materiality requirement in Washington

2023It held that implicit in the requirement of materiality in these constitutionally- guaranteed access to evidence cases “‘is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial.’” Id. at 868 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 , 96 S. Ct. 2392 , 49 L.

2023It held that implicit in the requirement of materiality in these constitutionally- guaranteed access to evidence cases “‘is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial.’” Id. at 868 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 , 96 S. Ct. 2392 , 49 L.

2019In State v. Mullen, 171 Wn.2d 881 , 259 P.3d 158 (2011), our Supreme Court expressly recognized that the Brady materiality standard is different than the materiality standard set out in CrR 7.5(a)(3), k1. at 905-06, because Brady does not require a defendant to demonstrate that “the evidence if disclosed probably would have resulted in acquittal,” at 894 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 , 105 S. Ct. 3375 , 87 L.

2019In State v. Mullen, 171 Wn.2d 881 , 259 P.3d 158 (2011), our Supreme Court expressly recognized that the Brady materiality standard is different than the materiality standard set out in CrR 7.5(a)(3), k1. at 905-06, because Brady does not require a defendant to demonstrate that “the evidence if disclosed probably would have resulted in acquittal,” at 894 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 , 105 S. Ct. 3375 , 87 L.

2014The rule does not govern a petitioner’s burden in a PRP. ¶26 Finally, Stockwell argues that we are precluded from applying the actual and substantial prejudice standard because it would require a materiality inquiry that was rejected under Isadore, 151 Wn.2d at 302 .

2014In Isadore , we declined to adopt a materiality test that would consider how material an error was to a defendant’s decision to plead guilty. 151 Wn.2d at 302 . 9 However, a materiality inquiry, involving a hindsight review of defendant’s motivations, is distinct from consideration of actual and substantial prejudice, which looks to the practical effects of a sentence.

2010Co., 725 F.2d 179, 183 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 , 105 S.Ct. 233 , 83 L.Ed.2d 162 (1984)), rev'd, 985 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir.1993). ¶ 28 In order to avoid liability based on a material misrepresentation, the insurance company must demonstrate that the insured knowingly made the untrue representations and that, in making those representations, the applicant intended to deceive the company.

2009Co., 725 F.2d 179 , 183 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984))), rev’d, 985 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1993). ¶28 In order to avoid liability based on a material misrepresentation, the insurance company must demonstrate that the insured knowingly made the untrue representations and that, in making those representations, the applicant intended to deceive the company.

2009It is consistent with federal constitutional standards requiring the State to produce evidence “ ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 , 119 S. Ct. 1936 , 144 L.

2009It is consistent with federal constitutional standards requiring the State to produce evidence “ ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 , 119 S. Ct. 1936 , 144 L.

2000See Etheridge, 74 Wash.2d at 112 , 443 P.2d *631 536; Lodge, 42 Wash.App. at 392 , 711 P.2d 1078 .

2000See Etheridge, 74 Wash.2d at 112 , 443 P.2d *631 536; Lodge, 42 Wash.App. at 392 , 711 P.2d 1078 .

2000S.A.H. v. City of Seattle, 138 Wash.2d 265 , 979 P.2d 400 (1999), decided by this court last term, also utilized a materiality standard similar to that articulated by the Court of Appeals in this case.

2000S.A.H. v. City of Seattle, 138 Wn.2d 265 , 979 P.2d 400 (1999), decided by this court last term, also utilized a materiality standard similar to that articulated by the Court of Appeals in this case.

2000S.A.H. v. City of Seattle, 138 Wash.2d 265 , 979 P.2d 400 (1999), decided by this court last term, also utilized a materiality standard similar to that articulated by the Court of Appeals in this case.

2000S.A.H. v. City of Seattle, 138 Wn.2d 265 , 979 P.2d 400 (1999), decided by this court last term, also utilized a materiality standard similar to that articulated by the Court of Appeals in this case.

2024App. 2d 461 , 473, 532 P.3d 629 (2023), this court declined to apply the constitutional harmless error standard, stating, “It cannot be the case that any defendant who identifies an erroneous exclusion of relevant evidence that is harmless under the nonconstitutional standard can—by doing no more than asserting a constitutional claim—impose on the State the heightened burden of proving constitutional error.” Instead, the court applied a materiality standard to determine whether a violation of the right to present a defense occurred.

