materiality standard in California

2015(People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 279 .) The prosecution’s failure to preserve evidence also may violate a defendant’s due process rights, though “[t]he duty to retain, rather than simply disclose, potentially exculpatory evidence is somewhat different.” (People v. Alvarez (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 761, 771 .) The affirmative duty to retain or preserve evidence is “limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.” (Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 488 .) To meet this materiality standard, “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that

1990In People v. Tierce (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 256, 263 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 325 ], this court held that section 28, subdivision (d) required that the due process and materiality issues in Hitch be decided by application of federal law, in particular, the materiality test in California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479 .

2025(Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 23 ; see also Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 406 [“it is imperative that the trial court determine specifically what the proffered evidence is offered to prove, so that the probative value of the evidence can be evaluated for that purpose”].) To satisfy the materiality requirement, the fact sought to be proved “ ‘must be either an ultimate fact or an intermediate fact from which such ultimate fact may be inferred.’ ” (People v. Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939 , 958 (Clark); see also Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 315, fn. 13 [“Both the identity of the perpe

2025(Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 23 ; see also Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 406 [“it is imperative that the trial court determine specifically what the proffered evidence is offered to prove, so that the probative value of the evidence can be evaluated for that purpose”].) To satisfy the materiality requirement, the fact sought to be proved “ ‘must be either an ultimate fact or an intermediate fact from which such ultimate fact may be inferred.’ ” (People v. Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939 , 958 (Clark); see also Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 315, fn. 13 [“Both the identity of the perpe

2024(E.g., Turner v. U.S. (2017) 582 U.S. 313, 324 (Turner); Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 433-434 (Kyles).) Although Wearry different standard of materiality. ( Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at pp. 682-683.) Responding to the Government’s suggestion “that a materiality standard more favorable to the defendant reasonably might be adopted in specific request cases,” Bagley agreed that “an incomplete response to a specific request not only deprives the defense of certain evidence, but also has the effect of representing to the defense that the evidence does not exist,” which might cause the defens

2002(People v. Superior Court (Barrett), supra, 80 Cal. App.4th at pp. 1317-1318, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 264 .) [13] Kyles notes, however, that "the prosecution, which alone can know what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of `reasonable probability' is reached." (Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 437 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , italics added.) In Kyles , a state argued that the materiality standard should be modified because it "`makes it difficult ... to know' from the `perspective [of the pro

2008This is so because, as our Supreme Court noted in City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 , 52 P.3d 129 ], under Ritchie a defendant cannot "`require the trial court to search through [privileged *64 documents] without first establishing a basis for his claim that [they] contain material evidence' [citation], that is, evidence that could determine the trial's outcome, thus satisfying the materiality standard of Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83 ." ( City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 15 , quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.

2008This is so because, as our Supreme Court noted in City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 , 52 P.3d 129 ], under Ritchie a defendant cannot "`require the trial court to search through [privileged *64 documents] without first establishing a basis for his claim that [they] contain material evidence' [citation], that is, evidence that could determine the trial's outcome, thus satisfying the materiality standard of Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83 ." ( City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 15 , quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.

2022Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) The function of this requirement is to ‘exclude[ ] requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges.’ (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1021 [(Warrick)].) If the movant shows that the request is ‘relevant to the pending charges, and explains how, the materiality requirement will be met.’ [Citations.] If information is ‘material’ within the meaning of Brady, it is necessarily material ‘to the subject matter involved in’ a criminal prosecution. [Citations.]” (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (20

2022Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) The function of this requirement is to ‘exclude[ ] requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges.’ (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1021 [(Warrick)].) If the movant shows that the request is ‘relevant to the pending charges, and explains how, the materiality requirement will be met.’ [Citations.] If information is ‘material’ within the meaning of Brady, it is necessarily material ‘to the subject matter involved in’ a criminal prosecution. [Citations.]” (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (20

2025The materiality standard for a Napue claim requires reversal of a conviction if “there is any ‘“reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.”’ [Citations.] This standard is equivalent to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard for determining whether constitutional error is prejudicial. [Citations.] ‘A strict standard is appropriate because, as the Supreme Court has explained, false testimony cases involve not only “prosecutorial misconduct,” but also “a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.”’ [Citations.] ‘[A] Na

