8 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dan Weaver v. George Niederkorngreen1 sentence2016Weaver v. Niederkorn, 9 N.E.3d 220, 222 (Ind.Ct.App.2014). [56] Because there was no offer or agreement between the State and Rickey, we also conclude Tibbs “fails to meet the materiality requirement, thereby defeating both the initial claim of newly discovered evidence and the claim of a Brady violation.” Kubsch, 934 N.E.2d at 1145 . | 1 | 1 |
Albright v. Olivergreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 274 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 807, 813 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114, 124 (1994) (stating that both sets of cases collectively “deal[ ] with the defendant’s right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment” (citations omitted)); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2531 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413, 420 (1984) (characterizing both lines of cases as a “group of constitutional privileges”); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 220 and n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 88 (1982) (noting that both lines of cases contain the s 1998See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 274 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 807, 813 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114, 124 (1994) (stating that both sets of cases collectively “deal[ ] with the defendant’s right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment” (citations omitted)); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2531 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413, 420 (1984) (characterizing both lines of cases as a “group of constitutional privileges”); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 220 and n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 88 (1982) (noting that both lines of cases contain the s | 1 | 1 |
California v. Trombettagreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 274 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 807, 813 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114, 124 (1994) (stating that both sets of cases collectively “deal[ ] with the defendant’s right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment” (citations omitted)); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2531 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413, 420 (1984) (characterizing both lines of cases as a “group of constitutional privileges”); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 220 and n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 88 (1982) (noting that both lines of cases contain the s 1998See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 274 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 807, 813 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114, 124 (1994) (stating that both sets of cases collectively “deal[ ] with the defendant’s right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment” (citations omitted)); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2531 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413, 420 (1984) (characterizing both lines of cases as a “group of constitutional privileges”); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 220 and n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 88 (1982) (noting that both lines of cases contain the s | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 274 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 807, 813 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114, 124 (1994) (stating that both sets of cases collectively “deal[ ] with the defendant’s right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment” (citations omitted)); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2531 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413, 420 (1984) (characterizing both lines of cases as a “group of constitutional privileges”); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 220 and n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 88 (1982) (noting that both lines of cases contain the s 1998See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 274 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 807, 813 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114, 124 (1994) (stating that both sets of cases collectively “deal[ ] with the defendant’s right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment” (citations omitted)); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2531 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413, 420 (1984) (characterizing both lines of cases as a “group of constitutional privileges”); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 220 and n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 88 (1982) (noting that both lines of cases contain the s | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kyles v. Whitley
green
2 sentences2000We held in Harrison that, “Neither the application for a reward ... nor the recommendation by the detective is sufficiently probative to satisfy the materiality standard of Bagley.” Id. 2000In other words, we determine whether “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34 , 115 S.Ct. at 1565 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 505 . | 3 | 1998–2000 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2011Id. 2011Id. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Kubsch v. State
green
1 sentence2016Weaver v. Niederkorn, 9 N.E.3d 220, 222 (Ind.Ct.App.2014). [56] Because there was no offer or agreement between the State and Rickey, we also conclude Tibbs “fails to meet the materiality requirement, thereby defeating both the initial claim of newly discovered evidence and the claim of a Brady violation.” Kubsch, 934 N.E.2d at 1145 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Peter S. Dimas and Ramon Roman
green
1 sentence1998We will therefore treat these claims together. *756 Citing United States v. Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir.1993), and United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365 (7th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 999 , 116 S.Ct. 540 , 133 L.Ed.2d 444 , [4] the defendant contends that we should not take into consideration any facts which were discovered after his trial. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. Dickson Veras
green
1 sentence1998We will therefore treat these claims together. *756 Citing United States v. Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir.1993), and United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365 (7th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 999 , 116 S.Ct. 540 , 133 L.Ed.2d 444 , [4] the defendant contends that we should not take into consideration any facts which were discovered after his trial. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Smith v. United States
green
1 sentence1998We will therefore treat these claims together. *756 Citing United States v. Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir.1993), and United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365 (7th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 999 , 116 S.Ct. 540 , 133 L.Ed.2d 444 , [4] the defendant contends that we should not take into consideration any facts which were discovered after his trial. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Bennett v. United States
green
1 sentence1998We will therefore treat these claims together. *756 Citing United States v. Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir.1993), and United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365 (7th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 999 , 116 S.Ct. 540 , 133 L.Ed.2d 444 , [4] the defendant contends that we should not take into consideration any facts which were discovered after his trial. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Michon v. United States
green
1 sentence1998We will therefore treat these claims together. *756 Citing United States v. Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir.1993), and United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365 (7th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 999 , 116 S.Ct. 540 , 133 L.Ed.2d 444 , [4] the defendant contends that we should not take into consideration any facts which were discovered after his trial. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. Bagley
green
2 sentences1998More recently, in United States v. Bagley, the Court applied a materiality standard for favorable evidence and held that “evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 473 U.S. 667, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383-3384 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). 1998More recently, in United States v. Bagley, the Court applied a materiality standard for favorable evidence and held that “evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 473 U.S. 667, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383-3384 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Richardson v. State
green
2 sentences1988The materiality requirement is not limited to trials but has been considered applicable to grand jury proceedings, Richardson v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 655 , 266 N.E.2d 51 ; Kellis, supra, to sworn statements made to police, Wilke, supra, and to sworn responses to questionnaires submitted by bidders for public works projects. 1988The materiality requirement is not limited to trials but has been considered applicable to grand jury proceedings, Richardson v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 655 , 266 N.E.2d 51 ; Kellis, supra, to sworn statements made to police, Wilke, supra, and to sworn responses to questionnaires submitted by bidders for public works projects. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Zordani v. State
green
2 sentences1988Zordani v. State (1978), 175 Ind.App. 297 , 371 N.E.2d 396 . 1988Zordani v. State (1978), 175 Ind.App. 297 , 371 N.E.2d 396 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Wilke v. State
green
1 sentence1988The materiality requirement is not limited to trials but has been considered applicable to grand jury proceedings, Richardson v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 655 , 266 N.E.2d 51 ; Kellis, supra, to sworn statements made to police, Wilke, supra, and to sworn responses to questionnaires submitted by bidders for public works projects. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.