2023To determine materiality, it explained, “looking at the record as a whole, we inquire as to whether the evidence was of such an exculpatory nature that its exclusion affected the trial’s outcome.” Id. at 874 (citing Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 868 ). “[D]ue to the evidence’s marginally relevant nature, and the context of the record as a whole,” the court held “the excluded testimony was not constitutionally material.” Id.

2023To determine materiality, it explained, “looking at the record as a whole, we inquire as to whether the evidence was of such an exculpatory nature that its exclusion affected the trial’s outcome.” Id. at 874 (citing Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 868 ). “[D]ue to the evidence’s marginally relevant nature, and the context of the record as a whole,” the court held “the excluded testimony was not constitutionally material.” Id.

2023To determine materiality, it explained, “looking at the record as a whole, we inquire as to whether the evidence was of such an exculpatory nature that its exclusion affected the trial’s outcome.” Id. at 874 (citing Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 868 ). “[D]ue to the evidence’s marginally relevant nature, and the context of the record as a whole,” the court held “the excluded testimony was not constitutionally material.” Id.

2020Deming v. Jones is the most analogous to the case at hand in terms of determining whether a breach justifies forfeiture. 173 Wn.2d 644 , 24 P.2d 85 (1933).

2019In State v. Mullen, 171 Wn.2d 881 , 259 P.3d 158 (2011), our Supreme Court expressly recognized that the Brady materiality standard is different than the materiality standard set out in CrR 7.5(a)(3), k1. at 905-06, because Brady does not require a defendant to demonstrate that “the evidence if disclosed probably would have resulted in acquittal,” at 894 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 , 105 S. Ct. 3375 , 87 L.

2019Instead, when evaluating newly discovered evidence on a CrR 7.5(a)(3) motion, the evidence is material only “if it strongly indicates that the defendant did not commit the crime.” State v. Gassman, 160 Wn.

2019In State v. Mullen, 171 Wn.2d 881 , 259 P.3d 158 (2011), our Supreme Court expressly recognized that the Brady materiality standard is different than the materiality standard set out in CrR 7.5(a)(3), k1. at 905-06, because Brady does not require a defendant to demonstrate that “the evidence if disclosed probably would have resulted in acquittal,” at 894 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 , 105 S. Ct. 3375 , 87 L.

2017App. at 336 (comparing the materiality requirement for newly acquired evidence (CR 60(b)(3) and misconduct(CR 60(b)(4)). 14 39 Wn.

2017App. 828, 830-31 , 696 P.2d 28 (1985). 15 Taylor, 39 Wn.

2015But "a materiality inquiry, involving a hindsight review of defendant's motivations, is distinct from consideration of actual and substantial prejudice, which looks to the practical effects of a sentence." Stockwell, 179 Wn.2d at 602 .

2010Co., 725 F.2d 179, 183 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 , 105 S.Ct. 233 , 83 L.Ed.2d 162 (1984)), rev'd, 985 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir.1993). ¶ 28 In order to avoid liability based on a material misrepresentation, the insurance company must demonstrate that the insured knowingly made the untrue representations and that, in making those representations, the applicant intended to deceive the company.

2010Co., 725 F.2d 179, 183 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 , 105 S.Ct. 233 , 83 L.Ed.2d 162 (1984)), rev'd, 985 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir.1993). ¶ 28 In order to avoid liability based on a material misrepresentation, the insurance company must demonstrate that the insured knowingly made the untrue representations and that, in making those representations, the applicant intended to deceive the company.

2009This materiality standard has been expressed in many states as requiring the petitioner to show "`a reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing.'" Id. (quoting as illustrative Ariz.Rev.

2009It is consistent with federal constitutional standards requiring the State to produce evidence "`if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) and discussing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). ¶ 53 Unfortunately, the majority concludes that our legislature intended a higher standard f

2009It is consistent with federal constitutional standards requiring the State to produce evidence "`if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) and discussing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). ¶ 53 Unfortunately, the majority concludes that our legislature intended a higher standard f