis.2d 6 2017See In the Matter of Attorney C , 47 P.3d 1167 (Co. 2002) (finding Colorado version of the rule aligned with Brady and adopting a materiality standard to avoid imposing "inconsistent obligations upon prosecutors"); Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin , 124 Ohio St.3d 415 , 923 N.E.2d 125 (Ohio 2010) (declining to construe Ohio version of the rule as requiring a greater scope of disclosure than Brady out of concern it would "threaten prosecutors with professional discipline for failing to disclose evidence even when the applicable law does not require disclosure"); In re: Riek , 350 Wis.2d 6 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. WARD
green
1 sentence2017Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Ward , 353 P.3d 509 (2015) (construing Oklahoma version of rule as "consistent with the scope of disclosure required by applicable law"). 7 As these other courts have found, 8 under conflicting standards, prosecutors would face uncertainty as to how to proceed, as they could find themselves in compliance with the standard enumerated in Brady , but in potential violation of the obligation set forth in Rule 3.8(d). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Brandt v. Engle
green
1 sentence2008Brandt, supra ; Hondroulis, supra ; Pinnick, supra . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Thibodeaux v. Jurgelsky
green
1 sentence2008Thibodeaux v. Jurgelsky, 898 So. 2d at 314 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Strickler v. Greene
green
2 sentences2002For purposes of ensuring that a defendant's constitutional rights are protected, suppressed evidence is material if its inclusion would establish that "`there is a reasonable probability ' that the result of the trial would have been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense." Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 . 2002For purposes of ensuring that a defendant's constitutional rights are protected, suppressed evidence is material if its inclusion would establish that "`there is a reasonable probability ' that the result of the trial would have been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense." Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
LaCaze v. Collier
green
2 sentences2001Neither is Ms. Meisner's testimony admissible to prove the second part of the materiality test, which, under Hondroulis , is whether a reasonable person in the patient's position probably would attach significance to the specific risk, because Ms. Meisner was not "a reasonable person in the patient's position." [2] This Court has specifically adopted an objective standard of causation, i.e., "whether a reasonable patient in the plaintiff's position would have consented to the treatment or procedure had the material information and risks been disclosed." Hondroulis, supra; LaCaze v. Collier, su 2001Neither is Ms. Meisner's testimony admissible to prove the second part of the materiality test, which, under Hondroulis , is whether a reasonable person in the patient's position probably would attach significance to the specific risk, because Ms. Meisner was not "a reasonable person in the patient's position." [2] This Court has specifically adopted an objective standard of causation, i.e., "whether a reasonable patient in the plaintiff's position would have consented to the treatment or procedure had the material information and risks been disclosed." Hondroulis, supra; LaCaze v. Collier, su | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Johnson
neutral
1 sentence1987Thus, under the materiality test, elucidated in Johnson, supra, another person’s mo-dus operandi as stated in written police reports might have affected the jury’s verdict. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Sylvester
green
1 sentence1984State v. Sylvester , 388 So.2d at 1161 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.