2001The Supreme Court has noted that Brady and its progeny do not create a general constitutional right to discovery. ( Weatherford v. Bursey (1977) 429 U.S. 545, 559 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 ["There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one"]; see United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 113, fn. 20 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 [stating that the materiality standard turns on the importance of the undisclosed evidence to the issues of guilt and punishment, not the impact on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial].) Although the Supreme Cou

2025Accordingly, the burden imposed by the requirement ‘is not 12 high.’ ” (ALADS, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 42 ; accord, Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 720 .) To show “good cause,” the movant must demonstrate (1) “ ‘the materiality’ of the information sought ‘to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation,’ ” and (2) “ ‘a “reasonable belief” that the agency has the type of information sought.’ ” (ALADS, at pp. 41-42; accord, Johnson, at p. 720.) If the movant “shows that the request is relevant to the pending charges, and explains how, the materiality requirement will be met.” (Johnson,

2025Accordingly, the burden imposed by the requirement ‘is not 12 high.’ ” (ALADS, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 42 ; accord, Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 720 .) To show “good cause,” the movant must demonstrate (1) “ ‘the materiality’ of the information sought ‘to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation,’ ” and (2) “ ‘a “reasonable belief” that the agency has the type of information sought.’ ” (ALADS, at pp. 41-42; accord, Johnson, at p. 720.) If the movant “shows that the request is relevant to the pending charges, and explains how, the materiality requirement will be met.” (Johnson,

2023We cannot discern whether the trial court exercised its discretion about information arising from investigations (see Haggerty, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1090 [concluding some information from internal affairs report discoverable]; see also Rezek v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 633, 643 [discussing when officer’s privacy interests are “implacated less”]; but see Galindo v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th1, 12 [discussing first stage of disclosure]), that could potentially shed light relevant to this case (see Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1048-1049 [“the mat

2019Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) The function of this requirement is to “exclude[] requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges.” (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1021 .) If the movant shows that the request is “relevant to the pending charges, and explains how, the materiality requirement will be met.” (Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 721 ; see also Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1048-1049 [“The materiality standard is met if evidence of prior complaints is admissible or may lead to admissible evidence”].) If information is “

2026(See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds (8th Cir. 2021) 8 F.4th 781, 787 (Animal Legal Defense Fund) [applying Alvarez in invalidating a statute prohibiting falsehoods on an employment application and noting that “the absence of a materiality requirement” distinguished the statute from “permissible prohibitions on fraud, perjury, and lying to government officials”].) Subdivision (a)(2)’s admonition provision uses entirely different — and arguably erroneous — language to explain the 45 LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. scope of sub

2026Code, §§ 3300–3313 [the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act]; § 832.5, subd. (c) [any complaints that are found to be frivolous, unfounded, or exonerated are not maintained in the officer’s personnel file].) Alternatively, it might “more finely tailor[]” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 738 , conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) the scope of subdivision (a)(1)’s criminal provision by, among other possibilities, “insist[ing] upon a showing that the false statement caused specific harm” (Alvarez, at p. 738, conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) or including a materiality requirement (see Animal Legal D

2025(Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 23 ; see also Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 406 [“it is imperative that the trial court determine specifically what the proffered evidence is offered to prove, so that the probative value of the evidence can be evaluated for that purpose”].) To satisfy the materiality requirement, the fact sought to be proved “ ‘must be either an ultimate fact or an intermediate fact from which such ultimate fact may be inferred.’ ” (People v. Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939 , 958 (Clark); see also Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 315, fn. 13 [“Both the identity of the perpe

2025(Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 23 ; see also Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 406 [“it is imperative that the trial court determine specifically what the proffered evidence is offered to prove, so that the probative value of the evidence can be evaluated for that purpose”].) To satisfy the materiality requirement, the fact sought to be proved “ ‘must be either an ultimate fact or an intermediate fact from which such ultimate fact may be inferred.’ ” (People v. Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939 , 958 (Clark); see also Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 315, fn. 13 [“Both the identity of the perpe

2016(Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1048-1049 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 226 , 183 P.3d 1199 ] [“the materiality standard [of Evidence Code section 1043] is met if evidence of prior complaints is admissible or may lead to admissible evidence”]; Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1039; cf. People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 712 [ 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 377 P.3d 847 ] [a criminal defendant seeking an in camera hearing for review and disclosure of peace officer personnel records must make a threshold showing of materiality to the pending litigation, a much lesser showin

