materiality standard in Maryland

2003In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), the Supreme Court explained the materiality standard under Brady , in relation to impeachment evidence.

2003In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), the Supreme Court explained the materiality standard under Brady , in relation to impeachment evidence.

2023As we noted in Yearby, the Supreme Court has explained that the “reasonable probability” standard for proving prejudice under Strickland and materiality under Brady are the same. 414 Md. at 718 & n.6 (comparing the materiality standard described in Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 , with the prejudice standard described in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).

2022The materiality analysis is “identical” to materiality claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): whether the newly discovered evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).

2022The materiality analysis is “identical” to materiality claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): whether the newly discovered evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).

2022The materiality analysis is “identical” to materiality claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): whether the newly discovered evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).

2012Among the factors the Court considers are “the materiality of the error in the context in which it arose, giving due regard to whether the error was purely technical, the product of conscious design or trial tactics or the result of bald inattention.” Id.

2011Factors to consider in that determination include "the materiality of the error in the context in which it arose, giving due regard to whether the error was purely technical, the product of conscious design or trial tactics or the result of bald inattention." Id., 411 A.2d at 1038 .

2023As we noted in Yearby, the Supreme Court has explained that the “reasonable probability” standard for proving prejudice under Strickland and materiality under Brady are the same. 414 Md. at 718 & n.6 (comparing the materiality standard described in Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 , with the prejudice standard described in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).

2022The materiality analysis is “identical” to materiality claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): whether the newly discovered evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).

2022The third prong requires a materiality analysis under a standard that “falls between ‘probable,’ which is less demanding than ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ and ‘might,’ which is less stringent than ‘probable.’” Faulkner, 468 Md. at 460 , 227 A.3d at 608 (quoting McGhie v. State, 449 Md. 494, 510 , 144 A.3d 752, 762 (2016)).

2022The third prong requires a materiality analysis under a standard that “falls between ‘probable,’ which is less demanding than ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ and ‘might,’ which is less stringent than ‘probable.’” Faulkner, 468 Md. at 460 , 227 A.3d at 608 (quoting McGhie v. State, 449 Md. 494, 510 , 144 A.3d 752, 762 (2016)).

2022The third prong requires a materiality analysis under a standard that “falls between ‘probable,’ which is less demanding than ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ and ‘might,’ which is less stringent than ‘probable.’” Faulkner, 468 Md. at 460 , 227 A.3d at 608 (quoting McGhie v. State, 449 Md. 494, 510 , 144 A.3d 752, 762 (2016)).

2022The third prong requires a materiality analysis under a standard that “falls between ‘probable,’ which is less demanding than ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ and ‘might,’ which is less stringent than ‘probable.’” Faulkner, 468 Md. at 460 , 227 A.3d at 608 (quoting McGhie v. State, 449 Md. 494, 510 , 144 A.3d 752, 762 (2016)).

2022To meet this standard, the cumulative effect of newly discovered evidence, viewed in the context of the entire record, must “undermine confidence in the verdict.” See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 , 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1952 (1999) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 , 11 In Smallwood v. State, this Court clarified that “actual innocence” means “the defendant did not commit the crime or offense for which he or she was convicted.” 451 Md. 290, 313 , 152 A.3d 776, 789 (2017). 16 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995)); see also Faulkner, 468 Md. at 463 , 227 A.3d at 610 (holding that the cumu

2022To meet this standard, the cumulative effect of newly discovered evidence, viewed in the context of the entire record, must “undermine confidence in the verdict.” See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 , 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1952 (1999) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 , 11 In Smallwood v. State, this Court clarified that “actual innocence” means “the defendant did not commit the crime or offense for which he or she was convicted.” 451 Md. 290, 313 , 152 A.3d 776, 789 (2017). 16 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995)); see also Faulkner, 468 Md. at 463 , 227 A.3d at 610 (holding that the cumu

2009In that regard, we “review the materiality of the error in the context in which it arose, giving due regard to whether the error was purely technical, the product of conscious design or trial tactics or the result of bald inattention.” Id.

2009In that regard, we "review the materiality of the error in the context in which it arose, giving due regard to whether the error was purely technical, the product of conscious design or trial tactics or the result of bald inattention." Id.

2010The Supreme Court has further explicated the materiality standard, explaining that it is essentially the same test as set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), in determining whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a constitutional violation affecting his right to a fair trial. 6 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. at *719 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d at 494 (Blackmun, J., plurality).

2010The Supreme Court has further explicated the materiality standard, explaining that it is essentially the same test as set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), in determining whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a constitutional violation affecting his right to a fair trial. 6 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. at *719 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d at 494 (Blackmun, J., plurality).

2010In each case, we will ‘review the materiality of the error in the context in which it arose, giving due regard to whether the error was purely technical, the product of conscious design or trial tactics or the result of bald inattention.’ Hutchinson, 287 Md. at 203 , 411 A.2d [at] 1038.” Diggs v. State, 409 Md. 260, 286-87 , 973 A.2d 796, 811 (2009).

2010In each case, we will ‘review the materiality of the error in the context in which it arose, giving due regard to whether the error was purely technical, the product of conscious design or trial tactics or the result of bald inattention.’ Hutchinson, 287 Md. at 203 , 411 A.2d [at] 1038.” Diggs v. State, 409 Md. 260, 286-87 , 973 A.2d 796, 811 (2009).