2016(Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1048-1049 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 226 , 183 P.3d 1199 ] [“the materiality standard [of Evidence Code section 1043] is met if evidence of prior complaints is admissible or may lead to admissible evidence”]; Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1039; cf. People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 712 [ 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 377 P.3d 847 ] [a criminal defendant seeking an in camera hearing for review and disclosure of peace officer personnel records must make a threshold showing of materiality to the pending litigation, a much lesser showin

2010In both situations, the right to a fair trial is equally denied.” (Brown, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 881 .) And in Brandon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 8 , the California Supreme Court stated that the materiality standard of Brady does not vary based upon when a Brady claim is raised: “Although Brady disclosure issues may arise ‘in advance of,’ ‘during,’ or ‘after trial’ [citation], the test is always the same. [Citation.] Brady materiality is a ‘constitutional standard’ required to ensure that nondisclosure will not ‘result in the denial of defendant’s [due process] right to a fair trial.’ [Citati

2008Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3); see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 536-537 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ] ( Pitchess ).) The materiality standard is met if evidence of prior complaints is admissible or may lead to *1049 admissible evidence. ( People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 683 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 ].) In contrast to this low threshold of Pitchess materiality is the showing required of a defendant who contends that the prosecution withheld evidence that was both favorable to the defendant and material either on the issue of guilt or punishment. ( Brady v

2008Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3); see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 536-537 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ] ( Pitchess ).) The materiality standard is met if evidence of prior complaints is admissible or may lead to *1049 admissible evidence. ( People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 683 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 ].) In contrast to this low threshold of Pitchess materiality is the showing required of a defendant who contends that the prosecution withheld evidence that was both favorable to the defendant and material either on the issue of guilt or punishment. ( Brady v

2008Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3); see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 536-537 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ] ( Pitchess ).) The materiality standard is met if evidence of prior complaints is admissible or may lead to *1049 admissible evidence. ( People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 683 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 ].) In contrast to this low threshold of Pitchess materiality is the showing required of a defendant who contends that the prosecution withheld evidence that was both favorable to the defendant and material either on the issue of guilt or punishment. ( Brady v

2026Code, §§ 3300–3313 [the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act]; § 832.5, subd. (c) [any complaints that are found to be frivolous, unfounded, or exonerated are not maintained in the officer’s personnel file].) Alternatively, it might “more finely tailor[]” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 738 , conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) the scope of subdivision (a)(1)’s criminal provision by, among other possibilities, “insist[ing] upon a showing that the false statement caused specific harm” (Alvarez, at p. 738, conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) or including a materiality requirement (see Animal Legal D

2025Code, §§ 3300–3313 [the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act]; § 832.5, subd. (c) [any complaints that are found to be frivolous, unfounded, or exonerated are not maintained in the officer’s personnel file].) Alternatively, it might “more finely tailor[]” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 738 , conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) the scope of subdivision (a)(1)’s criminal provision by, among other possibilities, “insist[ing] upon a showing that the false statement caused specific harm” (Alvarez, at p. 738, conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) or including a materiality requirement (see Animal Legal D

2015(City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83 ; see also Abatti v. Superior Court, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 51 [counsel’s declaration on information and belief is sufficient to state facts to satisfy the materiality requirement for a Pitchess motion].) 8 In light of our reversal based on pretrial abuse of discretion, we do not address the parties’ remaining arguments regarding whether the court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s various posttrial motions. 20.

2002Applying the materiality standard of section 1043 (informed by the principles set forth in Pitchess), we held that the defendant had demonstrated good cause for the information requested. [Citation.] • Counsel’s declaration asserted that the confession had been coerced. [Citation.] Discovery might lead to admissible evidence that the interrogating officers had a ‘habit or custom’ of obtaining confessions by use of excessive force. [Citations.] Hence, we concluded that ‘counsel’s allegations sufficiently “set forth the materiality” of the requested information. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Santa

2025Ultimately, the materiality inquiry is whether “ ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’ ” (Strickler, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 290 .) Because all the evidence pertaining to the inmate was ultimately disclosed during trial and presented to the jury, we see no basis to conclude 20 that the failure to disclose it any earlier put the case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.