2025See Cromartie v. State, 490 Md. 297 , 310 (2025) (assuming without deciding that the petitioner’s “objection encompassed the ground of improper lay witness identification testimony[]”); Blake v. State, 485 Md. 265, 306 (2023) (“Given that the same legal standard applies to the prejudice prong when analyzing an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland and the materiality standard necessary to establish a Brady violation, we assume, without deciding, that the State was required to disclose impeachment evidence prior to the suppression hearing[] . . . .”); Alarcon-Ozoria v. State, 477 Md. 75

2025See Cromartie v. State, 490 Md. 297 , 310 (2025) (assuming without deciding that the petitioner’s “objection encompassed the ground of improper lay witness identification testimony[]”); Blake v. State, 485 Md. 265, 306 (2023) (“Given that the same legal standard applies to the prejudice prong when analyzing an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland and the materiality standard necessary to establish a Brady violation, we assume, without deciding, that the State was required to disclose impeachment evidence prior to the suppression hearing[] . . . .”); Alarcon-Ozoria v. State, 477 Md. 75

2021See Jackson v. State, 214 Md. 454, 459 (1957) (citing Harris v. State, 141 Md. 526, 530 (1922)) (emphasizing that the “party requesting the continuance should show: . . . that the evidence was competent and material”).

2021See Jackson v. State, 214 Md. 454, 459 (1957) (citing Harris v. State, 141 Md. 526, 530 (1922)) (emphasizing that the “party requesting the continuance should show: . . . that the evidence was competent and material”).

2020A logical corollary of the least sophisticated consumer test is that false, deceptive, and misleading statements must be material to be actionable. *** The materiality requirement limits liability under the FDCPA to genuinely false or misleading statements that “may frustrate a consumer's ability to intelligently choose his or her response.” Donohue, 592 F.3d at 1034; see also Hahn, 557 F.3d at 758(“The statute is designed to provide information that helps consumers to choose intelligently ...”).

2010Id. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. at 2397 , 49 L.Ed.2d at 350 ; see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763, 766 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104, 108 (1972) ("A new trial is required if 'the false testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury____’”) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 , 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1178 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, 1222 (1959)) (emphasis added).

2010Id. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. at 2397 , 49 L.Ed.2d at 350 ; see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763, 766 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104, 108 (1972) ("A new trial is required if 'the false testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury____’”) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 , 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1178 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, 1222 (1959)) (emphasis added).

2010In Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 522 , 966 A.2d 925, 936 (2009), we reaffirmed the existence of a different materiality standard in cases where "the facts demonstrate that the prosecution’s case included perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew or should have known of the perjury.” See also State v. Williams, 392 Md. *718 194, 203 n. 4, 229 n. 12, 896 A.2d 973 , 978 n. 4, 993 n. 12 (2006); Grandison v. State, 390 Md. 412, 431 , 889 A.2d 366, 377 (2005); Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 598 , 790 A.2d 15, 31 (2002). 6 .

2010In Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 522 , 966 A.2d 925, 936 (2009), we reaffirmed the existence of a different materiality standard in cases where "the facts demonstrate that the prosecution’s case included perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew or should have known of the perjury.” See also State v. Williams, 392 Md. *718 194, 203 n. 4, 229 n. 12, 896 A.2d 973 , 978 n. 4, 993 n. 12 (2006); Grandison v. State, 390 Md. 412, 431 , 889 A.2d 366, 377 (2005); Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 598 , 790 A.2d 15, 31 (2002). 6 .

2010Id. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. at 2397 , 49 L.Ed.2d at 350 ; see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763, 766 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104, 108 (1972) ("A new trial is required if 'the false testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury____’”) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 , 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1178 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, 1222 (1959)) (emphasis added).

2010Id. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. at 2397 , 49 L.Ed.2d at 350 ; see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763, 766 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104, 108 (1972) ("A new trial is required if 'the false testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury____’”) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 , 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1178 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, 1222 (1959)) (emphasis added).

2010In Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 522 , 966 A.2d 925, 936 (2009), we reaffirmed the existence of a different materiality standard in cases where "the facts demonstrate that the prosecution’s case included perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew or should have known of the perjury.” See also State v. Williams, 392 Md. *718 194, 203 n. 4, 229 n. 12, 896 A.2d 973 , 978 n. 4, 993 n. 12 (2006); Grandison v. State, 390 Md. 412, 431 , 889 A.2d 366, 377 (2005); Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 598 , 790 A.2d 15, 31 (2002). 6 .

2010In Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 522 , 966 A.2d 925, 936 (2009), we reaffirmed the existence of a different materiality standard in cases where "the facts demonstrate that the prosecution’s case included perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew or should have known of the perjury.” See also State v. Williams, 392 Md. *718 194, 203 n. 4, 229 n. 12, 896 A.2d 973 , 978 n. 4, 993 n. 12 (2006); Grandison v. State, 390 Md. 412, 431 , 889 A.2d 366, 377 (2005); Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 598 , 790 A.2d 15, 31 (2002). 6 .

2010In Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 522 , 966 A.2d 925, 936 (2009), we reaffirmed the existence of a different materiality standard in cases where "the facts demonstrate that the prosecution’s case included perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew or should have known of the perjury.” See also State v. Williams, 392 Md. *718 194, 203 n. 4, 229 n. 12, 896 A.2d 973 , 978 n. 4, 993 n. 12 (2006); Grandison v. State, 390 Md. 412, 431 , 889 A.2d 366, 377 (2005); Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 598 , 790 A.2d 15, 31 (2002). 6 .

2010In Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 522 , 966 A.2d 925, 936 (2009), we reaffirmed the existence of a different materiality standard in cases where "the facts demonstrate that the prosecution’s case included perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew or should have known of the perjury.” See also State v. Williams, 392 Md. *718 194, 203 n. 4, 229 n. 12, 896 A.2d 973 , 978 n. 4, 993 n. 12 (2006); Grandison v. State, 390 Md. 412, 431 , 889 A.2d 366, 377 (2005); Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 598 , 790 A.2d 15, 31 (2002). 6 .