2024(Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1043 .) Ultimately, the materiality inquiry is whether “ ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’ ” (Strickler, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 290 .) Even considering the late disclosed evidence as a whole, as we must, Welch has not met his burden.

2019(See, e.g., People v. Morrison (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1551 , 1555, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 502 [submission of false urine sample to deceive probation officer]; People v. Bamberg , supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 629 , 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 139 [staged photographs of intersection prepared to deceive traffic judge]; Pereira, supra , 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1068-1069, 255 Cal.Rptr. 285 [altered loan document sent to FPPC]; People v. Bhasin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 461 , 468-470, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 708 [preparing and offering false document at trial].) And at least one court, construing a very similar statute, expressly r

2019Indeed, the Bamberg court does not mention the word “materiality” in the opinion and only uses the word “material” to describe the matter presented as false, as in the purpose of section 134 “is ‘to prevent the fraudulent introduction of material in a proceeding . . . .’ ” (Bamberg, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 629 , italics added.) 78 and relevant case law, and the absence of any legislative indication of a materiality requirement.

2008Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3); see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 536-537 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ] ( Pitchess ).) The materiality standard is met if evidence of prior complaints is admissible or may lead to *1049 admissible evidence. ( People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 683 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 ].) In contrast to this low threshold of Pitchess materiality is the showing required of a defendant who contends that the prosecution withheld evidence that was both favorable to the defendant and material either on the issue of guilt or punishment. ( Brady v

2008Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3); see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 536-537 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ] ( Pitchess ).) The materiality standard is met if evidence of prior complaints is admissible or may lead to *1049 admissible evidence. ( People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 683 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 ].) In contrast to this low threshold of Pitchess materiality is the showing required of a defendant who contends that the prosecution withheld evidence that was both favorable to the defendant and material either on the issue of guilt or punishment. ( Brady v

2025(See Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1035, 1049 [declining to remand for consideration of whether the prosecution had suppressed the evidence because Supreme Court found evidence allegedly suppressed was not material].) 30 different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’” (Strickler, at p. 290.) In performing the materiality inquiry, “[w]e must examine the trial record, ‘evaluat[e]’ the withheld evidence ‘in the context of the entire record,’ [citation], and determine in light of that examination whether ‘there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the

2024(E.g., Turner v. U.S. (2017) 582 U.S. 313, 324 (Turner); Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 433-434 (Kyles).) Although Wearry different standard of materiality. ( Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at pp. 682-683.) Responding to the Government’s suggestion “that a materiality standard more favorable to the defendant reasonably might be adopted in specific request cases,” Bagley agreed that “an incomplete response to a specific request not only deprives the defense of certain evidence, but also has the effect of representing to the defense that the evidence does not exist,” which might cause the defens

2024(Agurs, at p. 104.) Bagley discussed the three situations described in Agurs and the Court’s subsequent reformulation of “the Agurs standard for the materiality of undisclosed evidence” in cases outside the Brady context and held that a single materiality test is “sufficiently flexible to cover the ‘no request,’ ‘general request,’ and ‘specific request’ cases of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused.” ( Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at pp. 681, 682.) Contrary to the distinctions drawn in Agurs, in all three of these situations the evidence is material only if there is a

2024(E.g., Turner v. U.S. (2017) 582 U.S. 313, 324 (Turner); Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 433-434 (Kyles).) Although Wearry different standard of materiality. ( Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at pp. 682-683.) Responding to the Government’s suggestion “that a materiality standard more favorable to the defendant reasonably might be adopted in specific request cases,” Bagley agreed that “an incomplete response to a specific request not only deprives the defense of certain evidence, but also has the effect of representing to the defense that the evidence does not exist,” which might cause the defens

1990My review of the totality of facts convinces me that removal of the materiality requirement from the jury's determination in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 21 [ 17 L.Ed.2d at p. 709 ].) Whatever refined definition of "materiality" we apply here, under these facts, my conclusion would remain the same.

1990My review of the totality of facts convinces me that removal of the materiality requirement from the jury's determination in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 21 [ 17 L.Ed.2d at p. 709 ].) Whatever refined definition of "materiality" we apply here, under these facts, my conclusion would remain the same.